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Abstract
This thesis argues that we should consider extended modal realism
as a new player in the debate about non-existence. The primary aim
is to show that extended modal realism is a viable theory when it
comes to solving problems of non-existence. At times I will argue
that extended modal realism has advantages over Lewisian modal
realism when it comes to examining the problems of non-existence,
not only in the case of problems relating to thought but also problems
concerning truth as well. However, I do not intend for the proposed
advantages of extended modal realism to be presented as knockdown
arguments against other strategies.
Not only do I argue that extended modal realism is viable when it
comes to solving these problems, but I also make adjustments and
additions to the theory that supports the conclusion of this thesis,
and I argue that these are improvements to the modal realist theory.
I include arguments for a new theory of existence that removes the
need for the extended modal realist to rely on set-theoretic notations
to understand existence, which I consider problematic. I argue for
the revival of the Lewis-Rosen proposal for truth-making and a se-
mantic instrumentalist theory of thought, both of which naturally
i
accompany extended modal realism. Throughout this thesis, I will
comment on the proposals and strategies of other authors, and some
of these comments will be critical. At this very early stage, I want
to clarify that this thesis’s success does not rest on showing that
all other competitor theories fail. I only include critical comments
to situate extended modal realism within the landscape of viable
positions that are available for one to occupy.
Supervisors: Sara Uckelman and Stephen Mumford
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Before I begin this thesis it would be helpful to have some background in-
formation. Problems concerning non-existence have been present in philo-
sophical discussion for a great many years. It was Parmenides who stated
“Thou canst not know what is not—that is impossible—nor utter it; for it
is the same thing that can be thought and that can be...The thing that can
be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same
thing; for you cannot find thought without something that is, as which it
is uttered”(Russell, 2013, 49). Russell clarifies this comment from Parmen-
ides, stating “The essence of this argument is: When you think, you think
of something; when you use a name, it must be the name of something.
Therefore both thought and language require objects outside themselves”
(Russell, 2013, 49). But what happens when the objects of language or of
thought are standardly thought to be non-existent objects. The question of
how we think and talk about things which do not exist has become known
as the problem of non-existence. When it comes to non-existent objects, the
1
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standard view in mainstream, (Anglo-American) philosophy is that no such
objects exist (Parsons, 1981, 1). We might put this view in positive terms:
“everything that there is exists”. This, combined with an attachment to
quantification as a tool to range over what there is, causes problems. For
it seems that there is then a class of objects which do not exist and are not
captured by the standard use of quantification; therefore, the problem arises
about how we can say true things about these kinds of objects. Parsons
(1981, 1), expressing a similar concern, calls this dilemma the “Russellian
Rut” on the grounds that he thinks it stems from Russell.1 It is a view that
we are entrenched in, which is pervasive and dominant; however, we must
admit that recently there have been developments away from this style of
thinking, principally with Crane (2013) who has been referred to as a “weak
Meinongian” by Casati and Fujikawa (2016). In conversation, Crane has
clarified his position: to be a quasi or weak Meinongian is to accept that
there are things that do not exist without accepting the characterisation
postulate. Crane in our exchange admits that maybe we should not call
this Meinongian unless all we mean by Meinongian is that there are things
which do not exist. There is also the point that the force of Crane’s solution
comes with the non-relational understanding of intentionality rather than
any kind of vast metaphysical moves. Therefore, we may doubt how far
Crane’s development actually gets us out of the rut, and perhaps we might
understand Crane as offering a more sensible and less dogmatic way to op-
erate within the rut. No matter how we understand Crane, there have been




significant shifts in the metaphysics of non-existence with the work of Rout-
ley (1980); Parsons (1981); Zalta (1988); Priest (2016); Berto (2017, 2018).
There has been a renewed attention on questions about non-existence and I
think in no small part due to the new interest in impossible worlds, mainly
due to the work of Priest, Berto and Jago. Priest in particular takes his
view as one which pushes back against an orthodoxy that takes the view
that the particular quantifier is “existentially loaded”, and is so ingrained
in modern philosophical logic that to reject this association is enough to
receive an incredulous stare. Priest (2016, 323) cites the following passage
from Lycan (1979, 290, italics original) in support of his assessment:
I have to take my place amongst those who find relentlessly (i.e.,
genuinely or primitively) Meinongian quantification simply un-
intelligible. However, in saying this, I am not using the term
“unintelligible” in its sneering post-Wittgensteinian sense. So
far as I am able to introspect, I am not expressing any tenden-
tious philosophical qualm. (For this reason, my use of the term
may be irrevocably misleading.) I mean that I really cannot
understand relentlessly Meinongian quantification at all; to me
it is literally gibberish or mere noise.
I will say more about the notion of existence and its relation to the exist-
ential quantifier in Chapter 7. For now I wish to point out that the picture
has been set up as one between those who have an orthodoxy theory of
existence and those who do not. However, there is another option which
3
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is little explored, often mentioned in the literature, and features heavily in
the references and bibliographies of works concerning non-existence. That
is to go the way of the modal realist (Lewis, 1986). On The Plurality of
Worlds and many of Lewis’s other works are often seen in the references
of material about non-existence, but a modal realist solution to the prob-
lems of non-existence is rarely considered in full seriousness. Part of this
is because Lewisian modal realism, which is the most well-known variety
of modal realism does not seem that well equipped to deal with problems
of non-existence. Even though an ontology that admits possibilia might at
first seem appealing, the fact that Lewisian worlds are completely isolated
creates problems down the line. Because Lewis’s worlds are completely isol-
ated from any other worlds, any theory of thought which involves causal
relations rules out modal realism. What is more, Lewisian modal realism
completely rejects impossibilia and thus many typical non-existent objects
we might want to explain with Lewisian modal realism we cannot in the
seemingly alluring straightforward way.
There are also some potential meta-reasons as to why modal realism does
not seem to fit neatly into the picture as I have presented it above. It is
broadly in the Russell/Quine tradition and thus does not make the move of
Priest by noting an alternative reading for “∃”, but Lewisian modal realism
does seem to allow for a greater domain of existent objects than many
philosophers would be happy with and thus is awkwardly positioned in
the non-existence literature. This puts people in an uncomfortable position
where the theory of quantification remains traditional but the metaphysical
4
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commitments are just ones that people are unhappy with; even Priest (2016,
14) says, “by being a modal realist, and so taking every object to exist. But
this gives us an extremely bloated ontology.” In this thesis, I offer a new
application for a relatively new variety of modal realism, extended modal
realism (Yagisawa, 2010).
In this thesis, I argue that extended modal realism is a viable solution
to problems of non-existence and in some places succeeds in places where
Lewisian modal realism is limited. First, extended modal realism is able to
make sense of the noneist’s valuable comments about existential quantific-
ation, but it does not need to completely revoke the traditional position.
What is more, extended modal realism is also able to accommodate the-
ories of thought which involve causal relations better than Lewisian modal
realism can. However, merely because extended modal realism is successful
in some areas where Lewisian modal realism is limited this is not intended
to be presented as knockdown objections to Lewisian modal realism. These
critical comments are merely intended to show that in certain circumstances
extended modal realism could be advantageous to a Lewisian system.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 I detail what exten-
ded modal realism is. In Chapter 3 I introduce the general issues created
by non-existent objects and the particular problems I will be focusing on
in this thesis. In Chapter 4 I respond to claims made by Crane (2012), for
it seems that there are significant issues in how Crane sets up the problem.
In Chapter 5 I detail and introduce the concept of intentionality and its
related concepts. I highlight some issues that come with how to under-
5
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stand these concepts. Then in Chapter 6 I introduce some of the other
ways that the problem of non-existence has been approached in some of
the most recent and relevant literature. In Chapter 7 I survey some of the
positions on how philosophers understand existence, then in 8 I provide my
theory of existence and how it develops the relational existence of Yagisawa.
Chapter 9 provides a solution to the problem about true negative existen-
tial statements, in this chapter I also show how extended modal realism can
develop the Lewis–Rosen proposal. Chapter 10 contains replies to potential
objections. Chapter 11 provides the details of how extended modal realism
is a viable solution to the problem of non-existence and avoids the objec-
tions raised by Kriegel (2007); this chapter has been published in Thomas
(2019). Chapter 12 contains replies to some objections concerning modal
realism and singular thought showing that it is not only a metaphysics that
is important when it comes to problems of non-existence, but also a comple-
mentary theory of thought needs to be involved as well, which I provide in
this chapter. This thesis is broadly divided into four parts. The first part,
up to and including Chapter 7, details much of the work that has gone on
before and situates this thesis within the literature. The latter parts (start-
ing from Chapter 8 onwards) are comprised of a series of related standalone
papers. Finally, in Chapter 13 I summarise what has been achieved in this




Before I start the main part of the thesis, I will say a bit about the method-
ology for this project. This thesis aims to establish extended modal realism
as a viable player in debates about non-existence. This thesis will highlight
some of the advantages and solutions that extended modal realism brings
to the table. However, when reading this thesis, one should not consider
extended modal realism to be a panacea. Extended modal realism has its
own commitments and draws backs. That said, I will be focusing on point-
ing out the benefits it can bring. In true Lewisian fashion, the aim is to
establish extended modal realism as a “serviceable” theory in relation to
questions of non-existence. For this thesis to be successful, I need not show
that other relevant theories are false.
Another methodological point is that throughout this thesis, I refer to and
comment on other viable and well-known philosophical views in the area of
non-existence. Critical comments about these views are not intended to be
knock-down objections, and I take it that there are many viable options to
answer questions about non-existence. These critical comments are merely
included to show that there are areas where extended modal realism might
offer an advantage compared to existing theories.
7
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In this chapter, I outline the details of the position known as extended modal
realism. Extended modal realism is a development on the Lewisian modal
realist project. In this thesis, I argue that extended modal realism has a
place to be treated as a solution to the problem of non-existence. In this
chapter, I detail extended modal realism and explain what I take possible
and impossible worlds to be. I also highlight some reasons as to why we
1This title was selected in respect to Yagisawa’s book Worlds and Individuals, Pos-
sible and Otherwise, which had a significant impact on my philosophical thoughts in
general and on this thesis in particular.
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might want to extend the Lewisian project to also include impossible worlds
as well as possible worlds.
Extended modal realism is a variety of modal realism which claims that
there are possible worlds and impossible worlds. In 1986 Lewis provided
us with the metaphysical framework for a philosophers’ paradise. However,
his vision of paradise was not as expansive as it could have been. The
paradise Lewis offered us neglected to include impossible worlds. In the
discussion that follows, I present a modal realist metaphysics which includes
both possible and impossible worlds; this is truly a philosophers’ paradise.
Taking my cue from Lewis’s methodology, I do not set out with the aim
to establish extended modal realism as a theory superior to all rivalling
theories. What I can offer is a theory with a great deal of explanatory
power that is “serviceable”. The extended modal realism, as presented here,
is generally that as presented to us by Yagisawa (2010). However, there is
an important difference between Yagisawa and myself. The main difference
is that we disagree about what it takes to exist, which leads to a distinctive
division between our theories. I explain this difference in Chapter 8. I
argue that my theory of existence is not only an improvement on Yagisawa’s
theory but also has advantages for discussion concerning non-existence.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §2.2 I introduce what modal
realism is as articulated by David Lewis, since some readers might be unfa-
miliar with Lewis’s theory. In §2.3 I signal some reasons as to why we might
want to expand on the Lewisian framework as articulated by Kiourti (2019).
Finally, I will detail extended modal realism (Yagisawa, 1988, 2010).
10
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2.2 Lewis’s Modal Realism
Lewis’s modal realism is the view that there are other worlds just as real
as ours. He refers to these other worlds as “possible worlds”. They are spa-
tiotemporally isolated wholes. Nolan (2015, 54) says that “Every possible
description of a world matches up to a real, concrete universe out there.”
Lewis (1986, 2) states that there are worlds which are other ways. This is
the thesis he refers to as modal realism. For Lewis, our world is just one
among many. The worlds he speaks of are varied. There are enough worlds
that absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some
world is. Lewis’s worlds are comprised of possibilia (possible parts). Just
as there is variance among worlds, there is variance among these parts of
the worlds. Lewis (1986, 2) says, “There are ever so many ways that a part
of a world could be: and so many and so varied are the other worlds that
absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that
some part of some world is.” For Lewis, his possible worlds are all of one
kind. There is a difference in kind between the things that are parts of
worlds, but this difference is no more different than the difference in kind
that occurs between things that occupy the same world, for example the
difference between chairs and cats.
When it comes to creation, Lewis is clear that his worlds are not created,
though he does allow that “It may happen that one part of a world makes
other parts, as we do; and as other-worldly gods and demiurges do on
a grander scale”(Lewis, 1986, 3). For Lewis, the plenitude of worlds are
11
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causally isolated.
nothing outside a world ever makes a world; and nothing inside
makes the whole of a world, for that would be an impossible
kind of self causation. We make languages and concepts and
descriptions and imaginary representations that apply to worlds.
We make stipulations that select some worlds rather than others
for our attention. Some of us even make assertions to the effect
that other worlds exist. But none of these things we make are
worlds themselves.
(Lewis, 1986, 3)
This is the sketch of modal realism, but why might a philosopher be attrac-
ted to this system? Lewis (1986, 3) provides some reasons, although his
reasons are minimal and nuanced. Chiefly he says we ought to believe in a
plurality of worlds because the hypothesis is “serviceable”. Lewis also cites
the impressive record that possible worlds and possibilia have had on influ-
encing our analysis of necessity as truth at all possible worlds (Lewis, 1973).
But really the choice to go for modal realism comes down to a trade-off,
and for some maybe, the price to pay for modal realism is too high. Lewis
states:
If we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings,
the most straightforward way to gain one’s title to them is to
accept such talk as the literal truth. It is my view that the
12
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price is right, is less spectacularly so than in the mathematical
parallel. The benefits are worth their ontological cost. Modal
realism is fruitful; that gives us good reason to believe it is true.
(Lewis, 1986, 4)
2.3 Extending the Lewisian Project
Since Lewisian modal realism, there have been various uses and develop-
ments of the possible worlds framework to include impossible worlds even
though Lewis himself disapproves of such entities.
As far as I can tell, it was Naylor (1986) who originally suggested the ex-
tension of modal realism to include impossible worlds. Naylor’s argument
functions by highlighting that if we accept Lewis’s argument for possible
worlds, then we also ought to accept impossible worlds via the same argu-
ment.
Lewis writes:
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we
happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is
uncontroversially true that things might have been otherwise
than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have
been different in countless ways. But what does this mean?
Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways
things could have been beside the way that they actually are.
13
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On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification.
It says that there exist many entities of a certain description
to wit, ‘ways things could have been’. I believe that things
could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible
paraphrase of what I believe; taking the paraphrase of its face
value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities which might
be called “ways things could have been”. I prefer to call them
possible worlds. (Lewis, 1973, [84)
Naylor argues that if we are happy to accept Lewis’s short argument for
possible worlds, then we should accept the same argument for impossible
worlds.
Naylor writes:
It is also uncontroversially true that some things might not have
been otherwise than they are. The chair that is in fact blue could
not have been both blue and red in the same respect and at the
same time. I believe, and so do you, that things could not have
been different in countless ways. But ordinary language permits
the paraphrase: there are many ways things could not have been
besides the way that they actually are. On the face of it, this
sentence is also an existential quantification. It says that there
exist many entities of a certain description, viz., “ways things
could not have been.” I believe permissible paraphrases of what
I believe. Taking the paraphrase at face value, I therefore believe
14
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in the existence of entities which might be called “ways things
could not have been”. I call them impossible worlds. (Naylor,
1986, 28–29)
Whether or not Naylor is endorsing modal realism or the introduction of
impossible worlds is beside the point. There are philosophers, like me, who
take Lewis’s original argument for possible worlds seriously and are happy
to follow the Naylor’s argument for the extension of Lewis’s paradise to
include impossible worlds.
Before I detail the specifics of extended modal realism, I will say a little
bit about what exactly impossible worlds are and why we might decide to
include possible worlds in our ontology.
2.4 Impossible Worlds
2.4.1 Why Impossible Worlds?
I cannot employ them merely to solve the problem of non-existence so we
an need independent reasons for their introduction. Kiourti (2019) high-
lights the motivations for impossible worlds. The first reason for the in-
troduction of impossible worlds that Kiourti highlights is the “granularity
problem”. Possible worlds are useful when it comes to individuating distinct
propositions via distinct sets of possible worlds. However, the analysis is
too coarse-grained. Kiourti highlights that an account needs to be more
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fine-grained to distinguish all intuitively distinct thought content. Kiourti
provides the following example:
Mathematicians have tried to square the circle for centuries be-
fore it was proven impossible. In doing so they entertained an
impossible proposition, which, in turn, is identified with the null
set of worlds (for it is true at no possible world). But then, to
entertain the idea of squaring the circle is to entertain each and
every impossible proposition—“1+1=3”, “red is green”, “the
law of excluded middle is false”, “Tim (the time traveller) is
dead and not dead” and so on, also identified with the null set.
But, surely these are distinct thoughts for one can entertain, be-
lieve or desire one without thereby also entertaining, believing
or desiring every other. The situation is similar when it comes
to necessary propositions, usually identified with the set of all
worlds. One can presumably know that one plus one equals two
but not thereby know that Hesperus is Phosphorus or that if all
men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
Lo and behold, venturing into impossible worlds (a.k.a. worlds
that verify some impossibilities and falsify some necessities) al-
lows us to differentiate intuitively distinct propositions across
the board.(Kiourti, 2019, 2)
The next motivation that Kiourti highlights is that they allow for us to
build a semantics for counter-possible conditions, one which does not leave
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them all vacuously true. According to Lewis–Stalnaker semantics for coun-
terfactual states, a counterfactual is true just when all worlds closest to our
world satisfy the antecedent also satisfies the consequent. Kiourti says:
without impossible worlds, the same treatment does not extend
to counterpossibles, since antecedents of such conditionals are
false at all worlds, hence satisfy these truth conditions trivially.
Now, if my table suddenly sprouted wings and flew away I would
(presumably) sit up and take notice. Ditto if my table suddenly
turned into a square circle. By the same token, it’s false that
if my table suddenly sprouted wings I wouldn’t bat an eyelid;
and false that if my table suddenly turned into a square circle
I wouldn’t be surprised. But the latter proposition, no matter
how exotic, comes out true on the standard account. (Kiourti,
2019, 2)
The final way in which Kiourti motivates impossible worlds is by high-
lighting that “impossible propositions and counterpossible reasoning strikes
deeply at philosophical theorising” (Kiourti, 2019, 2). Kiourti goes on to
say:
Philosophers (and mathematicians) seem to entertain impossib-
ilities rather often, as Daniel Nolan (1997: 544–546) points out,
and frequently reason from such hypotheses in logic and meta-
physics. We regularly evaluate mutually exclusive metaphysical
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theories or logical systems, for instance, to assess their con-
sequences. But whilst these are epistemically possible, if one
such theory is true, then presumably, it is neccessarily true and
hence its rivals necessarily false, i.e. impossible. Still, the con-
tent of these theories is not trivial. Nor is any odd thing true
under such hypotheses. It seems unlikely that two philosoph-
ers may strongly disagree about, say, the behaviour of negation
or about the nature of properties, yet that everything at least
one of them says is trivially true. A more reasonable interpret-
ation would be to say that philosophers, mathematicians, logi-
cians and the like are capable of having meaningful arguments
about such matters, and making sometimes true and sometimes
false statements. As Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno put it:
“[p]erhaps much of philosophy is vacuous, uninformative and
fallacious. But if it is, it is not for systematic misuse of the
counterfactual”(Brogaard and Salerno 2013: 664). By contrast,
impossible worlds allow for contentful philosophical discussions,
and elegantly extend the standard treatment of counterfactuals
to cover subjunctives of all kinds.(Kiourti, 2019, 2–3)
2.4.2 What Are Impossible Worlds?
Those who endorse impossible worlds tend to think that whatever their
metaphysics for possible worlds is shared by impossible worlds. Priest ex-
presses this sentiment in the following way.
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As far as I can see, any of the main theories concerning the
nature of possible worlds can be applied equally to impossible
worlds: they are existent nonactual entities; they are nonexist-
ent objects; they are constructions out of properties and other
universals; they are just certain sets of sentences... There is, as
far as I can see no cogent (in particular, non-question-begging)
reason to suppose there is an ontological difference between
merely possible and impossible worlds. (Priest, 1997, 580–581)
There are a number of ways of understanding possible worlds which Berto
and Jago (2019, 31–32) catalogue informatively.
IMPOSSIBLE WAYS: One way to understand impossible worlds is as im-
possible ways. Berto and Jago (2019, 31) say we might understand im-
possible worlds as similar to possible worlds. Along the lines of “If possible
worlds are ways things could be, then non-normal or impossible worlds are
ways things could not be.” The thought behind this conception of impossible
worlds is that everything is possible. However, there are some things which
cannot happen. The ways the world couldn’t be are impossible worlds.
Yagisawa (1988) thinks of impossible worlds like this.
LOGIC VIOLATORS: We might also understand impossible worlds as
worlds where the laws of logic fail. Of course, this conception depends
on what we take the laws of logic to be. Berto and Jago (2019, 31), re-
ferring to Priest (2008) characterise this view in the following way: “Given
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some logic L, an impossible world with respect to the L-laws is one in which
some of those laws fail to hold.” Priest (2008, 172) himself says, “After all
we seem to envisage just such worlds when we evaluate conditionals such
as ‘if intuitionist logic were correct, the law of identity would fail’(false).
Even if one is a modal realist, why should there not be such worlds?”
CLASSICAL LOGIC VIOLATORS: A third way of understanding im-
possible worlds is to think of them as a classical logic violator. If we think
that the laws of logic are the classical ones, then this gives the same result
as the previous definition. However, if we think otherwise A world comply-
ing with intuitionistic logic, but where instances of Excluded Middle fail,
will be impossible in this third sense (Berto and Jago, 2019, 32).
CONTRADICTION-REALISERS: The final way to understand impossible
worlds is one where contradictions hold, that is to say worlds at which
sentences that take the form A and ¬A hold, violating the law of non-
contradiction.
The kind of worlds I am interested in are those articulated by Yagisawa,
first in Yagisawa (1988) and then developed at length in Yagisawa (2010).
In the 1988 paper, Yagisawa puts forward a development of the Lewisian
project with an argument in very much the same vein as Naylor: if we
accept Lewis’s argument for possible worlds, we ought also to do the same
for impossible worlds. In this 1988 paper, Yagisawa comments very little
about the metaphysics of impossible worlds. Rather, Yagisawa takes it that
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his scope in this paper is to endorse the conditional thesis:
If modal realism is to be accepted at all, we should not stop with
the Lewisian modal realism, but go all the way and accept the
extended modal realism. I shall leave it to the readers to decide
whether this condition should be used as the first premise of the
modus ponens or the first premises of the modus tollens.
(Yagisawa, 1988, 203).
In Yagisawa’s 2010 he departs slightly from the Lewisian project.1
Yagisawa (2010, 176) characterises impossible worlds in the following way:
Worlds are metaphysical indices of the modal kind. All possible
are worlds but not all worlds are possible worlds. Some worlds
are not possible worlds, that is, they are impossible worlds. An
impossible world is a world at which an impossibility obtains.
For Yagisawa, impossible worlds are as simple as that. Like Priest re-
commends, extended modalists straightforwardly apply the metaphysics of
possible worlds to impossible worlds; they are of the same kind but differ
in their qualities. To make the position that I will later rely on more clear,
I will detail what possible worlds are for the extended modal realist in the
next section.
1Depending on who you ask, the departure is more or less great. For instance, Nolan
(2015, 53) suggests that Lewis maintains the analogy between worlds and times and thus
might consider Yagisawa’s move very much in line with the Lewisian variety of modal
realism. However, Yagisawa himself points out that Lewis denies the analogy between
times and worlds so might consider his extension of modal realism at a greater distance
(Yagisawa, 1988, 45).
21
2.5. Possible Worlds and Extended Modal Realism
2.5 Possible Worlds and Extended Modal
Realism
The extended modal realist theory is realist in the sense that it is real-
ist about possible worlds and about mere possibilia. What is more, the
extended modal realist is realist in an important sense. They provide a
non-representational treatment of modality de re (Yagisawa, 2010, 19).
For the extended modal realist, “possible worlds” are metaphysical indices
on a par with temporal and spatial indices. They are “modal indices.” The
best way to get a handle on possible worlds in extended modal realism is
to compare them to worlds according to Lewis’s modal realism.
Lewis says:
The world we live in is a very inclusive thing. Every stick and
every stone you have ever seen is part of it. And so are you
and I. And so are the planet Earth, the solar system, the entire
Milky Way, the remote galaxies we see through telescopes, and
(if there are such things) all the bits of empty space between
the stars and galaxies. There is nothing so far away from us as
not to be part of our world. Anything at any distance at all is
to be included. Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-
gone ancient Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone
primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the
dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of this same
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world. Maybe, as I myself think, the world is a big physical
object; or maybe some parts of it are entechies or spirits or aura
or deities or other things unknown to physics. But nothing is so
alien kind as not to be part of our world, provided only that it
does exist at some distance and direction from here, or at some
time before or after or simultaneous with now. (Lewis, 1986, 1)
For Lewis, a possible world is the mereological sum of all that is spatiotem-
porally related. Lewis emphasises that his worlds are like spatial locations
stating: “The worlds are something like remote planets; except that most of
them are much bigger than mere planets, and they are not remote” (Lewis,
1986, 1).
By contrast, Yagisawa (2010, 44) thinks of possible worlds as things more
“akin to that of a spatial point (or extended region at best), not something
that occupies it. What Lewis describes in the first quotation above I call
the universe, or more accurately the actual world-stage of the universe”’.
The universe is a vast object which extends at least spatially, temporally,
and—according to extended modal realism—modally. You and I are part
of it, and so are the remote galaxies and the ancient Romans. But the
universe is not a possible world. It is instead the comprehensive subject of
possibility and necessity.
On this conception of possible worlds, possibility and necessity are cashed
out in the following way. When we assert that something p is possible (or
necessary), we are saying that the universe is possibly (or necessarily) P.
The universe is one way at one possible world. For Yagisawa (2010, 44), the
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universe extends in modal dimensions, as well as in spatial and temporal
dimensions.
Yagisawa (2010, 44) says:
What Lewis calls “our world” is the universe as it actually is, i.e.
the universe as it is at the actual world. In Lewis’s system there
are many objects like what he calls “our world”, and he calls
them “possible worlds”. In my system there are many objects
like the universe at the actual world, and they are the same uni-
verse at various possible worlds. That is, there are many objects
like the actual-world-stage of the universe, and they are different
world-stages of the same universe. Possible worlds themselves
are not objects like the universe of the inhabitants of the uni-
verse. They are just such that the universe is a certain way at,
or with respect to, them.
Yagisawa continues:
I regard what Lewis calls “possible worlds” as modal parts of one
and the same universe.1 The universe’s modal parts are not pos-
sible worlds, but the universe itself as it is at possible worlds, its
world-stages. The universe’s spatial or temporal parts are not
spatial regions or temporal regions, but the universe itself as it
is at such regions. Lewis’s modal space (what he calls “logical
1This is something I emphasise in my understanding of extended modal realist com-
mitments as seen in Chapter 8.
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space”, the collection of all Lewsisian possible worlds and all
possible objects existing at them) contains many concrete ob-
jects each of which is unified by spatiotemporal (or some other
more general natural) relatedness and which do not together
form a single possible object. My modal space (collection of
all possible worlds I embrace and all objects existing at them)
contains many concrete objects all of which are modal parts of
one and the same universe. Some of them may be unified by
spatiotemporal relatedness, some may be unified by some other
relation, and some other may not be unified by any relation
other than being part of the universe whatever that requires.
Yagisawa (2010, 44)
Yagisawa wishes to remind us that Lewis’s conception of a possible world
is akin to how the actualist conceptualises them in an important way.
Lewis analyses “x is F at w” in terms of x’s counterpart at w;
x is F if and only if x’s counterpart at w is F (expect when “F”
is a special predicate like ‘existent’). The counterpart of x at w
represents x at w, and this makes representation play a crucial
role in the truth condition for modalities de re. (Yagisawa, 2010,
47)
Yagisawa points out that actualists have to account for “x is F at w” in a
similar way.
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According to the linguistic version of actualism, x is F at w and
only if the sentence “a is F” is true at w, where “a” refers to
x. The term “a” represents x at w, which makes representation
crucial in this theory. The version of modal realism I [Yagisawa]
defend differs from both Lewis’s theory and actualism in this
regard. (Yagisawa, 2010, 47)
Yagisawa (2014, 47) puts it that “The version of modal realism I favour ana-
lyses ‘x is F at w’ in terms of x itself, but this does not mean that notion
of representation has no place at all in this analysis”. For Yagisawa, repres-
entation is narrowly Lagadonian just if the representative is identical to the
represented. Lewis calls this simply “Lagadonian”. Narrowly Lagadonian
representation is self-representation. Representation is broadly Lagaondian
just if the representative is identical to a part of the represented, i.e. the
representative is identical to either the represented or a proper part of
the represented. Broadly Lagadonian representation, is representation of a
whole by a part. On my version of modal realism, x is F at w if and only
if x’s world-stage at w is F. A modally extended individual is represented
at w by its world-stage at w. A world-stage of x at w is a modal part of x.
So, the version of modal realism I favour analyses modality de re in terms
of broadly Lagadonian representation (Yagisawa, 2014, 47).
The upshot of this is as Yagisawa describes it is:
Start with a particular individual, say you, as you actually are.
The broadly Lagadonian representational analysis of modality
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de re applies to modalities concerning you. The same applies to
modalities concerning a larger plurality of individuals, say, all
that are near the surface of Earth. This will continue to hold as
we move up in spatial size, to the contents of the solar system,
the Milky Way, the Virgo Supercluster, and so on. Increasing
the span on temporal period will not change the applicability
of the broadly Lagadonian representational analysis of modality
de re. The contents of the twenty first century, the Holocene,
the Cenozoic Era, the Phanerzoic Eon, and so on. Eventually
we reach the entire universe as it actually is, what Lewis calls
“the actual world”. But this object (or this plurality of objects
as considered together are) only a proper part of a much larger
whole extending through modal space, just as your actual-world-
stage is only a proper part of a much larger whole that is you
extending through many possible worlds. This object has dif-
ferent properties at different modal indices, just as you do. The
modal indices are worlds. This object, the modally extended
universe, is distinct from any world, just as you, a modally ex-
tended individual are distinct from any world. (Yagisawa, 2010,
47–48)
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2.6 Modal Realism not Meinongianism
Some might suggest that extended modal realism is closer to a Meinongian
ontology like that of Priest (2016) than to the modal realism of Lewis.
However, from the inception of his theory, Yagisawa provides comments to
ward off this objection. He says:
Alexius von Meinong’s ontology notoriously includes impossible
things such as a square circle. I agree with Meinong’s basic
ontological insight that impossibility is not a good reason for
exclusion from ontology. But I do not concur with his distinction
between Sein and Assersein. I have no analogous distinction.
Following Lewis, I say that there is only one ontological mode:
existence. We use the existential quantifier to express it. The
existential quantifier virtually always has a restricted universe
of discourse, there is a broader universe of discourse for the
variable to range over. Here I differ from Lewis. If the existential
quantifier is used with absolutely no restriction, it will mean
according to Lewis, “There exists an x in some world in our
logical space.” But according to me it will mean "There exists
an x in some world in some logical space in some super logical
space in some super super logical space...in some (super)n logical
space..." (Yagisawa, 1988, 202)
Yagisawa is sensitive to the closeness of his theory to Meinongian-style
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theories from the very outset. I say more about how we extended modal
realists distinguish ourselves from a Meinongian-style solution in Chapter
6.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided the basics of modal realism. I have ar-
ticulated what possible and impossible worlds are and why we might be
motivated to include not only possible worlds but also impossible worlds in
our ontology. What is more, I have motivated and outlined an elaboration
of the Lewisian project, a new variety of modal realism known as extended
modal realism. This variety of modal realism I will argue provides us with
a new and under-explored solution to the problem of non-existence.
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The Problem of Non-existence
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I outline the puzzle of non-existence. I allude to the fact
that Crane’s diagnosis of where the puzzle of non-existence is false and sup-
ply a full argument for this in the following chapter. I argue that rather
than the problem of non-existence primarily being a puzzle of thought, it
is, in fact, a puzzle about what there is. The focus of this chapter is to
set up the problems of non-existence that extended modal realism can help
with. I ultimately target two problems concerning truth and one concern-
ing thought. When it comes to the problem of thought, I mainly focus on
Crane’s formulation of the puzzle; the reason for this is that the way Crane
sets up the problem of non-existence has become standard in the way that
the problem of non-existence is engaged within the contemporary debate.
And even though I disagree with Crane about where the fundamental puzzle
is, I don’t disagree that the puzzle he articulates is an important element
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related to the foundational issue. I admit, in some respect, that any suc-
cessful solution should not only handle the puzzle of what there is but also
the puzzle of thought.
You might think about Chapters 3 and 4 as two parts of one large chapter
subdivided for ease of reading. In this chapter I highlight that the puzzle
of non-existence isn’t exactly one uniform puzzle. Rather, it is a puzzle
that comes in many different styles. My goal across these two chapters
is to show that the most fundamental way to think of the puzzle is as a
puzzle about what there is. This fundamental way of understanding the
problem of non-existence underpins the other varieties of puzzles. I use this
chapter to demarcate the kinds of puzzles about non-existent objects that
are directly relevant to this thesis.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the details for a new, under-explored,
but seemingly obvious solution to a well-known and well-researched problem
in metaphysics. The problem over time garnered the name “The Problem
of Non-existence” and the solution is a variety of modal realism known as
extended modal realism, which has been developed at length by Yagisawa
(2010). In this chapter, I focus on laying out the problem since although
the problem is well known, a clear formulation is often not given. As Crane
(2012, 417) says:
The problem of non-existence or “non-being” is often said to
be one of the most ancient and intractable problems of philo-
sophy. But like many such problems—the mind-body problem,
the problem of universals, the problem of change—there is often
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as much unclarity about how to formulate the problem as there
is about how to solve it.
I use this chapter to provide a clear formulation of the puzzles.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §3.2, I look at some of the
motivations that Crane highlights for looking at this problem in the first
place. Then in §3.3 I sketch some of the ways that the problem of non-
existence has been set up. Thankfully Sainsbury (2018) has made this an
easy task by consolidating them in his recent book on the topic of non-
existence. In §3.4.1, I suggest that Crane’s way of setting up the puzzle
on a problem of thought is problematic and provide an argument for this
in Chapter 4. Crane has become an influential figure in the non-existence
and intentionality literature, and his way of thinking about the puzzle is
extremely commonplace. I argue that there is a more fundamental way of
looking at the puzzle that underpins all other ways. Before concluding, in
§3.5 I highlight the two problems that non-existent objects make for truth.
I will handle these problems of truth in Chapter 9.
3.2 Motivations
Crane (2012, 423) points out that there does seem to be a general interest
in the non-existent. He cites a list published by USA Today of the 101
most influential people who never lived. The Marlboro Man, Big Brother,
King Arthur, Santa Claus, Hamlet, Dr Frankenstein’s Monster, Siegfried,
Sherlock Holmes, Romeo and Juliet, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Uncle Tom
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all featured on this list. Crane tells us that although the list is humorous, it
indicates an important feature of our interaction with non-existent objects.
Crane states the list indicates
...how pervasive and ubiquitous our talk of the non-existent is.
Not only do we indicate the influence and fame of these people
(Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any living detective, as
Terence Parsons (1980) has pointed out) but hours are spent
wondering about their non-existent emotions (Siegfried fell in
love with his aunt, you know), their non-existent families (how
many children did Lady Macbeth have?). (Crane, 2012, 423)
The motivation for looking at this puzzle is partly because of our interest
in fictions and other non-existent entities as Crane highlights. It is partly
because of philosophical curiosity and the chance to establish a new player
in the non-existence game (extended modal realism). The introduction of
this new theory in the puzzle has an interesting consequence. It refocuses
the objects of our concern not only to fictional characters but also more
mundane kinds of non-existence, the future, the past, how things could have
been, and how things could not have been. These things are often talked
about in ordinary conversation as well as in philosophical contexts without
a care for the ontological status of such things. I am not advocating that
standard conversation be constrained by ontological commitments; rather,
I merely intend to show that if this problem is a genuine one, then it is
one that is pervasive as opposed to one that isn’t just confined to concerns
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about fictional characters. Although fictional characters do make excellent
examples, as many philosophers before me have noticed for example, Russell
(1905) used the present king of France and Parsons (1981) used Sherlock
Holmes as their case studies.
3.3 Puzzles About Non-existence
It is common for us to think about the exploits of our favourite fictional
characters. I might, for example, think about the adventures of Tin-Tin
and Snowy. Sometimes we might even feel emotional about some fictional
character: I might pity Anna Karenina or fear Freddy Krueger. Fictional
characters have become the primary candidate for philosophers to use as
examples of non-existent objects. They are, however, not the only kind of
non-existent objects. I can also express intentional attitudes to objects at
other times and to the objects of alternative states of affairs, that is to say,
objects described by how things could have been and how things could not
have been. It might quickly be objected to with the question, “How can
we stand in intentional relations with an object that does not exist?” This
question is at the heart of the problem of non-existence. Here I detail some
examples of non-existent objects then provide a statement of some of the
relevant puzzles of non-existence.
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3.3.1 Thinking About Non-existent Objects
Given their dominating presence in the literature it is reasonable to say
that fictional characters have become the primary example for authors to
use when they want to discuss non-existent objects. Fictional characters
are not the only kind of non-existent object, however. In this section, I
draw attention to a number of other kinds of non-existent objects which we
can consider.1,2
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS: Fictional characters are the common ex-
ample of a non-existent object which agents think about. I think about
Frodo and how he might succeed in his quest; I think about the inhabitants
of 221B Baker Street and what cases they have solved. I think about Anna
Karenina and the fate that might befall her. However, fictional characters
do not standardly exist so how can we make sense of our thoughts about
them.
MYTHICAL BEINGS: Another common example of non-existent beings are
mythical beings, for example the likes of Pegasus. Like fictional characters,
the standard position is that mythical beings do not exist.
1I use object in a very general way just to indicate what other philosophers might
call a “something”.
2I do not mean to indicate that there is something wrong with the focus on fictional
characters. After all our gut response to this question probably reveals our answer to
the problem of non-existence in general. However, when it comes to theory choice, we
might think that if a theory can better account for edge cases than its competitors can,
then we ought to prefer it.
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MISTAKEN REFERENCE: Cases of mistaken reference also provide ex-
amples where we think about a non-existent object. Take the following
case: I believe that I am being followed by the shortest spy; however, un-
known to me, my belief is a false one. In this case it might be said that I
am thinking about a non-existent short spy.1
EMPTY REFERENCES: Empty references are referring terms that do not
have an object to match up with the reference examples, such as “the present
king of France”, “the president of the United Kingdom”, and “the queen
of the United States”. In these cases too, the object of our thought is a
non-existent object.
IMPOSSIBLE OBJECTS: It also seems straightforwardly obvious to me
that I can think about the round-square, or the box which is both full and
empty at the same time. I might even be so puzzled by such entities that I
think about them quite often.2
OTHER TIMES: Depending on your thoughts about the metaphysics of
time, your opinion about this example might differ. However, let us, for
now, adopt the basic and what many philosophers call —-although without
very good reason––,“the common-sense” theory of time. The so-called
1The shortest recorded spy was Richebourg (1768–1858) a Frenchman who measured
measured 58 cm (1 ft 11 in) as an adult. He was “employed by the aristocracy to act as
a secret agent during the French Revolution (1789–1799), dispatching messages into and
out of Paris, whilst disguised as an infant and carried by his ‘nurse’ ” (Guinness World
Records, nd).
2See Priest (1997) for the example of the box which is both full and un-full. And
Priest (1999) for examples of impossible artworks.
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common-sense theory entails what exists is the present, the past has gone
out of existence and the future is yet to come into existence. If this is the
case and the past and the future do not exist, then what is it I am worried
about when I express that I am concerned about my exam tomorrow? The
exam (and tomorrow) has not come into existence yet, what is my feeling
of concern directed at? The same goes for the past. The past ceases to
exist when it becomes present. If this is the case, how can I stand in inten-
tional relations with past events? It seems like I can express remorse and
regret for things I once did. If the objects of my remorse or regret are truly
non-existent, how is such an act possible?
COUNTERFACTUALS: Counterfactuals are understood as alternative ways
events could have gone.1 They often take the form if... then... One such
counterfactual would be, “if I had not been such a careful driver, then I
would not have been able to avoid the ice on the road, and my friend (and
myself) would have been hurt in a car crash”. Such a situation might move
some people to express sadness at the potential hurt that might befall one’s
friend or themselves. Some people might have a visible physical response
for example, a down-turned mouth or even tears. How could an agent ex-
press such sadness? The situation didn’t happen. My friend and I are
fine. We didn’t actually drive on any icy roads. The question, “what is our
melancholic agent sad about?” naturally arises.
There are plenty of cases where we express intentional attitudes towards
1If you are fictionalist about counterfactuals then you might just consider this cat-
egory a variety of fiction.
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supposedly non-existent objects. These problem cases have been bundled
together into a problem dubbed the “The problem of non-existence”.
In this section, I highlight a variety of related puzzles featuring non-existent
objects as catalogued by Sainsbury (2018, 6–9).1
A puzzle about unicorns: As I write these words, I am thinking about
unicorns. If you understand me, you too will thereby be thinking about
unicorns. So we are thinking about something, indeed the same thing:
unicorns. In fact, there is something—namely unicorns—we are thinking
about. But there are no unicorns. So, in thinking about unicorns, there’s
not anything we are thinking about; that is, we are not thinking about
anything—in other words, we are thinking about nothing. But we are
thinking about something—unicorns.
A puzzle about seeking: Ponce De Leon looked for the fountain of youth.
But there is no fountain of youth, so there wasn’t anything he was looking
for. So he wasn’t looking for anything. But of course there was something
he was looking for—the fountain of youth.
A puzzle about landscape painting: A representational painting may be a
landscape painting even though the artist had no specific landscape in mind;
1In Sainsbury’s retelling of these puzzles concerning aboutness these are not specific
to non-existent objects and have been excluded from the list below, for example his
puzzle about plurals. I will also not be dealing with Prior’s puzzle extended to visual
experience: formulated in the following way (a) X’s visual experience of Y constitutes a
relation between X and Y when Y exists, but (b) not when Y doesn’t; but (c) X’s visual
experience of Y is the same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. This is not the kind
of puzzle that my proposed solution can handle in a uniform way; for more on puzzles
about non-existence and hallucination, see Azzouni (2010).
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the painter did not paint “from life”. If it’s a landscape painting, then it’s
a painting. It’s a painting of a landscape. Given the artist’s intentions,
there’s no landscape it’s a painting of—that is, it’s not really a painting of
a landscape at all. So it both is and is not a painting of a landscape.
Prior’s puzzle about thinking: (a) X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation
between X and Y when Y exists, but (b) not when Y doesn’t; but (c) X’s
thinking of Y is the same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. Something
plainly has to be given up here; what will it be? (Prior, 1971, 130).
Prior’s puzzle extended to truth and falsehood: (a) X’s thinking that p
constitutes a relation between X and the fact that p when p is true, but
b not when p isn’t; but (c) X’s thinking that p is the same sort of thing
whether p is true or not.
Although Sainsbury presents a range of problems regarding our thinking
about non-existent objects, I do not think the solution I propose in the sub-
sequent chapters applies equally to all of them nor do I think I can present
a well-unified and cohesive thesis if I try and answer them all. However, I
do think that the extended modal realist solution applies, in a general way,
to all the problems when it comes to solving the fundamental issue that
underlies these questions. In a sense, these problems are underpinned by
questions about what there is. For if the non-existent object were able to
stand in a relation to our thinking or seeking subject, these questions would
have a straightforward answer.
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Of all the highlighted issues regarding non-existent objects, I focus on three
in particular. There are two problems about truth, which given that the
extended modal realist solution naturally comes with a commitment to
accidental truth-maker maximalism these problems can be solved fairly
straightforwardly. I will cover the details of these problems and the pro-
posed solution in Chapter 9. The other type of problem I focus on is a
problem of thought. I argue that with some minor additions, the exten-
ded modal realist can provide a solution to problems of non-existence that
relate to thinking, which I detail in Chapter 12 which concerns semantic
instrumentalism.
The three problems that I focus on in this thesis are Prior’s problem and the
two problems about truth. The reason for picking these problems is that
they are the most widely discussed in the contemporary analytic literature
about non-existence. However, it is important to distinguish these problems
since even though I argue that a single theory is useful in all cases, both the
puzzle about thought and the puzzles about truth are not problematic for
identical reasons. And exactly the same response cannot be given in both
cases since even though ontological commitment to non-existent objects
straightforwardly helps with the metaphysical element of Prior’s problem
and the problems of truth, a metaphysical solution says nothing about




Prior’s problem repeated: (a) X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation between
X and Y when Y exists, but (b) not when Y doesn’t; but (c) X’s thinking
of Y is the same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. Something plainly
has to be given up here; what will it be? (Prior, 1971, 130).
Prior’s problem can be divided into three steps. If we were to assume that
thinking in standard cases is relational, how do we make sense of this when
it comes to the case of non-existent objects, for there is nothing to satisfy
the second place in the relation?
1. An agent (a) F s something (x) non-existent.
2. An agent (a) cannot F something (x) non-existent if F is a relation.
3. F ing something (x) constitutively involves bearing a relation to it.
The first statement seems obvious; you can think of a non-existent object
even though that object is non-existent. For example, you can think of
Pegasus, the future, a square circle, or other ways the world could have
been even though these objects do not exist.1
On the face of it, the second claim is also straightforward; it relies on the as-
sumption discussed by Hawthorne and Manley that no relational expression
1Under the metaphysics I offer, some of these objects do exist but for the sake of
setting up the problem, let’s say they do not. Furthermore, some philosophers might
try to tell me I cannot represent impossible things such as square circles or positively
charged electrons. In response, I can provide two cases where this feat is achievable, see




can be about an object unless that object exists (Hawthorne and Manley,
2012, 9).
The final claim is the controversial one; it rests on the concept of intentional
thinking as a relation. Although there are those who doubt the relational
nature of intentionality, it is reasonable to think of intentionality as a re-
lation as the default position (Yablo, 2014). Dummett (2014, 36) explains
the problem of non-existence thus: “How can we stand in an intentional
relation with an object if that object does not exist?” Dummett states that
“intentionality is naturally taken to be a relation between the mental act,
or its subject, to the object of that act”. Dummett (2014, 36) continues
by articulating the problem: “how can there be a relation when the second
term of the relation does not exist?”
You might choose to get off the bus here and disagree that intentionality is
a relation. However, for those who want to maintain the relational struc-
ture of intentionality, the problem of non-existence is one problem they
must consider. The problem of non-existence is: “how can we represent
something that doesn’t exist, given that representation involves bearing a
relation to it and we cannot bear a relation to something that doesn’t ex-
ist” (Kriegel, 2007, 307).1 The problem arises when there is an existing
agent standing in an intentional relation with a non-existent object. The
indeterminate nature of non-existent objects prompts the question, “What
is in the object box?” In order to solve this problem, we need to do two
1I use the term Problem of Non-existence, in place of Kriegel’s intentional inexistence,
for, as I explain in Chapter 11 I think Kriegel has in mind something closer to the Problem
of Non-existence.
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things: we need not only to suggest what goes in the object box, but we
also need to say something about the relational nature of thought. Which
I do in Chapter 12.
3.4.1 Crane’s Development of the Puzzle
Crane takes the puzzle to be one about intentional thought or aboutness.
His characterisation does make one important element of the puzzle obvious,
that is a full answer to the puzzle must say something about the structure
of thought. However, the metaphysical element which seems to underpin
all his discussion is left underdeveloped. I will discuss this later in Chapter
4.
We might sum up the problem with the Platonic phrase: “how can we
think or talk about that which is not?” This phrasing of the problem gets
to the root of the issue quickly. At its core the problem of non-existence
is how we can hold in our mind or express things about that is not part
of reality. Crane makes the following comment comparing existent entities
with non-existent entities:
When the great explorers crossed the oceans to investigate new
lands, it was because they thought there was something out
there, and they wanted to find out what it really is. It isn’t
like this with non-existences: it’s not as if we think there are all
these non-existent things “out there” and we want to find out
what they “really are”. (Crane, 2012, 418)
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I contend, contra Crane, that this is exactly what our engagement with non-
existent entities is like. Whether Crane and I agree about exactly what the
puzzle is can be put to the side for one moment for I detail my response to
Crane in the following chapter. There I argue that Crane has misdiagnosed
the problem and that it is this misdiagnosis that leads Crane to be overly
focused on the problem of non-existence as a problem of thought. Rather, I
suggest that we should recast the problem as a metaphysical one. However,
I admit a suitable answer should be able to accommodate the element of the
puzzle that is related to thought as well; it is just not where the fundamental
issue is.
3.5 Two Problems About Truth
There are two further problems which non-existent entities create that I will
be addressing. The first is how can we say that there are truths about that
which does not exist; the extended modal realist can handle this problem
fairly well. The second problem concerns true negative existential state-
ments which many, such as Salmon (1987a), take to be the most difficult
aspect of the problem of non-existence. In this section, I sketch both these
problems before developing them and providing solutions in Chapter 9.
3.5.1 Truth About that Which Does not Exist
The problem about truth as Crane (2013) puts it is: If non-existent things
are not part of reality, then how can there be any truths about them? The
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problem of truth is somewhat less complicated in its setup than the problem
of thought.
How can it be true that Holmes lives at 221B if there is no Holmes or no
221B.1 It seems that in order for there to be truths, there must be things
for those truths to be about. But many feel the pull of the intuition that
it is true that Holmes lives at 221B. The presence of non-existent objects
causes problems for accounts of truth.
The issue here is only that for things to lack truths is for them to not be
part of reality. The extended modal realist solution I have on offer literally
affirms that the objects we would normally say are non-existent objects are
part of reality, so if this is the requirement for truths, then extended modal
realism meets it easily. I call this accidental truthmaker maximalism. I say
more about this in Chapter 9.
3.5.2 True Negative Existential Statements
The second problem that relates truth and non-existent entities is about
issues concerning true negative existential statements. These statements in-
troduce an entity via an existential expression such as “There is” or “There
are”, then state there is no such entity. For example, the following state-
1During the period when the Holmes stories were set, the numbers on Baker Street
did not go as high as 221. Later Baker Street was extended, and in 1932 the premises
of 219–229 Baker Street were occupied by the Abbey National Building Society. The
Holmes Museum occupies 237 and 241 Baker Street and even though Abbey National
closed in 2005 the location of the Holmes Museum has not changed (Stamp, 2012).
45
3.5.2. True Negative Existential Statements
ment, in which angle brackets signify a proposition:
〈There is not a hippopotamus in this room.〉 (3.1)
It seems like the proposition that 〈 There is not a hippopotamus in this
room 〉 is one which is capable of being true. But Russell (2012, 189) noted
something was difficult about statements which take a similar form to 3.1
since it is unclear what it is that makes negative existential statements true,
for seemingly their truth cannot be confirmed by any entity. Mumford
(2007, 45) says: “For any statement that says how things are not, it is
difficult to know in virtue of what it is true.”
By contrast, if we take the statement:
〈There is a hippopotamus in this room〉 (3.2)
Mumford (2007, 45) tells us:
If true, 3.2 is true in virtue of something in the world. Specific-
ally, 3.2 would be true in virtue of the hippopotamus that is in
this room. If we tried to generalise from 3.2, and say that all
truths are true in virtue of something in or about the world,
then what of apparent truths like 3.1? What is it in the world
in virtue of which statements like 3.1 are true?




I promised I would say something about the limits of this thesis. The
solution I want to offer is not a panacea for all problems regarding non-
existent objects, for even though it can easily say something about the
problem related to truth and with some additions make a contribution to
the problem about thinking, I do not address all cases of non-existence; for
example, I do not consider the representation of maps of fictional locations
nor of paintings of non-existent landscapes. I avoid these cases in this thesis
since their creation involves artistic intention and this invokes secondary
issues that I wish to avoid in order to maintain a narrow scope. However, I
do think that we should be able to see how we can generate similar solutions
in cases of relations towards non-existent objects in the cases of maps,
paintings and the like. However, I will not say much about these extensions
in this thesis save for some brief comments in a section that addresses future
work and developments of this project.
Another limit of this thesis is that it does not say very much about the
history of this problem. My focus is to develop a new application of a fairly
new theory. What is more, fairly recently the problem of non-existence
has received new attention and thus my goal is to join that contemporary
literature. For this reason I do not spend much space detailing ancient,
medieval, Russellian or Meinongian contributions to the problem. I do,





In this chapter, I have highlighted the various problems which are related to
non-existent objects. I have drawn attention to the particular problems that
are most relevant to this thesis. I have mentioned that there is disagreement
about the fundamental part of the problem of non-existence and that I do
not think it is located where Crane thinks it is; the most important level
included in the puzzle of non-existence is one about what there is rather
than one about truth. I have also demarcated those problems that are
tangential problems, which I think I can say something about but which
will not be covered in the main body of this thesis; however, speculative






In this chapter, I reply to Crane’s argument that the problem of non-
existence is a problem of thought. I argue contra Crane that the problem of
non-existence is a metaphysical problem about what there is. I make this
argument on the grounds that Crane makes metaphysical commitments im-
plicitly from the very start and that in order to set up the puzzle in the way
Crane wishes, he must rely on a distinction which he attempts to deny.
Instead, I argue that the problem of non-existence is, at the fundamental
level, a problem about what there is. In his 2012 paper, Crane argues that
the problem is a problem of thought and in order to solve the problem
we need to examine the process of thought and what exactly the concept
intentionality refers to. For Crane the problem is generated by a misun-
derstanding of the thinking process. For Crane—in the case of thoughts
about non-existents—that intentional thought is non-relational solves the
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problem. However, I argue that Crane mislocates the problem. I make this
argument because Crane displays a lack of sensitivity regarding the quanti-
ficational use of “something” and ultimately relies on a distinction between
existence and being that he attempts to deny from the outset. I also argue
that Crane makes ontologically substantial commitments implicitly despite
denying that the problem is a metaphysical one. I do not deny that the
problem of non-existence involves thought or reference; this is clear in how
Prior (1971) formulates the puzzle. The purpose of this chapter is merely
to show that the foundational element of the puzzle is at the level of meta-
physics. In order to solve the puzzle, we need to make a commitment to
the metaphysical matters before moving on to looking at other elements of
the problem.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Crane’s formulation of the puzzle
has become standard in the discussion of the problem of non-existence and
I see my reply here as a way of refocusing how we understand the puzzle of
non-existence. In this chapter I focus on a very particular part of Crane’s
2012 paper in which he articulates his motivations for framing the problem
the way he does. I accept that details of Crane’s theory more broadly might
answer some of the questions I raise in this chapter. However, I contend
that framing a puzzle in a certain way should not be motivated by the
solution you wish to deploy to solve it. Thus we must have independent
reasons for framing the puzzle the way we do.
First, in §4.2 I outline the relevant part of Crane’s position. Second, I
outline three problems that arise from the way that Crane articulates his
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motivations. I conclude that although Crane highlights an important ele-
ment of the puzzle of non-existence, what he calls the puzzle is not the most
fundamental way of formulating the issue. Finally, I highlight how I suggest
we proceed in regards to this problem. In short, my proposal is to get our
ontology in order before moving on to examining thought.
4.2 Crane’s Position
Crane takes it that the problem of non-existence is “one of the most ancient
and intractable problems of philosophy” (Crane, 2012, 417). He argues that
the problem of non-existence should be understood as a problem of thought.
Crane tells us that his motivation for locating the puzzle here is that:
Compare existing entities: when the great explorers crossed the
oceans to investigate new lands, it was because they thought
there was something out there, and they wanted to find out what
it really is. It isn’t like this with non-existence: it’s not as if we
think there are all these non-existent things “out there” and we
want to find out what they “really are”. They really are nothing;
but people nonetheless think and talk about them. And this is
true on a “Meinongian” as much as on an ontologically orthodox
conception of the issue. I therefore locate the significance of this
problem in the study of thought or mental representation. All
thought is about something. In other words, whenever someone
thinks, they think about something. One of the peculiarities of
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thought is that some of the things we think about exist, and
some of them do not. Crane (2012, 418)
Based on this passage, we could say that Crane thinks non-existent things,
unlike existent things, are not out there for people to find or investigate.
Crane suggests here that non-existent entities are nothing. But nonetheless,
he admits that people do think about them. However, he acknowledges that
all thought is about something, and thus locates the puzzle of non-existence
at the level of thought.
4.3 Something and Nothing
In this section, I argue that there is an error with Crane’s reasoning that
given his line of thought leads him in the direction of locating the puzzle as a
puzzle of thought rather than locating the puzzle at the level of metaphysics.
I suggest that once we have seen the issue with Crane’s reasoning, we will
be more inclined to think about the puzzle as a puzzle about what there is
rather than a puzzle of thought. The first issue for Crane is that he denies
a distinction that he later relies on. The second issue is that it is far from
clear what Crane means by “nothing”; lack of clarity on this matter leads
to issues down the line. Finally, there is the issue that Crane does not seem
to be sensitive to the quantification reading of “something”. In this section
I divide it into three subsections, each highlighting a problem for Crane’s




The first problem for Crane is that he denies the distinction between being
and existence. Crane (2012, 417) says:
...the solution places no weight on a supposed ontological dis-
tinction between being and existence. Such a distinction in so
far as it can be made at all, has no bearing on the problem of
non-existence.
Here I argue that the claim that the distinction between being and existence
has no bearing on the problem is false. First, the very fact that a position
on the distinction between being and existence has been taken should be
understood as that distinction having a bearing on the problem. It rules out
viable options to the puzzle, for example that articulated by Priest (2014)
and Parsons (1981), for they take the contrary option and argue—and some
might say convincingly—that there is, in fact, a distinction between being
and existence. Parsons (1981, 6) highlights that when students are taught
elementary logic and examine the two statements:
(a) Tables exist
(b) There are tables
The instructor will provide the same symbolism; (∃x)Tx. Parsons points
out that when this symbolisation is offered, it is presented as if it does
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not come with any metaphysical implications. However, Parsons (1981, 6)
argues this is not the case stating: “Symbolizing both (a) and (b) in the
same way amounts to equating the quantifier ‘there is’ with the quantifier
‘there exists’, a question which makes sense only if what exists is what there
is; and that is the metaphysical view I am now questioning.”
Priest’s view differs but he still calls for us to acknowledge a difference
between what there is and existence. Like Parsons, Priest’s view has
Meinongian origins but he takes it that his view is closer to that of Routley
(1980) and thus refers to the position as noneism. Priest points out that
“non-existent objects do not have some inferior mode of being, such as ‘sub-
sistence’. They have no mode of being whatever. They do not exist in any
sense of that word (at the world in question, of course —they may, or may
not exist at others; they may not even exist at any world)” (2016, 14). But
nonetheless, Priest thinks we can still quantify over such objects, and thus
what there is (what we can quantify over) goes beyond what exists. I say
more about Priest’s view in Chapter 6. Unlike Parsons and Priest, Crane
wants to deny that their distinctions have any bearing on the matter.
What is more, the fact that Crane denies this distinction pushes him to say
that non-existent objects are “nothing”. It is this thought that ultimately
motivates Crane to think of the puzzle as one of thought, for if he truly
thinks that non-existents are nothing, that is to say, things which cannot
be quantified over, then he has no other choice left to him but to explain




I will argue in §4.3.3 that Crane has to take a position on this and ultimately
in order to get his account going, he must rely on something very much like
this distinction even though he attempts to deny it from the outset.
4.3.2 Problem 2
The second issue with Crane’s line of thought is that he clearly states that
non-existent things are nothing and that all thought is about something.
He also admits that we do think about non-existent objects. If we take
the claim at face value, it is difficult to make sense of Crane’s claim. For
something cannot be nothing and something at the same time. It is far
from clear how Crane understands “nothing”. On the one hand, we might
understand nothing to literally mean no-thing. No-thing is a term that
means the object has no place in the universe, and it isn’t something we
can quantify over. This seems straightforwardly at odds with Crane’s claim
that thoughts are about something. On the other hand, Crane might mean
by “nothing” that non-existent objects are nothing out there in the world.
In the first case, there is straightforwardly a clash between something and
nothing. If we understand Crane’s claim in the second way, then I say
that the issues raised in §4.3.1 come again. If we cannot understand his
statement in the straightforward way, then it turns out that Crane does
seem to have a nuanced view of being and existence and this, in turn, does
have some bearing on the problem of non-existence, which Crane attempted




The third issue for Crane’s way of thinking about the puzzle is that it does
not respect the quantificational use of “something”. We might think that the
word “something” expresses quantification. Some understand “something”
to mean “some thing” in the same way some people read ∃x as “something
x”. The lack of comment on this matter leaves Crane in a confusing position
where he seems to employ the being/existence distinction that he denied
previously. As we have seen, some philosophers such as Parsons (1981) think
that there is a difference between being (what there is) and what exists.
Crane in his early quote denies his solution invokes this distinction and
seems to disavow it altogether. However, Crane says that when we think,
we think about something, but some of these things we think about exist
and some do not. It sounds like Crane is now quantifying over things which
do not exist, thus relying on the being/existence distinction he wanted to
avoid. At the very least, this is unclear and needs clarification. However,
this is more than just a matter which needs clarification; in order for Crane
to get his position off the ground, he must rely on a very similar distinction
to the being/existence distinction that he has previously denied.
We can read “something” in a quantificational way, where we understand
“something” as some-thing to refer to a particular thing. This I call the
quantificational reading; the non-quantificational reading is where we use
“something” to refer to no particular thing. Priest (2016, 13) offers a quan-
tificational reading of “something”. Priest suggests that we ought to read
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∃xA(x) as something, x, is such that A(x). Priest argues that “some-thing”
acts as the quantificational expression ∃x. If we follow Priest’s lead, then
Crane is left with the claim that there are things which have existence and
some things which do not. This is the very being/existence distinction he
was trying to avoid.
At this point, one might object on the grounds that we should not consider
the quantification reading of “something” as something reasonable. If we
did not go for this quantificational reading, then Crane would be left in
the position that he would have to say that “there exists some object that
exists”, which appears to be uninformative and completely trivial. He would
also have to say that “there exists something that does not exist”, and this
looks to be contradictory. Therefore, it is not clear how Crane can draw
distinctions between nothing and something, existence and non-existence
without relying on the being/existence distinction or something very much
like it.
One option for trying to understand Crane’s position is to interpret him as
saying “there is something that doesn’t really exist”, that is to say “there
is something that only exists in our thoughts”.1 However, this position
amounts to the denial of non-existent entities, although what we are left
with are only existent entities, some of which are only present in our minds.
The distinction is then between existing things, not between existing things
and non-existing things. If this is how we ought to understand the position,
then that is unproblematic. However, my gripe is with the fact that this
1As you can see, this reading is different from Parson’s understanding, who thinks
that “there is” differs ontologically from “exists”.
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amounts to a smuggled-in and pre-theoretic ontological commitment. Some
of you might note that the strategy I adopt is not completely dissimilar to
this, where there is distinction between “real” things at different world-
stages. However, I maintain that I am able to establish a genuine—albeit
deflationary—distinction between existence and non-existence covered in
Chapter 8.
4.4 Conclusion
I have highlighted that Crane is implicitly committed to taking an on-
tological stance of matters relevant to the puzzle of non-existence before
suggesting that he is motivated to think that the puzzle is a problem of
thought; at the very least he is guilty of making the error that Parsons
warns against, which is to present matters of logic as being divorced from
matters of metaphysics. I have also suggested that Crane appears to be
relying on a distinction which he denied needing in order to get his position
going.
Either Crane relies on the being/existence distinction or denies it is a thing,
and thus, either way, it has a bearing on the problem of non-existence. As a
result of this, we ought not to follow Crane’s lead in thinking that the puzzle
is primarily one about thought; instead, we should think of the puzzle as a
foundational one about what there is, a metaphysical puzzle. I have argued
that we should avoid the way Crane sets up the puzzle since the only way
that Crane can motivate his position is by already taking a stance on these
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metaphysical questions from the outset. I say more about my proposal
throughout this thesis, but at the heart of it, my position is that we need
to establish what exactly non-existent objects are before we can say how





In Chapter 3, I drew attention to two kinds of problems concerning non-
existent entities: problems of truth and problems of thought. Both these
problems invoke aboutness; they are concerning truths about non-existent
objects or thoughts about non-existent objects. The use of the term “about”
in these problems relates to different technical uses for the aboutness re-
lation. When it comes to thought, aboutness corresponds to the concept
known as intentionality. However, in the case of truth, aboutness refers to
what has become known as intensionality.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of some relevant
terms that are used in this thesis, in particular the use of the term inten-
tionality and the role it might play in the problem of non-existence. The
aim is to introduce, in detail, the terms intentionality (and some of the
related concepts) and intensionality. I also indicate the difference between
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how these terms are used.
Here I also want to draw attention to the fact that intentionality is not
a well–defined concept. I am trying to highlight that different usages of
intentional can influence the direction that the problem of non-existence
goes in. I even suggest that a particular conception of intentionality can,
in part, help forward a certain solution to the problem of non-existence.
For if you build into your definition that intentionality is non-relational
or relational, this pushes one in a particular direction when it comes to
potentially viable solutions to the problem of non-existence. I am trying to
avoid it being our definition of intentionality that informs our metaphysics.
Rather, I try to forward the idea that it is our metaphysics that ought to
inform our definition of intentionality.
Despite all this, in this chapter, I try to frame intentionality as neutrally
as possible. The purpose of this chapter is mainly introductory, but it also
functions to make the reader aware of the potential problems which are
related to understanding “intentionality”. Due to the nature of this chapter
and the structure of the overall thesis, I save my argumentative comments
for later chapters. I presently want to draw particular attention to Searle’s
theory of intentionality, which I think is neutral enough to serve as a general
introduction to the term as it is used in contemporary analytic philosophy
but detailed enough not to leave out any relevant features of the term.
I also use this chapter to draw attention to some concepts related to in-
tentionality; they are representation and singular thought. In the case of
representation, it has been suggested that to think about an object is to
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represent an object. Thus the terms “intentionality” and “representation”
have become closely related. As for intentionality and singular thought, the
paradigm cases used in the problem of non-existence are often cases of sin-
gular thought, for example, “Graham is thinking about Sherlock”. On top of
the fact that intentionality and singular thought are commonly associated,
I wish to point out that those who deny the relationality of intentionality
may struggle to deny the relationality of singular thought for it has been
suggested that singular thought is constituted by acquaintance relations.
Finally, I examine the term intensionality and how this relates to the previ-
ously mentioned problems about truth and will be relevant for the chapter
concerning that issue.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §5.2 I introduce the concept of
intentionality and look at some of its historical development. I aim to keep
the historical discussion fairly brief, trying to touch on the most significant
developments only; I include greater exposition about the scholastic inter-
pretation in the appendix of this thesis. I also discuss some complications
with straightforwardly adopting Brentano’s position, to whom we arguably
owe the contemporary understanding of the concept. I explain that there is
scope to interpret his position in both a relational or non-relational way. I
point out that there are contemporary philosophers who also take aboutness
to be a relation. In light of these difficulties, I develop Searle’s approach
to the term in order to provide the reader with an introduction to the
term, which is as free from baggage as it can be. Then in §5.3 I examine
the close relation between intentionality and representation. In the next
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section, §5.4, I draw attention to the relationship between intentionality
and singular thought. In §5.5 I provide some analysis concerning the term
intensionality and how this term relates to the problem of non-existence.
5.2 Intentionality
The concept of intentionality arguably has roots in medieval philosophy, as
pointed out by Priest (2016, 68), most notably in the work of Buridan and
Ockham (Klima, 2015). Since the medieval times the next notable discus-
sion of intentionality comes from Brentano. For Brentano, intentionality
characterised mental activity (Brentano, 2012, 88). Brentano makes the
further claim that “every mental phenomenon includes something as object
within itself although they do not all do so in the same way. In a present-
ation something is presented, in a judgement something is acknowledged
or rejected, in love something is loved, in hate hated, in desire desired,
etc.”(Brentano, 2012, 88). Berto elaborates and points out that Brentano
might have been wrong by claiming that all mental states bear intention-
ality. However, most scholars agree that at least some mental states do
(Berto, 2018, 3). Crane (2013, 4) tells us that “every intentional state or
episode has an object — something it is about or directed on”. Yablo defines
intentionality in terms of aboutness: “the relation that meaningful items
bear to whatever it is that they are on or of or that they address or concern”
(Yablo, 2014, 1). Sometimes intentionality is simply described in terms of
directedness or aboutness (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 185). It is contro-
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versial as to whether intentionality is a relation or not. Kriegel (2007) has
argued for a variety of phenomenal intentionality suggesting that intention-
ality involves the agent instantiating an adverbial property. Discussion of
whether intentionality is a relation or not will be saved for another Chapter.
Here I take for granted that it is at least standard to think of intentionality
as a relation between a subject and an object.1
What is more, the intentional element of our attitudes isn’t particular to
one kind of mental act but is common among a range. The most generic
kind of intentional act is “thinking about”. Other than “thinking about”,
directional emotions are the intentional acts which feature most heavily
in our daily lives. Ratcliffe (MS) tells us, “It is fairly uncontroversial to
maintain that some or all emotions either are intentional states or at least
incorporate intentional states.” It is for this reason that emotional atti-
tudes and the generic “thinking about” feature heavily in the examples of
intentional attitudes given in Chapter 3.
5.2.1 Early Thoughts on Intentionality
Searle et al. (1983, 1) introduces the term intentionality in the following
way:
Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events
by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states
1By standard I mean something like “is necessary to generate the problem in the
first place”. Without the initial assumption that intentionality is relational — at least
in some respect — it seems like the problem wouldn’t get going.
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of affairs in the world. If, for example, I have a belief, it must be
a belief that such and such is the case; if I have a fear, it must
be fear of something or that something will occur; if I have a
desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something
should happen or be the case; if I have an intention, it must
be an intention to do something. And so on through a large
number of other cases. I follow a long philosophical tradition in
calling this feature of directedness or aboutness “intentionality”.
In Searle’s discussion of intentionality, he hits on an important and very
valid point. Searle in (Searle et al., 1983, 1) states “in many respects the
term is misleading and the tradition something of a mess”. A significant
amount of confusion comes from the issue that the term intentional appears
to have its first appearance in the work of medieval philosophers who used
the term in a way that is much more similar to the contemporary use
of the word intensionality with a focus on what the terms of sentences are
about. In order to have a good understanding of the medieval understanding
of intentionality, a good deal of technical vocabulary is necessary. This
vocabulary does not feature anywhere in this thesis nor is it central to my
overall argument and thus I have covered it in appendix V. The medieval
philosophers claimed that verbs of the intentional kind have the power to
ampliate the supposition of terms following them. Thus ‘I understand the
Antichrist’ is true since “the Antichrist” supposits for a future entity due to
the ampliation of “understand”. Moreover, verbs may ampliate not just to
past and future objects, but to merely possible objects too. For example,
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in “I seek 221B Baker Street’‘, “seek” ampliates the supposition of “221B
Baker Street” so that it may refer to a possible but non-existent object. It is
interesting and valuable to consider the origin of the term for it is obvious
to see how the idea that there needs to be a something in intentionality
came about. However, the medieval understanding of the term has little
bearing on the contemporary usage of the term which has a greater focus
on thought but arguably still retains some of the relationality that is clear
in the terminists use of the concept.
5.2.2 Intentionality Going Forward
Prior (1971) arguably revitalised the contemporary interest in intentionality
as he laid the groundwork for Crane’s 2013 work with a similar title.1 Prior
indicates that he is happy to accept that in the case of regular thought —
that is thought that does not feature a non-existent object— intentionality
is relational.
When analysing “Thinking of” statements, Prior states:
The first thing to be said here is that, prima facie at least, we
are now concerned with a “relation” in the strict sense. There
is no question here, at all events not immediately, of a function
of which one argument is a name and the other a sentence...
(Prior, 1971, 111)
1Crane merely adding the definite article.
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Prior (1971, 111) says, “It is true, of course, that thinking that y φ′s is one
way of thinking about y, e.g. thinking that Joan is beautiful is one way of
thinking about Joan. But this connection between the topics of thinking of
and thinking that is a straightforward one, with plenty of parallel cases in
general logic of two-place predicates.”
Prior’s comments indicate that at least in the standard cases, intentionality
appears to have a relational structure. However, Prior (1971, 112) also
says “[T]here are strong reasons for not regarding ‘X is thinking of Y’ as
expressing a relation between X and Y.”
To get a better understanding of the development of intentionality, it is
helpful to look back at how the term was introduced into the modern discus-
sion. The modern use of the concept intentionality has its roots in Brentano
(2012, 48) who states: “Every mental phenomenon includes something as
object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way.”1
Brentano’s thesis can be stated as intentional states have an intentional
object: this is what the intentional state is directed on, or is of, or is about.
However, there are still some issues with the interpretation of Brentano’s
articulation of his position, since some of his followers seem to have a rela-
tional understanding of intentionality, while others think that intentionality
1Although the modern use of intentionality is attributed to Brentano, it seems like
Reid also put forward a similar notion. Reid states: “In perception, in remembrance,
and in conception, or imagination, I distinguish three things—the mind that operates,
the operation of the mind, and the object of that operation. That the object perceived
is one thing, and the perception of that object another, conception, of remembrance, of
love and hate, of desire and aversion. In all these, the act of the mind about the object
is one thing, the object is another thing. There must be an object, real or imaginary,
distinct from the operation of the mind about it.” (Reid et al., 1895, 292)
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must be non-relational. Those who think that intentionality is a relation
regularly make reference to a thesis often stated in the form above.
Meinong, a student of Brentano, defends the thesis, “the realm of objects
is far wider than of existents” and Findlay, supporting this position states,
“The world of actual existents is only a poor selection out of an infinitely
rich and various range of possible objects...”(Findlay, 1963, 42). Meinong
expressed concerns about the “prejudice in favour of the actual”. According
to Meinong, it is this prejudice that led us to “ignore the unreal and treat
it as a mere nothing” (Meinong, 1988, 485–486). Findlay, expanding on
Meinong, states “that we are able to think of objects that do not exist” and
in these cases “the objects that are before us are undoubtedly something,
they are distinct from the experiences by whose means they are given to us”
(Findlay, 1963, 43). Prior, characterising Meinong, states that for Meinong,
“there are many true statements that we can make about many objects; for
example, though it is not a fact that a golden mountain...exists, he thinks
that it is unquestionably a fact that the golden mountain is both golden
and mountainous” (Prior, 1971, 122). Arguably Meinong’s view stems from
Brentano’s comment that:
Every mental state possesses in itself something which serves as
an object, although not all possess their object in the same way.
In a presentation something is presented, in a judgement some-
thing is acknowledged or rejected, in love something is loved, in
hate hated, in desire desired, etc.
(Brentano, 2012, 48)
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Findlay interprets Brentano differently, when developing Brentano, Find-
lay attaches particular importance to a passage in which Brentano holds
“the intentionality of mental states to be a case of a unique logical cat-
egory: the category of a determination which is relation-like without being
a proper case of a relation”. According to Findlay “intentionality...is a re-
lational property which is one sided, which does not involve the being of a
corresponding relation or related term.”1
On the other hand, there are many philosophers who find reason in Brentano
and make the claim that intentionality must be non-relational.
It might occur to someone to say that whenever a person re-
lated himself mentally to something as object, this object must
always be just as properly as he himself, even though it need not
always exist just as he does...I confess that I am totally incap-
able of deriving any sense from this distinction between being
and existence. (Aquila, 1976, 38)
Aquila (1976, 38) highlights another passage from Brentano:
If someone thinks something, that thinker must of course exist,
but the object of his thinking need by no means exist...Thus
the thinker is the only thing which mental reference requires.
1However, it is unclear how seriously Findlay takes the relationality of this relation-
like property, for he states: “an incontestable fact that in describing a state of mind as
being of this or of that, must not be taken to imply that there is anything having the
character attributed to our object. That this would be an illicit transformation is of
course clear to all ordinary speakers: from the fact that X is striking an F one can infer
that something is an F, but is some F of which X is thinking.” (Findlay, 2014, 35)
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The term of the so-called relation need not be given at all in
reality. On account of this, one might doubt that we are here
really dealing with etwas Relatives, and not rather with einem
Relativen ähnlichen, which one might accordingly call etwas Re-
lativliches. The similarity consists in the fact that just as when
one thinks about a relation in the proper, similarly when one
thinks about a mental act, he must in a certain sense think two
objects — one, so to speak, in recto, the other in obliquo. If
I think about a flower-lover, then the flower-lover is the object
which I think in recto, the flowers are what I think in obliquo.
But this is similar to the case where I think someone who is
taller than Caius. The taller one is thought in recto, Caius in
obliquo.
According to Aquila, in this passage Brentano makes a distinction between
relational and merely relation-like properties, and he counts intentionality
as a case of the latter. If we take Brentano’s comments in this way, then it
is hard to understand why the puzzle of non-existence has garnered so much
traction. The reason for this is because the term intentionality is thought by
some to be straightforwardly relational, contra interpretations of Brentano;
for example, philosophers such as Yablo claim that intentionality or about-
ness is a relation. Yablo (2014, 1) states, “the relation that meaningful
items bear to whatever it is that they are on or of or that they address or
concern.” If we have an extensional metaphysics, a relational concept of in-
tentionality makes sense. Berto (2018) has continued this analysis. Others
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think that what is constitutive about intentionality is representation and
takes representation to be a relational term. Others think that it is de re
singular thought that generates the problem of non-existence; I think this
is more common given the way the debate has evolved.
Whatever we take from this, something to highlight is that those who take
intentionality to be relational have the ontology to do so while those who
take it to be non-relational often employ a much more narrow ontology.
I would like to advise that our view on intentionality should not detail
one’s ontology; rather, one’s ontology might influence one’s position on
intentionality.
5.2.3 Searle on Intentionality
In light of the difficulty defining the concept intentionality, we can turn
to Searle who helpfully provides some clarifications concerning the term
intentionality.1
Searle states on his account:
...if a state S is Intentional then there must be an answer to
such questions as: What is S about? What is S of? What is it
an S that? (Searle et al., 1983, 1–2)
1In Searle et al. (1983) “Intentional” is with a capital “I’ is distinguished from “in-
tentional” with a lower case “i”. The former refers to the kind of aboutness or directed
in question whereas the latter refers to meaning to do something. I do not keep up this
way of distinguishing between the two throughout this thesis apart from when directly
quoting Searle. Firstly, because I think it is obvious what kind of intention I am talk-
ing about and secondly, because other authors who I quote did not adopt this way of
distinguishing the terms.
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What is more, on Searle’s characterisation it allows that there are some
types of mental states which are intentional and others which are not. This
is not an uncommon distinction to make —Crane makes one very similar—
but the way Searle makes this distinction is helpful. For Searle:
Some types of mental states have instances which are intentional
and other instances which are not. For example, just as there
are forms of elation, depression and anxiety where one is simply
elated, depressed, or anxious without being elated, depressed
and anxious about anything, so, also, there are forms of these
states where one is elated that such and such has occurred or
depressed and anxious at the prospect of such and such. Un-
directed anxiety, depression, and elation are not intentional, the
direct cases are intentional.
(Searle et al., 1983, 1–2)
If there are unintentional mental states, they are like Searle’s undirected
mental states; that is to say, they are non-intentional because they are
undirected in virtue of the kind of mental attitude. This differs from Crane’s
(and Prior’s) position, which contends that states are non-intentional if they
lack an intentional object, which appears to presuppose a metaphysics of
intentionality. Thus in this respect, I suggest we go with Searle’s position
as our introduction for neutrality.
Secondly, Searle draws a distinction between intentionality and conscious-
ness. He maintains that:
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Many conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense
of elation, conscious states are intentional, e.g., I have many
beliefs that I am not thinking about at present and I may never
have thought of. For example, I believe that my paternal grand-
father spent his entire life inside the continental United States
but until this moment I never consciously formulated or con-
sidered that belief. Such unconscious belief, by the way, need
not be instances of any kind of repression, Freudian or other-
wise; they are just beliefs one does not normally think about. In
defense of the view that there is an identity between conscious-
ness and Intentionality it is sometimes said that all conscious-
ness is consciousness of, that whenever one is conscious there
is always something that one is conscious of. But this account
of consciousness blurs a crucial distinction: when I have a con-
sciousness experience of anxiety, there is indeed something my
experience is an experience of, namely anxiety, but this sense
of “of” is quite different from the “of” of Intentionality, which
occurs, for example, in the statement that I have a conscious
fear of snakes; for in the case of anxiety, the experience of anxi-
ety and the anxiety are identical; but the fear of snakes is not
identical with snakes. It is characteristic of Intentional state, as
I use the notion, that there is a distinction between the state
and what the state is direct at or about or of... (Searle et al.,
1983, 2)
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Searle continues with distinctions highlighting the difference between inten-
tionality and intention. Searle points out:
The obvious pun on “Intentionality” and “intention” suggests
that intentions in the ordinary sense have some special role in
the theory of Intentionality; but on my account intending to
do something is just one form of Intentionality along with be-
lief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others; and I do not mean to
suggest that because, for example, beliefs are Intentional they
somehow contain the notion of intention or they intend some-
thing or someone who has a belief must thereby intend to do
something about it.
(Searle et al., 1983, 3)
Searle points out that the term intention is used in the sense of someone
intends to do something, while intentionality relates to directedness men-
tioned earlier, intentionality thus seems to be an active cognitive process.
Finally, Searle comments that:
Notice that Intentionality cannot be an ordinary relation like sit-
ting on top of something or hitting it with one’s fist because for
a large number of Intentional states I can be in the Intentional
state without the object of state of affairs that the Intentional
is “directed at” even existing. I can hope that it is raining even
if it isn’t raining and I can believe that the King of France is
bald even if there is no such person as the King of France.
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(Searle et al., 1983, 4)
Importantly Searle notes that while intentionality is not a relation like a
physical relation, he permits that it can be a kind of relation and nothing
about his account precludes this. He states:
an Intentional object is just an object like any other; it has
no peculiar ontological status at all. To call something an In-
tentional object is just to say that it is what some intentional
state is about. Thus, for example, if Bill admires President
Carter, then the Intentional object of his admiration is Presid-
ent Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy intermediate
entity between Bill and the man. (Searle et al., 1983, 16–17)
So from here on out, I continue with something very much like Searle’s ac-
count of intentionality in mind. It is detailed enough to capture the relevant
features of this mental faculty but is neutral enough to not come with any
metaphysical baggage. Searle indicates the neutrality of this position in the
comment above.
5.3 Representation and Intentionality
When considering intentionality, we should also be aware of the relevant
related terms. Some philosophers think that to have an intentional attitude
about an object is to represent that object. And even though some might
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be able to deny the relationality of intentionality, it might be more difficult
with representation.
When characterising the orthodox view of intentionality, Kriegel (2012, 79)
states:
...mental representation is a two-place relation holding between
a representing state and a represented entity (object, event,
state of affairs).
If we recall the puzzles articulated by Sainsbury in the previous chapter,
Searle points out that “Intentional states, and the puzzles they raise, all
involve representation” (Searle et al., 1983, 20). And it seems as if we can
represent things that do not exist. For example, I can represent Holmes
even though we standardly think that there is actually no Holmes. When
painting a picture I could represent a landscape which does not respond to
any landscape at our world. Although Searle might be right in pointing out
that these puzzles involve representation, in Chapter 11 I argue the terms
intentionality and representation are not interchangeable.
5.4 Intentionality and Singular Thought
I mentioned previously the importance of being aware of the terms related
to intentionality; in this section I highlight the relationship between in-
tentionality and what is known as singular thought. There is significant
convergence between the term intentionality and what has become known
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as singular thought or de re thought. When we think about an object,
we are thinking in an intentional and singular way. It would be reason-
able to say that all singular thoughts are intentional, that is to say, they
are about something in particular. However, it would also be reasonable
to say that it isn’t the case that all intentional expressions are singular.1
What is more, acquaintance relations are often taken to be a precondition
for singular thought. Burge (1977, 51) famously stated, “a de re belief is
a belief whose correct ascription places the believer in an appropriate non-
conceptual, contextual relation to objects the belief is about.” The concern
is then even though some have attempted to suggest that intentionality is
non-relational, they face the issue that if singular thought is intentional
and singular thought requires acquaintance relations—of some kind—then
at least in these cases where intentionality rests on these acquaintance re-
lations, intentionality appears to be constituted by a relation, for as Burge
(2010, 72) states, “being in many mental states constitutively requires that
there be relations between those mental states and a subject matter”. What
is more, the paradigmatic cases involved in the problem of non-existence are
ones which tend to involve singular thought. For example, these problem
cases often take one of the following forms:
1. Alexius is thinking about the Golden Mountain.
2. Mark is thinking about Bertie, the pug that is both portly and not
portly.
1And the relationality of non-singular thought is a different matter.
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3. David is thinking about his counterpart who expresses a preference
for automobiles over locomotives.
4. Theodore is thinking about a sea battle that takes place in the future.
5. Jonathan is thinking about a sea battle in the future.
6. Terence is thinking about Holmes.
Sainsbury attempts to escape the concerns I have raised with a similar
trick to those who try to escape the relationality of intentionality employ.
Sainsbury (2010, 300) points out that one might think there is a distinction
between external singular thought and internal singular thought. He states:
Some thoughts are externally singular : there is an object which
the thought is about. Some thoughts which are not externally
singular are internally singular : although there is no object the
thought is about, it recruits resources of a kind appropriate to
external singular.
(Sainsbury, 2010, 300)
The distinction seems to amount to a thought being external if there is
some object which it is about and internal if there is no object.
Sainsbury provides a helpful example to clarify this distinction.
Jack wants a sloop (I am using “thought” broadly, so that want-
ing is a species of thinking). The desire is externally singular if
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there is a sloop (a “specific sloop”) he wants. There are two ways
which the desire can fail to be externally singular (so we cannot
describe the case just in terms of Quine’s notional/relational dis-
tinction, for we need three pigeon-holes and not just two.) The
desire can be wholly non-specific: the desire is, as Quine (1948,
117) famously put it, for relief from slooplessness. But the con-
tent of the desire can alternatively possess internal singularity.
This is so if Jack has engaged in very specific imagining: “She’s
called The Mary Jane; 42 ft, a nanteen sail...." Of an existing
sloop Jack might truly say: “That’s not the sloop I want; I want
The Mary Jane; and in fact she should be ready in a couple of
months — I’ve already signed the contract with the shipyard.”
Alas, tragedy strikes, and The Mary Jane that features in the
content of the desire is the kind of concept appropriate to ex-
ternal singularity, though that kind of singularity is absent, so
the desire counts as internally singular.
(Sainsbury, 2010, 300)
Put simply, according to Sainsbury (2010, 301) “External singularity is
a relation: a subject is related to an object. Internal singularity is not
relational in this way.”
Again the problem I have highlighted previously raises its head here too.
Whether a thought is external or internal seems to depend not on anything
about the thought itself but on the ontology one adopts before analysing
thought. The question is, were Sainsbury to adopt a perfectly extensional
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ontology, would he be happy to admit that all thought was extensional?
Based on his account he should, but I do not think he would be happy to
admit to this.
5.5 Intensionality
Another distinction that needs drawing is between Intentionality and In-
tensionality. Put quite simply, the distinction between the two terms can
be characterised as follows: intentionality is a term that relates to what
thoughts are about whereas intensionality is a term that relates to what
words are about.
Sainsbury (2010, 305) provides four conditions which if any hold indicates
a verb V is intensional. In the following set of conditions “NP” refers to
some noun phrase and “F” stands for some object:
1. A sentence of the form “NP1-V-NP2” can be (genuinely and liter-
ally) true even if the corresponding “there is no such existent, actual
concrete thing as NP2” is true.
2. A sentence of the form “NP-V-an F” can be true even if “there is no
existent, actual concrete F such that NP-V-it” is true.
3. A sentence of the form “NP-V-an F but no F in particular” can be
true.
4. Sentences of the form “NP1-V-NP2” and “NP2=NP3” can both be
true even if “NP1-V-NP3” is not.
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Each condition comes with a corresponding example.
1. “The Greeks worshipped Zeus” is true even though “There is no such
existent, actual concrete thing as Zeus” is true.
2. Condition two can arise in two ways. The first way is through lack of
anything answering to the noun in the indefinite phrase, as in: “The
Greeks worshipped a God” is true even though “There is no existent,
actual concrete god such that the Greeks worshipped it” is true. The
second is through unspecificity, as in Quine’s famous example. It
may be that “I want a sloop” is true, read as implicitly qualified by
“but no sloop in particular”, even though “there is no sloop such that
I want it” is true. Sloop desires can be specified in two ways, the
externally singular way and the internally singular one. The former
is what Quine (1956) calls, appropriately enough, the relational case:
the state consists in a relation between a [subject] (S) and a sloop.
In the latter case, the subject has desires which are specific in their
contents even though they fail to be relational: John does not want
any old sloop but a particular sloop, The Mary Jane (even though
there is no such sloop and never will be).
3. The third mark is the possibility of truth when “but not F is partic-
ular” is added to something in the form “NP-V-an F”; the possibility
of an unspecific reading. Arguably, the third mark can fail even when
the second mark is satisfied. “The Greeks worshipped a god, but no
god in particular” cannot be true, but many will think that the infer-
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ence from their worshipping a god to there being a god they worship
is suspect.
4. The fourth mark is the supposed failure of substitution of identical to
preserve truth. On standard views, this can’t apply if the first mark
is present, for empty terms cannot enter into truths of identity. As a
further sign of the possible divergences among the marks, many think
that “worship” does not satisfy 4, even though it does satisfy 1.
The terms intentionality and intensionality are closely related, but the dis-
tinction made here can be helpful. As I proceed in this thesis, I will use the
term intentionality when I am talking about thoughts and propositional at-
titudes. I will be using intensionality when I am talking about the meaning
of words and the truth of propositions.
5.6 Conclusion
There is significant controversy as to whether intentionality is a relation or
not. There are those who think that intentionality is non-relational and
those who think it or some constitutive part of it is. In this thesis, it is my
aim to introduce a new player to the problem of non-existence and not to
argue significantly in favour of one conception of intentionality or another.
In this chapter, I have outlined intentionality and the related terms. I have
merely introduced the term so that an unfamiliar reader can get a general
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handle on the terms as I proceed. In the later chapters, I provide more
substantial discussion about what I take to be the nature of intentionality.
Although the majority of this chapter has had the purpose of introducing
terms and avoiding argumentation, I have, in places, pointed out that to
insist that intentionality is non-relational is a part solution to the problem
of non-existence; thus, in this chapter I have tried to introduce the concept
in a neutral way that does not introduce and preclude relationality to in-
tentionality. In my opinion, the relationality of intentional is not detailed
by any theory of intentionality; it is detailed by one’s ontology. Those with
fully extensional ontologies might be more inclined to think of intentional-
ity as relational, and if you have more of an intensional ontology, then you
might naturally think of intentionality in a non-relational way.
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Chapter 6
Ways of Responding to the
Problem of Non-existence
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I articulate some of the most recent, well-known and vi-
able responses to the problem of non-existence. I conclude the chapter
by proposing a new and underexplored option for handling the problem of
non-existence. This new option makes use of a metaphysical framework
known as extended modal realism that I outlined in Chapter 2. This ex-
tended modal realist framework allows for a perfectly extensional theory of
intentionality and sufficiently solves the problem of non-existence.
The problem turns on the assumption that in order for a relation to hold,
it requires the existence of both its relata (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012,
9). This problem has been discussed at length by Crane (2013). Crane
takes a similar line to Prior (1971). Ultimately both Prior and Crane ap-
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proach the problem by challenging the relational structure of intentionality.
More recently there has been a resurgence in closely related Meinongian-
style solutions. These approaches have notably been forwarded by Parsons
(1981), Zalta (1988), Priest (2016) and Berto (2018).1 In this chapter I
explore the option for a new solution to the problem of non-existence, one
which has only been hinted at by Yagisawa (2014).2
The new solution I am offering makes use of the metaphysics of exten-
ded modal realism. The extended modal realist solution is functionally
much like the neo-Meinongian approach, particularly Priest’s version. Both
extended modal realism and neo-Meinongianism share the similarity that
they include, straightforwardly, in their ontology the objects of our inten-
tional attitudes. Given this feature, both approaches solve the problem of
non-existence by satisfying the relational structure of intentionality. Ad-
mittedly, the way this is achieved differs. I take this difference to be what
ultimately separates modal realist-style positions from Meinongian-style po-
sitions. The difference comes in how things exist or don’t exist. Some of the
more straightforward ways of distinguishing extended modal realism from
neo-Meinongianism will not work. extended modal realism and noneism
1Berto calls his position “Modal Meinongianism” and Priest calls his position
“Noneism”; it is reasonable to say they are both varieties of neo-Meinongianism even
if they both diverge significantly from traditional Meinongianism. I take it that Parsons
would be happy to have his position referred to as neo-Meinongian without any addi-
tional caveats. I have decided not to focus on detailing traditional Meinongianism. The
position has undergone much scholarship. In order to keep this project manageable, I
will not retrace what has already been written on the subject. Rather, I try to show
where my position fits into the contemporary literature.
2Caddick (2012) employs a system which resembles parts of both modal realism and
Meinongianism. However, she does not do so in relation to intentionality. Rather, she is
more focused on how we can use this hybrid system to understand our engagement with
fiction qua literary devices better.
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use singular quantification and both include non-existent objects in their
ontologies. However, for the noneist, their non-existent objects lack “be-
ing”. Whereas under extended modal realism non-existent objects are just
as real as existent objects. What distinguishes non-existent and existent
objects under extended modal realism is their position relative to an ob-
server: their modal index. Rather than the objects of our intention being
those objects which lack being, the objects of our intention are possible or
impossible entities, which do not exist but are real.1 The sole purpose of
this chapter is to survey some of the most prominent solutions to the prob-
lem of non-existence and to introduce what I take to be a new and more
successful solution to the problem of non-existence.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §6.2 I recap what the problem
of non-existence is and how it has been developed. Then in §6.3, I will sur-
vey some of the solutions to the problem; there have been too many to cover
them all so I will focus on what I take to be recent archetypal solutions. I
will point out, as many have done before me, that solutions which are not
underpinned by ontological commitments will fail. I do not take the lack of
ontological commitment to mean that only solutions which are ontologic-
ally committed to non-existents can be successful, rather that all successful
theories must respect the de re aspect of the problem of non-existence. To
answer this aspect of the problem requires a metaphysical framework. An
attempted solution which ignores this dimension is a non-starter. Solutions
that take the object of our intention as some purely mental object lack the
1See Chapter 7 for more details on how it is I distinguish between existence and
non-existence.
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relevant ontological underpinnings and fail to genuinely provide an answer
to the problem of non-existence. Finally in 6.5, I will outline a new solution
to the problem of non-existence which relies on the metaphysics of a position
known as extended modal realism. I will conclude with a sketch of some
reasons as to why we might opt for the extended modal realism response
which will be elaborated on in a separate chapter. In short, we should prefer
extended modal realism because it can provide a more versatile and a more
fine-grained account of intentional relations with non-existent objects than
competing theories can. Throughout out this chapter I make critical com-
ments about other viable options for solutions to problems of non-existence
these comments are provided only to show that there is space for a new
theory to occupy. They are not intended to knockdown objections to any
of these theories.
6.2 The Problem of Non-existence
Here I quickly recap the problem of non-existence which I outlined in detail
in Chapter 3. The problem at hand has been characterised neatly by Prior
in the following way:
X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation between X and Y when
Y exists, but not when Y doesn’t; but X’s thinking of Y is the
same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. Something plainly
has to be given up here; what will it be?
(Prior, 1971, 130)
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The problem of non-existence can be formulated neatly as an inconsistent
triad made up of the following propositions which cannot be jointly held
(Crane, 2001, 24).
1. All thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things which they
are about.
2. Instantiations of relations entail the existence of their relata.
3. Some thoughts are about things which do not exist.
(3) seems evident given the examples provided in the previous section. (2)
rests on the common philosophical assumption that relations entail the
existence of their relata. Although (2) and (3) are largely uncontroversial,
(1) has received significantly more discussion. Notably Prior, Crane and
Kriegel have all challenged (1) on the grounds that thoughts about objects
are not always relations. Crane (2001, 26) takes the position that “Not
all thoughts are relations between thinkers and things they are about.”
However, not even Crane can deny that some thoughts are relations. What
is more, this position seems to come out of a response to the problem of
non-existence and isn’t independently motivated.1
I am in no doubt that the mind is complicated and the entire process
of “thinking about something” cannot be explained by the presence of a
metaphysical relation. However, what I am interested in is the metaphysical
dimension to the problem of non-existence, and it seems fair to say there
1This is particularly obvious in Crane (2001).
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is a well-established view under which it is at least standard to think that
thoughts about objects are relations (of some complex kind).
6.3 Possible Responses
Before I get to the various successful responses, I will first address one
response which doesn’t get very far. One of the immediate and most natural
ways to respond to this question is to suggest that non-existent objects are
purely mental abstracta. That is to say, when we stand in an intentional
relation to a non-existent object, it is a relation with a pure representation.
The strategy of a representational approach is to have a subject stand in an
intentional relation with a “surrogate object” in effect rejecting (1). Given
this move, our subject no longer stands in an intentional relation with a
non-existent object. Instead, they stand in an intentional relation with a
surrogate for the non-existent object. A surrogate, in this case, might be an
idea or an imagining that acts as a stand-in for an object.1 At first glance
it looks like positions of this kind do avoid the paradoxical element of the
problem of intentionality.
However, Priest provides a series of arguments to suggest that this cannot
be the case. Priest’s argument takes the form that even if presented in the
most charitable way, a formalisation of an intentional relationship involving
a representation acting as a surrogate for a non-existent object will fail.
Priest breaks his argument down into steps showing, in turn, that each
1It seems like Lamarque (1981) defends such a position.
89
6.3.1. Attempt 1
formulation is a dead-end for the representationalist. Priest concludes
that there is nowhere for the representationalist to turn, so an alternat-
ive strategy must be pursued. In Priest’s formulation he uses the symbol
“G” rather than “∃” on the grounds that reading ∃ as “there exists” is just
too strong. He suggests we read Gx as “something x”. I agree that his point
is correct, important and valuable. It is a mistake to read straightforward
existence into the existential quantifier. I don’t agree, however, that we
need to substitute a new symbol. We ought to get ourselves into the good
practice of reading ∃x as “something x” in all circumstances. Therefore, I
will use ∃ in retelling Priest’s argument against the representationalist.
6.3.1 Attempt 1
The first move the representationalist can make is to re-analyse the state-
ment “Anna fears Zeus” so that what Anna (a) fears is something which
exists, for example a mental image. Let us say Anna has a representation
of Zeus. We will use F ′ to indicate the kind of fear one would have towards
a representation. In this picture, the content of our object box is a mental
representation.
However, Priest (2016, 58) points out this is not a satisfactory analysis on
the grounds that it does not account for the statement, “there is someone





To make sense of this, the quantifier must range over the representation,
but then the second conjunct, according to Priest, is nonsense: the repres-
entation is not a man at all, nice or otherwise (Priest, 2016, 58). Priest is
effectively arguing that representations are simply not the kind of things
which can be nice, mean, or otherwise (at least not in the same way a per-
son can be nice). Therefore, this analysis does not correctly express what
the representationalist meant to express.
6.3.2 Attempt 2
Another attempt the representationalist could make to save their view is
by invoking the relation “x is a representation of y” (xRy). We would then
give the sentence the form:
∃x∃y(aF ′x ∧ xRy ∧My)
Priest presents further problems with this formulation: how are two people
supposed to fear the same thing if it a representation? Supposedly Anna
and Ben (b) fear the same thing which is a representation formalised as:
∃x(aF ′x ∧ bF ′x)
This will not do either since here both agents merely fear a representation:
there is no way of telling that Anna and Ben have exactly the same mental
representation of the object. Another formalisation we could try is:
∃x∃y∃z(aF ′x ∧ bF ′y ∧ xRz ∧ yRz)
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Priest lets us know that this could work if Anna and Ben both fear the
same existent object (z). But of course, if the object or state of affairs in
question does not exist, then non-existent objects are still being invoked; if
this were the case, then the theory would not truly be a representationalist
theory (Priest, 2016, 58–59).
6.3.3 Attempt 3
Following Priest’s arguments, he suggests that at this point it would only
be natural to define an equivalence relation between representations, “∼”,
such that x ∼ y iff x and y are representations that appear to be of the
same thing, z, and if z exists, then Anna and Ben actually are fearing the
same thing. We can then give the sentence the form:
∃x∃y(aF ′x ∧ bF ′y ∧ x ∼ y)
However, without noneism, Priest points out, it seems difficult to under-
stand the equivalence relation “∼”. Different representations of the same
object can be arbitrarily different. If x and y are merely representations,
how are we to understand they are equivalent? There are obvious meta-
physical concerns about the identity conditions of representations that are
highlighted by Priest.
The arguments that Priest provides show that any theory that attempts to
employ a surrogate to substitute the object of our intention will struggle.
Even given the strongest formulation, they are at a significant disadvantage
since it is common for subjects to share an intentional object, but under
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a pure representationalist picture, this cannot happen easily. Moreover,
without metaphysical commitment, or elaboration, representationalism faces
the challenge that there is nothing behind the representation. If this is the
case, then without anything behind said representation they encounter the
strange position of standing in intentional relations with purely mental en-
tities, which are not the kinds of things that can be scary, nice, or otherwise.
If we agree that a relation to some purely mental object will not work, we
are able to characterise some desiderata for a solution to the problem of
non-existence. A good solution to the problem should either provide an
object for the agent to stand in a relation with or it should say why the
object is not needed.
However, this does not rule out direct, intentional relations that also include
a mediary mental state, for example fearing x via a belief about x, or pitying
y via imagination about y. Whatever mental mechanics are in play have no
bearing on the metaphysics of the issue. To not accept this would reduce
us to a view where all we could express intentional attitudes about are just
those things we have direct perception of; this is of course absurd. So, we
must continue to use F ′ rather than F simpliciter in our formalisations.
To my mind there are two viable and archetypal responses to the problem of
non-existence. The first archetype is to maintain the traditional structure
of intentionality and suggest that the object of our intentional attitude is
real, exists, or in some other way is in the domain of which our intentional
attitudes can access. The other kind of approach accepts that objects of
thought are non-existent (in the everyday way) and instead deny that in-
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tentionality is a genuine relation. Priest (2016) promotes a solution of the
first kind while Crane (2001, 2013) promotes a solution of the second kind.
The first kind satisfies the relational structure of intentionality. The second
explains why the relational structure does not need satisfying. These kinds
of solutions are detailed below. Although these two positions are certainly
archetypal responses, there is a third option offered to us by Sainsbury
(2018) which I will also present. Sainsbury’s solution claims to maintain
both the intuition that intentionality is relational and the intuition that we
cannot stand in relations with non-existent objects. Sainsbury’s solution is
arguably the middle ground between the two archetypes.
6.3.4 Towards Non-being
As an alternative to the representationalist theory, Priest provides us with
an obvious and neat strategy for dealing with intentional predication to-
wards non-being and that is to say existent objects can stand in intentional
relations with non-existing objects. He calls this strategy noneism. Priest
states,
when one fears something, one has a direct phenomenological
experience of a relation to the object of the fear. And the phe-
nomenology is quite independent of whether or not the object
actually exists. What more appropriate, then, to suppose that
objects may exist or not, and that their existential status is ir-
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relevant to whether or not they can be the target of intentional
states? (Priest, 2016, 58–59)
In a nutshell, Priest thinks it is possible for us to stand in an intentional
relation with a non-existent object in just the same way as we can stand
in a relation with an existent object. For Priest it is straightforwardly the
non-existent object, the object without being, that we are standing in an
intentional relation with. This is Priest’s general strategy. He allows that
the objects of our thoughts exist and literally characterise the properties
they have. Priest, however, develops his solution to the problem of non-
existence by saying more about intentionality.1 In relation to intentionality,
Priest (2014, 159) says:
So let R be any intentional relation (perceives, admire, fears,
dreams...). The aRo iff there is some R-mental state of a, s such
there is an i-couple a, s − o. (Of course, a can bear more than
one intentional relation to the same object.)
For Priest (2014, 159) an intentional mental state is simply “one that is the
subject pole of an appropriate i-couple”.2
We could describe intentionality for Priest as a relation between two parts
of one object. He continues and states that since an i-couple is an object it
1Priest’s characterisation principle (CP) differs from that of traditional Meinongian-
ism; see (Priest, 2016, 83–85). Priest’s take on the characterization principles has little
impact on his theory of intentionality and thus it will not be detailed in full here but
sketched below.
2Priest describes an i-couple as a single thing with two poles, a subject pole s and
an object pole o. He also notes that since the i-couple is a single thing it will have a
gluon (Priest, 2014, 159).
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has a gluon g.1 Given that s = g = o′ Priest can take the relation between
s and o to constitute intentionality. For Priest intentionality “captures” an
object simply because the mental state s is glued to its object o via o′. For
Priest gluons are literally the glue of intentionality. Priest summaries his
position on intentionality as follows:
Intentionality has been explained in terms of there being a cer-
tain object, an i-couple. And the intentional bond is the gluon
of that unity. This is a substantial explanation of intentional-
ity.2(Priest, 2014, 160).
6.3.5 Characterisation Principle
Priest not only allows us to stand in relations with non-existent objects
but he also maintains that these non-existent objects literally have the
properties which characterise them. Priest (2016, 83) describes the standard
Characterisation Principle (CP) as follows:
When we represent an object to ourselves we may do so in terms
of its properties. Thus, we represent Holmes as living in Baker
St, being a detective of acute powers of observation and infer-
ence, etc.; we, or the Ancient Greeks, represent Zeus as being
the head of the Greek Pantheon, as living on Mt Olympus, etc.;
1I will not detail Priest’s gluon theory here. For a detailed discussion on gluon theory
see (Priest, 2014).
2Priest admits that it does not tell us when the relation of intentionality obtains and
suggests that we ought to look to other theories to tell us what objects exist and when.
In this case he suggests this is the remit of cognitive science (Priest, 2014, 160).
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we or the nineteenth-century astronomers who proposed its ex-
istence, represent Vulcan—the planet, not the god—as being
a planet that has a sub-Mercurial orbit, and whose existence
accounts for the precision of Mercury’s perihelion; and so on.
It would seem that these objects, must in some sense, have
the properties that they are characterised as having. If they
didn’t we wouldn’t know what we were talking about when we
talk about them. Moreover, we would seem to be able to think
about, imagine, tell a story about an object with any old bunch
of properties that we can put together.
Priest, however, takes issue with the traditional formalisation of the CP on
the grounds that there is no principled way of deciding what predicates are
characterising.1 As a result, Priest makes the suggestion that the objects
which we characterise with a representation have the characterising prop-
erties, not at the actual world, but in the worlds (partially) described by
the relevant representation (Priest, 2016, 84). Priest states:
Holmes has the properties he is characterised as having not at
this world, but at those worlds that realise the way I represent
the world to be when I read the Holmes stories. And Vulcan
has the properties it is characterised as having at those worlds
that realise the theory of the nineteenth-century scientists who
postulate its existence.
1For details see Priest (2016, 83–84).
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(Priest, 2016, 84)
Priest is able to respond to the problem of non-existence in the first instance
by allowing for there to be something which satisfies the object box in the
relational structure of intentionality, namely objects which literally have
the properties they are characterised as having. Moreover, his gluon theory
allows him to develop the intentionality relation as one between a subject
and object—in an i-couple—connected by a gluon.
6.4 Intentionality Is not a Relation
Potentially we are not satisfied with the traditional structure of intentional-
ity and might opt for a solution that rejects intentionality as a relation. As
mentioned this strategy has been promoted firstly by Prior (1971, 112–130).
Prior considers a number of reasons why we might doubt that intentional-
ity is a relation and thinks “...there are strong reasons for not regarding ‘X
is thinking of Y ’ as expressing a relation between X and Y ” (Prior, 1971,
112). However, in an effort to keep the discussion contemporary, I will focus
on the argument advanced by Crane (2001, 2013). Crane’s solution to the
problem is to appeal to a different concept of intentional object. He states
“An intentional object is not a kind of object, but rather the intentional
object of a thought T is what is given in answer to the question ‘What is
T about?’ ” (Crane, 2001, 26). If this question has an answer then the
thought has an intentional object. Crane takes it that if this is the case
then our best option is to reject the claim that all thoughts are relations
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between thinkers and the things they are about. His grounds for this are
that “relations must be relations between things, yet the intentional object
of thought is not a real thing. After all, intentional objects are not such
things”(Crane, 2001, 26).1
Crane (2001, 26–27) draws a distinction between externalism and internal-
ism. Externalism is the view that some thoughts are broad and intention-
alism is the view that intentional states are narrow. If a mental state S
is broad, then the existence of S entails the existence of its object. Inter-
nalism denies that an intentional state always entails the existence of the
thing it is about. A thought is narrow when its existence does not entail
the existence of its objects. So thoughts about non-existent objects are on
the face of it narrow. Crane argues that the view not all intentional states
are relational comes naturally from the idea that not all intentional states
have intentional objects.
6.4.1 Relational Intentionality but Non-relational
Representation
Sainsbury (2018) offers a solution to the problem of non-existence which
he thinks does justice to both the intuition that intentionality is relational
and also to the intuition that we cannot stand in relationships with non-
existent objects. His strategy begins with the denial of Brentano’s thesis,
and holds that some intentional states can lack intentional objects, this
1Crane adds the caveat that this is not to say that no thoughts involve relations to
real existing things; it is just that not all of them do.
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strategy, he says, allows us to use intentional objects in a perfectly sensible
way. Sainsbury takes the position that there is nothing problematic about
empty (non-relational) representation (2018, 143).1 Sainsbury sharpens his
position, stating:
My approach to resolving Prior’s puzzle involves distinguishing
different species of relationality: factual, semantic, phenomenal,
and metaphysical. Only the last has a serious claim to be fun-
damental: all intentional states have the same degree of meta-
physical relationality, for they all involve a two-term relation
between a subject and a representation.(Sainsbury, 2018, 144)
Sainsbury describes the kinds of relationality in the following ways.
1. Factual relationality. A fact is n-place relation just if it involves n
terms. (The word “relational” is often used for facts involving two or
more terms. One-term facts are often called non-relational.)
2. Semantic relationality. A fact is n-place semantically relational iff it
can be stated by a sentence dominated by an n-place verb, one that
takes n noun phrases to make a sentence.
3. Phenomenal relationality. An intentional state is phenomenally n+1-
term relational iff in being in the state, it is for the subject as if there
are n things before her mind.
1Sainsbury draws a distinction between representation and representation* where
representation* is extensional. Sainsbury (2018, 143) insists that representation may be
empty, but representation* may not.
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4. Metaphysical relationality. An intentional state is metaphysically n-
term relation iff in its metaphysical nature it involves n terms.
(Sainsbury, 2018, 144–146)
Despite Sainsbury’s distinction drawing, his solution to the problem of
non-existence comes down to the fact that he thinks our representation
of non-existent objects is non-relational and that only our thinking about
concepts is relational. It might be objected that Sainsbury might be faced
with Priest’s challenges against the representationalists. However, I will
not articulate the challenges for a second time. Sainsbury (2018, 27) argues
that intentional states are always relations to representations, so they are
relational in that sense. However, Sainsbury says that some representations
involved in intentional states are relational but others are not. In the case of
the concept OBAMA the representation is a relation, but in the case of PE-
GASUS it is not.1 Sainsbury (2018, 27) claims that PEGASUS—and other
purely fictional objects are not real, and therefore our representations are
non-relational, but OBAMA is real and therefore our representation is re-
lational.2 For Sainsbury empty concepts are non-relational representations;
this is how Sainsbury provides a solution to Prior’s problem.
When we say truly that the concept PEGASUS represents Pe-
gasus or the concept UNICORNS represents unicorns we are not
1Sainsbury uses capitalisation to denote a concept rather than an object.
2Sainsbury (2018, 150) notes that thinking about something like Obama is “relational
twice over” since it involves both a relation to the concept OBAMA and the object
Obama.
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assigning either concept a relatum. There are truths of the form
“x represents y” even when there is no such entity as y.
(Sainsbury, 2018, 150)
Sainsbury’s solution solves Prior’s problem by denying that our represent-
ation of non-existent objects involve relations to empty concepts, which he
takes to be unproblematic and states:
my account smoothly makes room for both intuitions, with no
appeal to nonexistents. Subjects of intentional states are always
metaphysically related to a representation, satisfying the intu-
ition of relationality. But if the representation itself is empty,
the subject is not related to anything beyond it, satisfying the
intuition of non-relationality. (Sainsbury, 2018, 142)
Whether we think theories in the style of Priest’s, Crane’s, or Sainsbury’s
are successful is not the point of this chapter. My goal here has been
to outline various possible solutions to the problem of non-existence and
show how a new solution based on extended modal realism can fit in. My
solution effectively treats the problem of non-existence as a metaphysical
problem about what there is. Crane himself alludes to the elegance of an
ontology-focused strategy. Crane states, “...it certainly solves our problem of
intentionality in a very elegant and simple way. By appealing to an ontology
of non-existent objects, we can preserve the idea that every intentional state
is a relation to a real object while still maintaining that we can think about
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things which do not exist (since real 6= existent)” (2001, 24). This is the
line I take when it comes to solving the problem of intentionality.
6.5 Extended Modal Realism
6.5.1 The Extended Modal Realist Solution
A modal realist solution to the problem of non-existence has received rel-
atively little attention. However, recently Yagisawa (2014) has highlighted
the usefulness of a modal realist approach; in particular, he has highlighted
the benefits of extended modal realism. Yagisawa states that his theory of
existence has benefits when it comes to dealing with non-existent objects
and intentionality relations. Yagisawa (2014, 14) states:
You admire Miss Marple and marvel at Vulcan, but how can
this be if Miss Marple and Vulcan flatly lack the property of ex-
istence? If there exists no such thing as Miss Marple or Vulcan,
how can you stand in a genuine relation to either of them?
Yagisawa claims that the kind of existence that features in extended modal
realism is free of such an objection. According to extended modal realism,
Miss Marple and you both exist relative to an appropriately chosen set
or frame. We have already seen that Yagisawa’s theory of existence has
problems and because of that I take a slightly different approach, under
which both you and Miss Marple exist relative to the index of an observer.
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Modal realism is a metaphysical system in which there are other ways things
could have been, that is to say other modalities are real. extended modal
realism is the view that not only are possible states of affairs real but so
are impossible states of affairs, or to use Yagisawa’s language “possible and
impossible world-stages”. When it comes to the problem of intentionality,
extended modal realism has the distinct advantage over Lewisian modal
realism that all worlds belong to a single universe. For Yagisawa and ex-
tended modal realism, worlds are not disconnected, concrete wholes; rather,
they are points in the modal dimension of the universe. The universe is ex-
tended in this modal direction just as it is in the temporal direction. The
modal stages of the universe we call world stages. In the previous chapter I
have suggested a change to the extended modal realist’s theory of existence.
I suggest that existence is an indexical just like actuality is. And that we
treat the term real as a phrase to denote that the universe is a proper class
of everything that there is. We now have a picture of where we can’t say
that Miss Marple exists (unless she is actual) but we can say that she is
real and part of the universe. As I have noted previously, what it takes
to be non-existent is just not to be actual. I suggest it is at this point
where extended modal realism makes use of some noneist tools; according
to Priest, we simply can stand in intentional relations with non-existent
objects. I suggest the modal realist can do the same. I present this in
more detail in Chapter 12. However, when cashed out against the back-
ground of extended modal realism, to have an intentional attitude towards
something non-existent is just to have an intentional attitude towards some
possibila or impossibila: a real something. extended modal realism solves
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the problem of non-existence simply by having an object to place in the
object box, a very real but non-existent, non-actual object.1 Under my
picture, extended modal realism is also at liberty to use the “∼” relation as
articulated by Priest. We are on good grounds to think that the extended
modal realist picture will work for the same reasons that the noneist pic-
ture works. Modal realism also, as a matter of happenstance rather than
principle, satisfies some variety of the CP. The objects we represent have
those properties at some possible or impossible world, not because they are
represented as having them just because that is the way the universe is.
Under extended modal realism the account of intentional attitudes towards
a fictional character we give is like this: I (the agent) stands in a genu-
ine intentional relation with something. Lewis tells us plainly that we have
doxastic access to other worlds (Lewis, 1986, 27).2 It seems that straightfor-
wardly modal realism is helpful in solving the problem of non-existence. In
the case of fictional characters it looks like noneism and modal realism are
on fairly equal grounds; however, in the conclusion of this chapter, I touch
on some reasons why we might overall prefer the modal realist approach.
The solution to the problem comes quickly and is straightforward. However,
it would be beneficial to build out the theory.
1I treat intentionality and representation as extensional relations. And I do not buy
into the distinction between about/about* and representation/representation* made by
Sainsbury (2018).
2Lewis is quite explicit that we at least have doxastic access to at least some other
worlds. However, this has been called into question. I provide more details of the




I have shown that there is a modal realist response to the problem of non-
existence. The modal realist takes it that there are non-existent objects.
The modal realist also takes it that we can think about non-existent objects
as just those objects which are at other modal locations. This straightfor-
wardly answers the problem of non-existence and shares some similarities
with the noneist response. So we might begin to wonder why we should go
with the modal realist way rather than the noneist way. The most appealing
reason why we might go the way of the modal realist opposed to the way
of the noneist is that modal realism allows us to make some sense of the
attitudes we have to these non-existent objects. That being said, in the case
of fictional characters, the two positions are relatively equal. However, in
the case of other instances of non-existence, modal realism wins out. Take
for example desiring a certain outcome or fearing a future event. Under
the modal realist pictures, these are perfectly intelligible events. What you
are desiring or fearing is a person or state of fears that could have been
the case. And since we do not privilege the actual, these possibilities could
have been actuality for us. Sinhababu (2008) makes a good case for desiring
possible love interests. If Sinhababu is correct then I think the fact that the
modal realist can make sense of complex relational de re attitudes such as
love gives us a distinct advantage over the noneist. Discussion of complex
attitudes towards non-existent but possible entities will not be covered here








When considering non-existence, it is helpful to have a handle on the re-
lated issue of existence and quantification. In this chapter, I survey some
of the well-articulated and well-known positions about existence and quan-
tification. In Chapter 8, I provide my own stance on this matter.
The following discussion might lead some to think that existence is a com-
plicated and difficult to define notion. I disagree with this. I think with
the indexical understanding we can clearly define what it is for something
to exist and for something not to exist.
The subject of existence has had a long philosophical tradition, and various
theories have been proposed to explain the term. In this chapter, I sketch
the historically iconic thoughts on existence. This chapter is not a compre-
hensive overview of all the available positions. Instead, it is a whirlwind
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tour touching on the views of the most historically significant players in the
existence game. In the first part of the chapter, I focus on whether “exists”
ought to be understood as a predicate. In the second part I look at the evol-
ution of the particular quantifier. From this analysis we should conclude
that the association of the quantifier with existence is a relatively new idea;
it isn’t something we need continue with and is a potentially problematic
association.
It should be noted that what I present here may be considered slightly di-
vergent from what is philosophically popular. The discussion of existence
is normally framed as one between Russell and Meinong. It is normally
presented that Russellians take existence to be expressed by the partic-
ular quantifier and Meinongians take existence to be a predicate. I will
avoid setting up the debate as a juxtaposition between these two thinkers,
for it oversimplifies the matter in a harmful way. The historical picture
I paint is less clean and more scattered. The reason for this is that the
Russell/Meinong dichotomy is a false one, which stems from the paradigms
created by the discussions following the work of Russell and Meinong rather
than by the writers themselves.1 Moreover, Griffin raises concerns about
whether Russell was engaged in an ontological project or a logical one
(Griffin, 1985). Nowhere in “On Denoting” nor in Introduction to Math-
ematical Philosophy does Russell provide an explicit ‘theory of existence’.
Instead, Russell provides a “theory of descriptions” and explains how the
term “exists” fits into this theory. The existence literature is far from uni-
1Some might think this debate about ‘exists’ ultimately turtles down into one about
which kind of logic we use: free logic or classical predicate logic. If this is the case then
we really have a debate where the historical authors are talking past each other.
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form, and carving it up into neat groups is by no means an easy task, not
least because we will see that there are very few authors who are in genuine
disagreement, other than those who disagree at a fundamental level. Most
authors on the topic share the thought that “existence” and by extension
“exists” is not a proper predicate. And by proper predicate I mean it does
not detail a property of an object. However, in various forms, most authors
land on the thought that “exists” is a kind of predicate in one way or an-
other, that is to say, it takes the place of a predicate in sentence structure.
The discussion between most authors boils down to whether “exists” is a
logical predicate or just a grammatical one.
7.2 Exists and Predication
A logical predicate is something that is said of a subject; it is a Boolean
value that can either be true or false. In philosophical logic, if something
is a logical predicate it stands for the property of a subject. Take again
our declarative sentence “Jane(x) runs(P )”. In classical logic, this would
be formalised as ∃x(Px).
There are two problems with the historical debate. First is that most au-
thors agree that “exists” is not straightforwardly a predicate and will want
to make some kind of adjustment to the status of “exists” as a predicate.
Those authors who say that “exists” is a predicate do so with a caveat.
The second problem is the natural temptation to conflate logical and gram-
matical predicates. The conflation of “exists” as a logical and grammatical
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predicate is what Thomson refers to as “Mr Pears’ difficulty”.
A predicate is a certain type of word or phrase, such as “runs”,
“is warm”, “is married to the younger sister of a violinist”. Then
whatever existence may be, it is certainly not a predicate, since
it is not a word or phrase.1 So, then, it may seem that the
question must be “Is (the verb) ‘exists’ a predicate?” That is
how Mr Pears tacitly takes it. And if that is the question, then
there seems no reason for not returning an affirmative answer.
(Pears and Thomson, 1963, 103)
Thomson, in response to Pears, explains that there is more than one way
of looking at “exists”. He suggests that rather than taking our cue from the
word “predicate”, we could instead take our cue from the word “existence”
and ask something about it. If this were the case, then the question would
be, is “existence” an attribute objects have?
Thomson’s under-recognised comments help us to clarify the issue of exist-
ence. He points out that there are at least three ways to look at the debate
over the term “existence” (and “exists”). The first is whether existence is
an attribute or property that the subject or object has. The second way is
whether “exists” is a grammatical predicate. Finally, there is the question
as to whether “exists” is a logical predicate. Even with Thomson’s distinc-
tions in place, the literature is still far from clear. I will use the way that
Thomson carves the debate to outline the historical context.
1“Existence” is most certainly a word. I think what Thomson means is existence is
not the right kind of word.
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7.3 Types of Existence
This section is split into subsections; each contains a cluster of views about
existence which are loosely grouped together. There are those who think
existence is a property of an object, those who think “exists” is a predicate
(of a special kind), and are those who think existence is divorced from
the existential quantifier. Finally, there are those philosophers who think
existence is closely linked to the existential quantifier and think “exists” is
not a (logical) predicate.
7.3.1 Existence as a Property
First, I look at those philosophers who think that existence is a property
of an object. That is to say, existence adds something to the object. Aqui-
nas makes a distinction between essence and existence. Aquinas argued
that one could have an understanding of what a man or Phoenix is while
being ignorant of whether it has being in reality(Aquinas, 1968, 55).1 So,
existence can be something in addition to the essence of an object. The
crux of Aquinas’s argument is that existence can be a separate property as
existence is not part of the nature of most objects, and so those objects can
be conceived of separately from their existence. The Thomistic position
that existence is a property is generally unpopular. Most contemporary
1Aquinas does not think this is the case for all beings, however. Aquinas states,
“...there must be a reality that is the cause of being for all other things, because it is
pure being” (Aquinas, 1968, 57). Aquinas here is referring to God, a being where essence
and existence cannot be separated.
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philosophers agree that existence is not a straightforward property. How-
ever, there appears to be significant disagreement about what existence is.
Although there is reason to think this disagreement is not as deep as many
would have us believe, as I show as the argument develops in what follows.
7.3.2 Exists as a Predicate
Those who think “exists” is a predicate do not necessarily think that it is
a property. And those who think “exists” is not a logical predicate do not
necessarily think that it is not a grammatical predicate. Now, let’s turn our
attention to the second group: those who think “exists” is a predicate, but
that it has special or selected uses. Pears argues that “exists” is a predicate.
It is used when the subject which is predicated of (is supposed to exist at
one time) is said to exist at another time (Pears and Thomson, 1963).
The correct usage of “exists” as a predicate would be in a sentence such
as “Dinosaurs no longer exist”. Another case when, according to Pears,
it would be correct to use exists as a predicate would be in cases where
existence is presupposed in one world and asserted in another. An example
of what is meant by this is “The house I dreamt about really exists”.
Alston suggests that it is permissible that “exists” can be used as a predicate
in some places. For example, exists could be used as a predicate in cases
where X is presupposed to have one mode, and we can predicate existence
of it in another mode. Alston states, “The way is then open to regarding
‘King Arthur really existed’ and ‘Centaurs do not really exist’ as subject-
predicate statements” (Alston, 1960, 459).
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7.3.3 Existence and Quantification
Before I provide the remaining two views in this section, I will use this
paragraph to provide a brief aside and expand on the different readings
of the existential quantifier. In classical logic, the existential quantifier
symbolised as “∃” is read as “there exists”, and it is commonly thought to
be existence entailing. However, this is not the only way that ∃ can be read.
In a free logic, the existential quantifier can be read in a neutral way: a way
which is not existence entailing. Under a neutral reading, the existential
quantifier is read as “there is” or “something”.1 Using a free logic, we can
escape concerns about existence statements being tautological. Sentences
such as “swans exist” is not tautological under a free logic. In a logic where
the existential quantifier is read as “exists”, this sentence is tautological,
and it would be read as “There exists some swans that exist”. However, in
a logic where the existential quantifier is read as “something”, the sentence
then would be read as “something swans exist” or as “some swans exist”.
In free logic, we can express the existence of swans by using “exists” as an
informative logical predicate.
Back to the overview of positions on “exists”. There are those who take
“exists” to be a special kind of predicate. Routley analyses existence by
using two kinds of quantification. Routley thinks there is existentially loaded
quantification and existentially neutral quantification (Routley, 1980, 174–
180). According to Routley, we use “exists” as the word in cases of loaded
1(Lambert, 1991) coined the term “free logic” to mean a logic free from existential
assumptions. (Priest, 2016) notes that the existential quantifier can be read as “some-
thing” in all cases. I follow Priest’s usage.
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quantification, whereas “there are” and “some” are used in cases of neutral
quantification. Given this we can say that for Routley “exists” is strictly a
predicate but we can make more fine-grained “existence-type” statements
by using “there are” or “some” in cases where we do not mean to use loaded
quantification.
Parsons, who followed in Routley’s footsteps, also argues that exists is a
predicate but of a special kind. “Exists” is a kind of predicate that Parsons
refers to as an “extranuclear predicate”. An “extranuclear predicate” is a
predicate that does not stand for a property. On the other hand, “nuclear
predicates” do stand for properties of objects. What is more, the addition
of “exists” as an extranuclear predicate is informative, and it details the
ontological status of the swans in question. So under Parsons’s theory, using
“exists” as a logical predicate would also be permissible since he operates
with a free logic where ∃ is not necessarily existence entailing.
To make Parson’s point more clear, I use his example and divide predicates
into two kinds (Terence, 1980, 23).
Nuclear Predicates: “is blue”, “is tall”, “kicked Socrates”, “was kicked
by Socrates”, “kicked somebody”, “is golden”, “is a mountain”.
Extranuclear Predicates: Ontological: “exist”, “mythical”, “is fictional”.
Modal: “is possible”, “is impossible”
Intentional: “is thought about by Meinong”, “is worshipped by someone”.
Technical: “is complete”.
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7.3.4 Existence and Logical Predication
The final position is advanced by those that argue that existence is not a
predicate of the logical sort, the sort which stands for an attribute or char-
acteristic of the object. Instead of thinking of ‘exists’ as a logical predicate,
this group suggests existence is captured by the existential quantifier. Those
who fall into this group take it that existence should not be used as a logical
predicate on the grounds that it is tautological. This thought arguably has
its origins in Kant’s work and popularised by Quine. Kant tells us that
existence is not a real predicate. Kant states existence is not “a predicate
which is added to the concept of a subject and enlarges it” (Kant, 1999,
Ch.3, Sect. 4). Kant argues that adding exists to the subject is tautolo-
gical. To say the “lion exists” amounts to saying there “exists a lion that
exists”. The idea that existence is not a logical predicate is supported in
modernity. Moore and Kneale continue this line of thought. Kneale states,
“The sentence ‘tame tigers exist’ may mislead philosophers into thinking
that existence is a predicate, because it is grammatically similar to such
sentences as ‘tame tigers growl’ and ‘Rajah growls’ ” (Kneale and Moore,
1936, 164). Kneale argues that existence is only a grammatical predicate
and is so often confused for a logical predicate because it takes its place
in the grammatical structure of sentences. Moore follows a similar line
and states “exists”, in this usage [about tame tigers], does not “stand for
an attribute”(Kneale and Moore, 1936, 180). And Peetz concludes with a
more moderate view, stating it is just not accurate to say that “exists” is
not a predicate. However, Peetz continues: “but it cannot be used, as most
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other predicates can, to describe a characteristic (or habit) which something
has”(Peetz, 1982, 401).
Despite all this line drawing for ease of digestion, we should note that Berto
(2012, 49–50) states “even that the Quinean, famous for the thought that
exists is expressed by the particular quantifier, should admit that ‘exists’
is a predicate. The Quinean ...after reflecting upon the fact that her logic
allows for an existence predicate of individuals in the most well known way:
x exists=df ∃y(y = x). The Quinean predicate is definable, reduced to
the existential quantifier and identity”. Berto (2015, 243) makes a similar
point: “The point of Quineanism is that the property at issue is reduced to
the quantifier — and identity. Both quantification and identity are logical
notions. So existence is, in a precise sense, a logical property”. Given this,
I think it is reasonable to say that debates about what “exists” refers to
are very muddled and difficult to unpick. Ultimately, it seems that when
it comes down to it, most authors are generally in agreement that exists is
some kind of predicate; some think it can be reduced and some deny that
reduction. The difference in views comes at the level of ontology and what
we are happy to admit to our ontology. Therefore it really seems that meta-
ontology commitments about how to understand “exists” are reflected by
ontological commitments about what there is rather than meta-ontological
detailing ontology.
In the following part of the chapter, I provide an analysis of how we ended
up in this situation.
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7.4 How We Got Here
As I mentioned in the introduction, I will say more about the development
of existence and the particular quantifier. In this section, I will highlight
how we came to be in a position where the existential quantifier became
existentially loaded. Priest (2016, 330) tells us it was not until very recently.
This is a tale of how certain usage after many years can become ‘tradition’ or
‘dogma’ without anyone batting an eyelid. Priest’s retelling of the history
between the quantifiers and existential loading pinpoints two characters,
Peirce and Frege as the starting point, and this is where we pick up the
story.12
7.4.1 Peirce
The first use of something like the particular quantifier we use in contempor-
ary logic was introduced by Peirce. Peirce writes the particular quantifier as
ε and reads it simply as “some” which we can see in the following example:
Here, in order to render the notation as iconical as possible we
may use ε for some, suggesting a sum, and π for all suggesting
a product. Thus, εixi means that x is true of some one of the
1I accept that other authors might retell this history a bit differently and potentially
someone might say that Priest has a particular agenda. To this I have to say this is not
a history of logic thesis; I have to pick some retelling to go for it and I think Priest is
clear and sets up the issues well enough.
2In Priest’s retelling he re-writes the particular quantifier as G in line with the rest
of Towards Non-being. In this case, I will not use Priest’s notation as I have not provided
the fore-grounding to do so; the particular quantifier will be written as ∃.
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individuals denoted by i...(Peirce and Kloesel, 1993, 180, Italics
original)
Peirce writes “εixi means that x” this would now be written by contempor-
ary logicians as “∃ix(i)”. The notion is close enough to the contemporary
quantifier, but it is understood to just be read as ‘some’.
7.4.2 Frege
For Frege particular quantification expressed in Begriffsschrift notation, is
often read as “there is” (Es gibt) (Frege, 1980, 35, 73). However, Priest
(2016, 331) points out that Frege also refers to such sentences as “existen-
tial” (Existentialsätz) (Frege, 1980, 35). For Frege sentences like this also
ascribe the property of existence (Existenz Eigenschaft) to a concept (Frege,
1980, 73). In the following quote we can see that in Frege’s view, existence
is a second-order concept.
I have called existence a property of a concept. How I mean this
to be taken is best made clear by an example. In the sentence
“there is at least one square root of 4,” we have an assertion,
not about (say) the definite number 2, nor about —2, but about
a concept, square root of 4 ; viz. that it is not empty. (Geach
and Black, 1960, 48–49, italics original)
It would be wrong to read any metaphysics into this, for as Priest (2016,
331) highlights, “This is just the standard way that mathematicians talk
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when showing that something satisfies a certain condition; that its concept
is, as Frege puts it, not empty. It is simply an idiom.”
When remarking on the mathematicians’ use of exists, Frege says, replying
to Peano:
Existential sentences, beginning “there is” (“es gibt”), are closely
related to particular ones: compare the sentence “there are num-
bers which are prime” with “some numbers are prime”. This
existence is still too often confused with reality and objectivity.
(McGuinness, 1984, 239)
When it comes to what Frege might have meant by reality, Priest (2016,
332) posits that Frege might have meant physical reality as opposed to
some kind of platonic reality. “One reason for thinking so is that in his
1919, The Thought, Frege seems to see a close connection between what is
real (wirklich) and its cognates, and what has causes (wirken) (to cause).”
When it comes to thoughts, Frege takes them to be abstract objects, stating:
“The thought, admittedly, is not something which it is usual to call real.”
Frege goes on to say:
Thoughts are by no means unreal, but their reality is of quite
a different kind from that of [material] things. And their effect
is brought about by an act of the thinker without which they




Frege’s comments indicate that he thought abstract objects, although they
are real, they behave in a different way from physical objects. Drawing
our attention to an important feature, Priest (2016, 332) emphasises that
“Frege contrasts the existence of ‘there is’ not only with the real, but with
the objective. As the rest of The Thought makes clear, thoughts are entirely
objective. So the distinction he is drawing cannot be abstract and concrete
existence.”
When it comes to existence as a predicate, Priest notes that Frege casually
wrote “because existence is a property of concepts, the ontological argu-
ment for the existence of God breaks down” (Frege, 1968, 65). However,
no further comment is provided, and it might be thought that this remark
contradicts what has just been said. However, Priest highlights other com-
ments from Frege which seem to support his analysis provided above. Priest
(2016, 333) draws attention to lecture notes concerning the ontological ar-
gument for the existence of God. In these lectures, Frege explains “...that
existence may mean either a first-order property of an object or a second-
order property of a concept to be a part of the definition of “God”. However,
“we always want to ask ourselves whether there really is such a thing”, i.e.,
whether something satisfies the concept.” Based on this, it does seem that
Frege’s position is compatible with his comments on Peano and with the
analysis that Priest has provided.
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7.4.3 The Backward E
The contemporary symbol for the particular quantifier ∃ comes from Peano’s
Formulaire de Mathématique. However, in this case, ∃ was not used as a
quantifier. For Peano, ∃ was introduced as a monadic predicate of sets,
expressing the property of being non-empty (Priest, 2016, 333).
7.4.4 Enter Russell
Russell’s use of this notation was originally limited at first, and most not-
ably, he did not use Peano’s ∃ in Principles of Mathematics (Priest, 2016,
334). Even in “On Denoting” in which Russell rejects his former view that
there are objects that don’t exist, the use of the quantification symbol does
not appear nor is there any association with existence and the particu-
lar quantifier (Priest, 2016, 334). However, there is a shift in Principia
Mathematica. Here, Russell uses the same terms to frame the particular
quantifier, but here we also see the introduction of the ‘backward E’ for the
particular quantifier (Priest, 2016, 335).
The symbol “∃xφx” may be read as “there exists an x for which
φx is true”, or “there exists an x satisfying φx̂”, and this con-
forms to the natural form of the expression of thought. (Russell
and Whitehead, 1997, 15)1




However, even at this point Priest argues that nothing about Russell’s view
indicates “anything more than a mathematical idiom to the effect that
something satisfies a certain condition or is a member of a class. Nor is
there any argument to the effect that the particular quantifier is existentially
loaded in any serious metaphysical sense” (Priest, 2016, 335).
It was only in the lectures in Russell (1918) where first he explicitly linked
and defended that existence is expressed by the particular quantifier.
Russell’s main argument for this position is as follows:
It is perfectly clear that when you say “Unicorns exist”, you
are not saying anything that would apply to any unicorns there
might happen to be, because as a matter of fact, there are not
any, and therefore if what you say had any application to the
actual individuals, it could not possibly be significant unless it
were true. You can consider the proposition “Unicorns exist”,
and see that it is false. It is not nonsense. Of course, if the
proposition went through the general conception of the unicorn
to the individual, it could not even be significant unless there
were unicorns. Therefore when you say “Unicorns exist,” you
are not saying anything about individual things, and the same
applies when you say “Men exist”. (Russell, 2009, 67)
It is Russell’s claim that if an existence predicate — and a fortiori the
existence predicate — to something that does not exist, the result lacks
meaning (Priest, 2016, 336).
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Russell continues his argument asking us to consider two inferences (Russell,
2009, 67).
In the first case, we are asked to consider
1. Men exist
2. Socrates is a man
3. Socrates exists
compared to
1. Men are numerous
2. Socrates is a man
3. Socrates is numerous
It is Russell’s claim that there is the same sort of fallacy involved in both.
From this, we are supposed to notice that the conclusion of the first is
ungrammatical, as is that of the second. However, Priest (2016, 337) points
out:
...the analogy is lame, as should have been clear to Russell had
he not already been in the grip of his view. To say that men
are numerous is indeed to say that many things are men. In
the right context, this is true, as is the other premise. The con-









Priest (2016, 338) highlights a final argument from Russell:
You can see this in various ways. For instance, you sometimes
know the truth of an existence-proposition without knowing any
instance of it. You know that there are people in Timbuctoo, but
I doubt if any of you could give me an instance of one. Therefore
you clearly can know existence-propositions without knowing
any instances that make them true. Existence-propositions do
not say anything about the actual individual but only about the
class or function. (Russell, 2009, 68)
Priest takes a dim view on Russell’s argument and raises the point that
maybe we should doubt whether Russell seriously “believed that the partic-
ular quantifier encodes existence” due to the quality of his argument. Priest
(2016, 388) states:
Of course you can know the truth of a sentence starting with
a particular quantifier, such as ∃x(Mx ∧Ex), without knowing
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the truth of any particular instance, just as you can know the
truth of a disjunction without knowing the truth of one of the
disjuncts. But this is irrelevant. It remains the case that the
quantifier is existentially unloaded, and that existence may be
expressed by a monadic predicate.
Priest’s analysis of Russell indicates that we should potentially not think of
“∃” as expressing existence in any kind of heavy metaphysical way; rather,
Russell’s usage is in line with mathematical logic.
7.4.5 The Significant Step
Up until now, we have seen that there is at least some gap between meta-
physical existence and the particular quantifier. Although Russell’s use of
symbolisation and association with the term existence might have led some
to associate the two, Priest argues that it was not until much more recently
that the particular quantifier came to signify existence. It is Quine’s view
that the particular quantifier expresses existence. Or in Quine’s dictum “to
be is to be the value of a variable” (Quine, 1948, 32). It is worth looking
at Quine’s position in full:
At this point McX begins to wonder whether there is any limit
at all to our ontological immunity. Does nothing we say commit
us to the assumption of universals or other entities which we
may find unwelcome?
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I have already suggested a negative answer to this question, in
speaking of bound variables, or variables of quantification, in
connection with Russell’s theory of descriptions. We can very
easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying,
for example, that there is something which is a prime number
and larger than a million. But this is, essentially the only way
that we can involve ourselves in ontological commitment: by our
use of bound variables. The use of alleged names is no criterion,
for we can repudiate their namehood at the drop of a hat unless
the assumption of a corresponding entity can be spotted in the
things we affirm in terms of bound variables. Names are, in fact,
altogether immaterial to the ontological issue, for I have shown,
in connection with “Pegasus” and “pagasize”, that names can
be converted into descriptions, and Russell has shown that de-
scriptions can be eliminated. Whatever we say with the help of
names can be said in language which shuns names altogether.
To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned
as the value of a variable. (Quine, 1948, 31–32)
In sum Quine takes the position that names and predicates are not exist-
entially committing in themselves. However, Quine doesn’t provide an ar-
gument as to why quantification is existentially committing. Quine merely
assumes that the domain of quantification is made up of existent objects.
Priest states “So if neither names, nor predicates, nor quantifiers are on-
tologically committing, what is? To say that something exists, of course!
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Quine, one might say, is one of those philosophers who have united in ruin-
ing the good old word ‘exists’. At any rate, if Russell used bad arguments
for the view then Quine used none at all” (Priest, 2016, 340).
In what follows, I provide what some philosophers might consider to be
one of the most damaging paragraphs for non-existent objects. I also think
that it is one of the most harmful paragraphs in analytic philosophy, for
the argument is almost entirely motivated by rhetoric. I present the full
paragraph with Priest’s highlighting of these rhetorical moves in bold.
Wyman’s overpopulated universe is in many ways un-
lovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a
taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst of it.
Wyman’s slum of possibles is a breeding ground for dis-
orderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in
the doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in the doorway.
Are they the same possible man, or two possible men?
How do we decide? How many of them are alike? Or
would their being alike make them one? Are no two
possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that
it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally,
is the concept of identity simply not applicable to un-
actualised possibles? But what sense can be found in
talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said
to be identical with themselves and distinct from one
another? These elements are well-nigh incorrigible. By
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a Fregean therapy of individual concepts some efforts might be
made at rehabilitation; but I feel we’d do better simply to clear
Wyman’s slum and be done with it. (Quine, 1948, 23–24)
This quote begins with purely defamatory comments about possibilia claim-
ing that they are offensive; unfortunately for Quine, merely being offended
by possibilia is not a good argument about their inclusion in one’s ontology.
As has been highlighted in bold, we can see that the majority in this pas-
sage is not argumentation but rather rhetoric. Following this comes a series
of questions concerning the identity conditions of possibilia, but here again,
no argument is present. There is merely a series of rhetorical questions
designed to push the reader into doubting possibilia. But none of Quine’s
potential answers are shown to be implausible. Ultimately possibilia are
dismissed by Quine due to his preference and not because of any argument.
1
What is potentially more egregious is that as (Priest, 2016, 341) states,
almost the entire paper is carried by its rhetoric rather than by argument.
Priest provides two examples: “Wyman, by the way, is one of those philo-
sophers who have united in ruining the good old word exists” and “For McX
1Furthermore, Casati (2017) argues that the way Quine argues for his position in-
troduces an inconsistency. Casati’s arguments amount to inconsistencies introduced by
taking McX and Wyman to be fictional entities; if this is the case then Quine under his
own theory will not be able to distinguish them for he admits that it is not possible to
provide identity conditions for such entities. However, these philosophers are presented
as distinct individuals in ‘On What There Is’. Thus by using fictional philosophers as a
straw man, Quine traps himself in an inconsistency. I will not detail Casati’s argument
at length, but I think what I have said gives sufficient flavour for his argument. I choose
not to provide the full argument for even as Casati (2017, 2) admits, their argument
“...should not lead [us] to dismiss Quine’s position”; rather, the argument highlights a
problematic feature of the argument as presented in “On What There Is”.
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this is an unusually penetrating speech”. Moreover, even Wyman and McX
are rhetorical devices for they are fictional philosophers whose persons are
not held by any historical philosophers but have rather been gerrymandered
to suit Quine’s needs.1 This is problematic predominantly because Quine’s
paper has become hugely influential and the view he offered has become
exceedingly popular and ingrained in the minds of many philosophers and
logicians. Quine’s paper not only associated the particular quantifier with
existence but it also damaged the reputation of possibilia. However, neither
of these outcomes were achieved via argument but rather as Priest (2016,
342) says they were “as a result of Quine’s silver rhetoric”.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sketched some of the various historical positions on
existence, and I have provided some analysis for how the particular quan-
tifier became existentially loaded. This chapter provides the setup for the
next, in which I provide my theory of existence and explain how I under-
stand the particular quantifier. I do not take existence to be expressed
by the particular quantifier. Rather, I take it that existence should be ex-
pressed by an indexical. I take it that the existential quantifier expresses the
domain of quantification; it expresses “what there is” in the dictum of the
extended modal realist: it expresses reality. In the next chapter, I provide
a theory of existence that admits that there is something to quantification
1Although it is commonly thought that McX is supposed to be a hyper-Platonist
and Wyman to be kind of pseudo-Meinong.
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and ontological commitment, for the domain of quantification is merely set
in terms of your metaphysics which may differ from philosopher to philo-
sopher. You might say I suffer from the Quinean hangover, which is hardly
surprising given the trajectory of modal realism, so I uphold what might
be thought of as the “common-sense” notion that ‘there is everything that
there is’. However, the metaphysics of extended modal realism allows us to
maintain this and makes room for possibilia, and with my modification, we




This chapter offers an indexical theory of existence. The indexical account
of existence allows modal realists to speak meaningfully and clearly about
existence and non-existence. The indexical theory operates in the extended
modal realist framework, although it shares many linguistic and logical
similarities with Lewis’s theory of existence. I, however, argue that the
metaphysical underpinning of extended modal realism and language used
by the indexical theory is more precise when it comes to talking about
existence and non-existence compared to Lewis’s approach. I also argue
that the indexical theory of existence is more successful than its closest




The primary concern of this chapter is to explore an underdeveloped option
for modal realists seeking a theory of existence.1 The indexical theory is
Lewisian in flavour, but operates within the extended modal realist system.
The indexical theory of existence achieves what Lewis did with restricted
quantification, but the toolkit of extended modal realism allows the index-
ical theory to be more precise about existence and non-existence talk. The
benefit of using the extended modal realist system is that we have access
to modal tensing and primitive reality, according to which “reality does not
entail existence” (Yagisawa, 2010, 23).2 These features of extended modal
realism allow for a genuine distinction between the words “existence” and
“non-existence”, something which seems troubling for Lewisian modal real-
ists who only have the tools for distinctions in scope. One might point out
that for Lewis, everything exists. This does not seem to match up well with
the language we use when we talk about non-existent objects. We do seem
to want to say that some things exist and some things do not.3
The second concern of this chapter is to point out that the indexical theory
of existence allows modal realists to use “existence” in a straightforward
1Van Inwagen (1980) hinted that this option is open for modal realists but doesn’t
go into details on what a theory like this would look like. Branquinho (2012) notes the
option of an indexical theory of existence in a Meinongian context but does not develop
the theory at great length either.
2The extended modal realist framework is one in which there are both possible and
impossible worlds in a single five-dimensional universe. In this Chapter, I do not argue
for this position, but it has been developed at length by Yagisawa (2010).




and easily definable way; we might say it allows modal realists to use “ex-
istence” in a deflationary way. I argue that if modal realists are searching
for a deflationary theory of existence, then we ought to go for the index-
ical theory of existence as it has advantages over its closest competitor,
Yagisawa’s relational account of existence. The first reason to prefer the
indexical account is a positive one. The indexical theory allows for a more
precise account of “existence” than either Lewis’s restricted quantification
or Yagisawa’s relational theory. The second reason to prefer the indexical
account is that it does not encounter the same issues as the relational ac-
count and ultimately it is, on balance, more deflationary—at least in one
sense— than the relational account.1
There are two strands running through this chapter: a metaphysical project
that establishes an indexical and deflationary theory of existence and there
is also a linguistic strand, in which I will state when it is true to say some-
thing “exists” and when something does not “exist”. The topic of existence
is so heavily steeped in metaphysics that even the linguistic part of the
project cannot be undertaken in total isolation from the underlying meta-
physics. I put forward the view that it is true to say something “exists” if it
is picked out by a relevant indexical. As a result of this theory, “existence”
like, “actual” is an indexical, changing mean based on the context in which
it is uttered. I reserve the term “real” to capture talk about things in a
maximal sense.2
1The kind of deflation I am referring to here is a commitment to less metaphysical
machinery. That is to say, a view with less “stuff” is more deflationary than a view with
more “stuff”.
2The reason for setting out the terminology in this order is two-fold. First, it is the
established way for extended modal realists to use the terms. “Real” as a primitive,
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I am not the first extended modal realist to supply a deflationary theory of
existence.Yagisawa (2014) provides a deflationary theory of existence too.
Yagisawa thinks that existence is a shallow notion and it can be defined
within a mathematical discipline. Yagisawa offers us a relational analysis
of existence in which existence is set membership (Yagisawa, 2014, 1). How-
ever, I will contend that Yagisawa’s analysis of existence suffers from two
issues. The first issue is that Yagisawa’s theory is not as deflationary as
he takes it to be since it relies on more metaphysical commitments than
necessary. The second issue is that Yagisawa’s relational theory also ulti-
mately collapses into a view where existence is a property, a consequence he
was hoping to avoid from the start. For these reasons, I argue that modal
realists searching for a lightweight theory of existence will be better off
with my proposal than Yagisawa’s since both theories ultimately get to the
same place yet the indexical theory does not face the issues of Yagisawa’s
relational account.
For those looking for context, I say that many objects are real, even non-
existent ones, and that the term “existence” (or “exists”) is a description
of real objects. Aside from existing objects, there are also objects that
are real but do not exist. What there is is tied to what is real and is
distinguished from what exists. Mirroring “existence”, “non-existence” is a
term that describes a different group of real objects. Finally, that which is
unreal features nowhere in reality. Thus, unreal objects cannot properly be
while “exists” can be analysed (Yagisawa, 2010, 8–9). Second, setting the terminology
out this way allows for a useful divide that helps resolve the problem of non-existence.
Some of the benefits of using extended modal realism as a solution to this problem have
been highlighted in Thomas (2019).
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described with either of the terms “existent”, or “non-existent”.1
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §8.2 I outline the indexical
theory of existence, drawing attention to the important distinction between
“real” and “exists”. Then in §8.3 I outline what it takes to be considered
a deflationary theory. In §8.4 I outline Yagisawa’s theory of deflationary
existence, and in §8.5, I provide some reasons why Yagisawa’s notion of
existence is not as deflationary as he would like us to think. My primary
concern is that the metaphysical weight has been moved away from existence
as a property to existence as a relation. If this is the case, then the weight
that existence carries has not got any lighter — it has just moved about.
I do think, however, this is the least charitable way to read Yagisawa’s
proposal, and thus my objection comes with a caveat, and I discuss the
more charitable way to read Yagisawa, which is not free from objections
either. Yagisawa and I both share the view that existence is shallow and
easily definable. However, the details between our theories of existence
differ. In §8.6 I summarise the view I have offered. I conclude that the
indexical theory is not only practical and useful when it comes to existence
talk, but it provides a more deflationary account of existence than its closest
competitor theory.
1When we are talking about the unreal we mean literal nothingness.
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8.2 The Indexical Account
Before I get onto the topic of existence, it is helpful to quickly detail some
other relevant concepts, what it is to be an object and what reality is. The
indexical theory, I argue, is a way for extended modal realists to main-
tain their position that reality does not entail existence without needing to
employ Yagisawa’s relational account of existence.1
8.2.1 Objects
A straightforward theory of objects underpins the discussion of existence. I
take objects to be just those things which we can quantify over and predicate
about.2 They are just things like that. For something to count as an object,
it must belong to the domain everything which I call the “universe”.3 To
use different language, if something is part of the universe it is an object.
“Object” here is used in a very general way; it is just a thing that shares
in the universe. The only non-objects are nothings, and these non-things
do not belong to the mereological sum of everything, those things which do
not belong to the “universe”. The term “universe” is an all-encompassing
term for all space, physical, modal, and temporal. Literally speaking, the
only non-objects are those things which are no-things. In short, “something
1My motivation for upholding this distinction in this chapter is primarily a practical
one. But Yagisawa (2010, 8–23) provides metaphysical motivations that I will not detail
nor comment on in this chapter.
2It follows that all objects are things and all things are objects.
3Please note, I use the term domain rather than set. This is a purposeful move:
domains are proper classes and unlike sets can be maximal and can be the fusion of
parts Lewis (1991, 98).
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x is an object if it is part of the domain U (everything)”. This is a very
general description of objects, but objects are a very general class, so a
general definition is apt.1
8.2.2 Reality
If an object is part of the universe, then it is real. There is just one sense of
real, and it is a binary notion: things are either real, or they are not. Objects
are either part of the universe or they are not objects at all. To clarify my
position on reality, it is helpful to draw a comparison with Lewis’s use of
existence simpliciter. My use of “real” shares a similarity with Lewis’s use
of wide-scope existence or existence simplicter. Lewis thinks that there is
one sense of existence. Lewis states,
I do not have the slightest idea what a difference in the man-
ner of existing is supposed to be. Some things exist here on
earth, other things exist extraterrestrially, perhaps some exist
no place in particular; but that is no difference in the manner
of existing, merely a difference in location or lack of it between
things that exist. Likewise, some things exist here at our world,
and other things exist at other worlds; again, I take this to be
a difference between things that exist, not a difference in their
existing. (Lewis, 1986, 2)
1I am not aware of anyone who explicitly holds this position. However, discussion on
the mereology of classes can be found in (Lewis, 1991). And Priest characterises objects
in a general way like this in the 2017 Robert Curtius Lecture of Excellence.
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In a separate paper, Lewis (1990, 154) says:
We of the establishment think that there is only one kind of
quantification. The several idioms of what we call “existential”
quantification are entirely synonymous and interchangeable. It
does not matter whether you say ‘Some things are donkeys’ or
“There are donkeys’ or “Donkeys exist” — you mean exactly
the same thing whichever way you say it. The same goes for
more vexed cases: it does not matter whether you say “Some
famous fictional detective uses cocaine”, “There is a famous fic-
tional detective who uses cocaine”, or “A famous cocaine using
fictional detective exists” — whether true or whether false, all
three statements stand or fall together.
Like Lewis thinks there is just one sense of “existence”, I think there is one
sense of “reality”, and we agree that there is one kind of quantification but
disagree in its reading. For Lewis, the term “existence” does the ontological
work of drawing the boundaries of “what there is”. For me, the term “real”
does the same work. However, Lewis’s use of existence simpliciter and my
use of the term “real” cannot be read as synonyms since, as Yagisawa (2012)
highlights, Lewis is committed to unrestricted quantification. Moreover, it
is the primitiveness of reality that is partly what distinguishes the indexical
view in the extended modal realist system from Lewis’s view.
When [the ersatz modal realist] says there are no other worlds,
and no other-worldly possible individuals, he says it with his
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quantifiers wide open. He means to quantify over everything,
without any restriction whatever, ignoring nothing. (And these
quantifiers too are meant to be entirely unrestricted. I doubt
that any perfect disambiguation is possible: all our idioms of
quantification alike are flexible, subject to tacit restriction. But
I think that, wilful misunderstanding aside, my meanings should
be clear.) (Lewis, 1986, 137)
Although Lewis and I use different terms, we share the same ends. We use
the terms “exists” and “real” to set our ontological boundaries and while
Lewis’s might be open, mine are closed.1
The term “real” refers to the domain of everything which I have named the
“universe”. This large domain includes all the objects there are.2 I would
say that everything that is part of the universe is real, but not necessar-
ily everything that is real exists. My choice of words here might prompt
questions from some readers, which I hope to clarify in what follows in this
paragraph and in the remaining sections. Yagisawa points out that “...the
question of reality is entirely separate from the question of existence and
that failure to keep terms separate tends to cause grave confusion, espe-
cially in modal metaphysics”(Yagisawa, 2010, 9). I agree with Yagisawa
that “real” is a primitive notion, and therefore it is more foundational than
existence. Thus “real” should be used to set the largest boundaries while
1For discussion about restricted quantification and extended modal realism, see
Yagisawa (2012).




“exists” is reserved for more precise boundary drawing. However, con-
cerns are often brought against the extended modal realist’s use of “real”.
Yagisawa (2012), replying to Kim (2012), provides some helpful comments
on this matter. The concern is that Yagisawa and extended modal realists
appear to be committed to an inconsistency regarding what we call “real”.
Yagisawa says:
I reject an absolutely unrestricted collection of anything, whether
it forms a domain for quantification or not. But I appear to em-
brace reality as completely unrestricted; anything whatever is
real.1 (Yagisawa, 2012, 79)
Kim’s critique brings out an important feature of extended modal realism
which it is helpful to clarify. Yagisawa continues:
I refuse to envision an absolutely unrestricted collection, do-
main, totality, whole, or what have you along those lines. But
I do envision reality. So, reality is not an absolutely unrestric-
ted collection (or domain or totality or...). When I say that the
notion of reality is a basic metaphysical notion, forming the bed-
rock of metaphysics, I mean, inter alia, that it is not explicable
in other terms. To say that the reality is an absolutely unres-
tricted collection (or domain or...) is to explicate the notion of
reality in other terms. Therefore, I refuse to say so. (Yagisawa,
2012, 79)
1To capture the use of ‘unrestricted’ in this second instance I will use unrestricted*.
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One might still object that the fundamentality of reality hasn’t been argued
for, and this is just mere insistence. This is an objection I have to agree with.
However, it is not the aim of this chapter to further defend the extended
modal realist’s conception of “real”. My aim is to provide an alternative
theory of existence for those already attracted to some variety of modal
realism.
Before I go on, it would serve me well to say something about what it means
to be unreal on my account. To be unreal is to not feature anywhere in the
universe. There are no unreal things. These “nothings” are not part of the
universe.
8.2.3 Existence
With our definition of what it is to be real in hand, we can turn our attention
to existence. Existence is a term used differently by different philosophers.
There are at least two broad senses in which things can exist. First, there is
existence in the unrestricted* sense. The unrestricted* sense of “existence”
refers to what exists across all domains. Second, there is the restricted
sense of ‘existence’, or what exists in a certain domain. Most philosophers
think that when we use ‘exists’ in everyday speech, we are usually using it
in a restricted way because we normally want to talk about what exists at
some particular location. If these philosophers are correct and the restricted
sense is the ordinary use of “exists”, then the unrestricted* sense of “exists”
must refer to what exists in all domains. If this is the case, then “exists”
in the unrestricted* sense and “real” as I use them have the same meaning.
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Because “exists” (unrestricted*) and “real” have the same meaning, we
should collapse both terms into the single term, “real”. So my focus is on
restricted existence. Following Priest (2016), I read the existential quantifier
as “something”, rather than exists in all cases. I collapse “A thing(s) x
exists” and “there are x(s)” into “something(s) x”. The upshot is that
under my system, “exists” is free to be used as a word just to describe
objects in a certain context. This is a technical linguistic move; in the
unrestricted* sense, the existential quantifier and its translations refer to
quantification over what is real. In what follows, I provide a way for us to
square this move with a precise notion of existence.
My proposal is to treat the term “existence” just like Lewis treats “actual-
ity”. Regarding “actuality”, Lewis says:
Our actual world is only one world among others. We call it
alone actual not because it differs in kind from all the rest but
because it is the world we inhabit. The inhabitants of other
worlds may truly call their own worlds actual, if they mean by
“actual” what we do; for the meaning we give to “actual” is
such that it refers at any world i to that world i itself. “Actual”
is indexical, like “I” or “here”, or “now”: it depends for its
reference on the circumstance of utterance, to wit the world




I suggest that “actual” and its cognates should be analyzed as
indexical terms: terms whose references varies, depending on
relevant features of the context of utterance. The relevant fea-
tures of context, for the term “actual”, is the world at which
a given utterance occurs. According to the indexical analysis I
propose, “actual”...refers at any world w to the world w. “Ac-
tual” is analogous to “present”, an indexical term whose refer-
ence varies depending on a different feature of context: “present”
refers at any time t to the time t. “Actual” is analogous also
to “here”, “I”, “you”, “this”, and “aforementioned” — indexical
terms depending for their reference respectively on the place, the
speaker, the intended audience, the speaker’s acts of pointing,
and the foregoing discourse. (Lewis, 1970, 184–185)
I suggest that we treat “existence” as an indexical, just like Lewis describes
“actuality”. “Existence” should be analysed with a varied reference, de-
pending on the relevant features of the context of utterance. The upshot
of this is that “existence” can be variable. Some might be sceptical about
this, but in the following section, I provide some positive reasons as to why
we might go for the indexical theory and in §8.4 I provide some reasons to
avoid the closest competitor the indexical has, the relational account.
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8.2.4 Why Go This Way?
The reason we might think that the indexical theory of existence is useful
is that it can provide a fine-grained and precise account for the variety of
ways we use the term “exists”.
It is helpful for us to talk about what exists immediately; this use of “exists”
is “what exists around here”, or “what exists locally”. We might open the
fridge and say “there exists milk”. On the contrary, if there was no milk in
the fridge, we might say “there exists no milk”. This local existence is the
first and most common-sense way in which something can exist. Things
also exist by being present. We might say that computers exist because
they are present objects. On the contrary, we might say that dinosaurs are
non-existent because they are not present: they are in the past. The final
kind of existence is actuality. Actuality is the modal status for being at the
actual world. We might say that “I exist and that I am actual”, while we
might say that a counterpart of mine is “non-existent but possible”. What
makes it the case in all three of these instances that the objects in question
exist is that they exist in the frame of reference for the relevant speaker
of the existence statement.1 In the case of milk in the fridge, we can say
there is milk in the fridge because, from our frame of reference, there is
milk in the fridge. The same goes for computers. There exists computers
because, for us presently, there are computers. Actuality picks out the
world at which the utterance is made. In all these cases we would want
1The mention of counterparts is by no means a commitment to counterpart theory;
instead, this statement merely serves as an example.
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to say something exists, but we wouldn’t want to say they all exist in the
same way. The benefit of the indexical theory of existence is that it allows
for different kinds of existence statements to be true without additional
metaphysical mechanics. Instead, we can make our language more precise
with the introduction of tensing.
Tensing is the practice of adding a subscript letter to our metalanguage to
indicate tensed predication. Modal tensing works in a similar way. It is
the practice of adding a subscript letter to indicate where in modal space
something is. Yagisawa makes use of modal tensing; he takes the analogy
between times and worlds seriously. He also takes it that we can and should
tense verbs in temporal discourse. Myself and Yagisawa think such a move
can be made with modal discourse too. This is modal tensing. Yagisawa
provides four modal tenses: actuality, mere-possibility, (metaphysical) im-
possibility, and a modal tense used for predicating about modal space in a
general way. These tenses are denoted with the subscript letters a,p,i and m
(Yagisawa, 2015, 319). I will not discuss modal tensing at length here; what
is important is that there is a toolkit for a precise metalanguage available
to extended modal realists. I simply use the tensing schema to distinguish
between predicating about existence in different contexts and with differ-
ent degrees of specificity.1 We can use the tensing schema to indicate the
variety of different ways we might use existence statements. For example,
to talk about what exists at actuality, we would use one tense, what exists
at the present moment another, what exists locally another and so on.
1Yagisawa uses modal tensing for a different purpose; for details see Yagisawa (2010,
73–93) and Yagisawa (2015).
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“Existence” is then just the term we use to describe the objects picked out
by an indexical. There are three degrees that we would obviously want to
give an account for so I will focus on these for now. Objects can appear
spatially, temporally, and modally; modality is the most primitive and the
broadest so I will start with it. To express an existence claim about an
object (x) we would say that “something (x)a”. “Something (x)a” and
“There is something actual” have the same meaning. Depending on the
context, it would be permissible to add additional subscript letters at will
to account for more specific existence statements; for example, we might use
n for now and l for local. We could read “something (x)n” as “something
is now” or “something (x)l” as “something (x) is local”. We only need
to introduce additional subscript letters if we want a more fine-grained
description of existence which is possible and ought to be encouraged under
this schema.1 If a more fine-grained language is desired, then we should
simply introduce additional subscript letters to indicate more fine-grained
tenses. I see no reason why this is not possible, provided the introduction is
stipulated in the metalanguage. When speaking in broad terms “something
(x)a” functions as a descriptor for all three obvious ways we might want
to talk about existent objects. My conception of existence makes use of
existence as actuality in the modal sense. I say what “exists” is what is
“actual”; for a modal realist, “actuality” is an indexical that shifts with the
utterance of the speaker. So “existence” becomes an indexical as well.2
1Yagisawa (2010, 78) sees this kind of metalanguage as “overkill” but where Yagisawa
sees overkill I see an opportunity for precision.
2It has been suggested that my framework is unable to account for disagreement
about existence. However, this objection only comes about when there is a mixing of
frames of reference. The confusion comes from cases where one subject is talking about
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Someone might challenge the view I have on offer, suggesting that I have
simply moved issues about existence to issues about reality. To this point,
I have two responses. First, the distinction between reality and existence
has already been made by Yagisawa, and it is my goal to provide an index-
ical theory of existence that we extended modal realists can use. I am not
creating a new distinction, but I am working within an established frame-
work (Yagisawa, 2010, 49). Secondly, in some ways, I have to accept that
the objector has made an accurate criticism, metaphysical questions about
‘what there is’ still need an answer, but this is not part of the scope of this
chapter and will be established in a separate work. Moreover, there are
two reasons the move is independently motivated. The first reason is that
it serves to further distinguish between the existential quantifier and the
term “exists”, a distinction whose benefit has been pointed out by Priest
(2016). The second reason for switching terms is that it allows for a genuine
juxtaposition of terms between existence and non-existence. Without this
terminological clarification there would be some philosophers who would
be forced into clumsy language such as “non-existent objects exist”, or
“impossible objects exist”. With a small terminological distinction these
philosophers are afforded the ability to say “non-existent objects are real”
and “impossible objects are real but do not exist”. I am left with technical
terms for unrestricted quantification and restricted quantification, namely
“real” and “exists” respectively, a toolkit which if nothing else is practically
restrictive existence, and another is talking about a more general kind of existence.
The introduction of tensing helps remove this confusion. To genuinely disagree about
existence, subjects must be talking about the same tense. However, there is one case
where disagreement would be impossible; no two subjects can share a purely subjective




The indexical theory allows for precise, fine-grained existence talk with
the possibility of genuine disagreement. The indexical theory is similar in
flavour to Lewis’s approach which he achieved by using restricted quantific-
ation, and I have achieved with tensing. These options are logically similar
but differ in their metaphysics. What is more, the tensed metalanguage of
the indexical approach allows for us to meaningfully say that there are non-
existent things, something which is more difficult to do under Lewis’s system
especially with any degree of specificity; however, this is easily handled in
the indexical theory. This solution comes with little extra metaphysical
weight, and I argue it has advantages over the relational account proposed
by Yagisawa.1
8.2.5 Non-Existence
I have provided an indexical theory of existence, so the implications of such
a theory must also stretch to non-existence.
If existence is just what is picked out by the indexical “exists”, then non-
existence is just those things which fall outside the range of the indexical in
that particular context. “Non-existence” describes objects that are real but
are not picked out by the speaker’s use of existence. For example, objects
covered by the other two modal statuses, possible and impossible, would be
considered to be non-existent when the speaker in the context of their actual
1Of course we are committed to modal realism, but if we aren’t, a modal realist using
this indexical theory would seem like a strange thing to do.
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world is talking about what exists. The same goes for other temporal modes
past and future, and the other local modes, that is to say things that fall
outside that particular local context. So, following our statements about
“exists”, the objects that are non-existent also depend on the context. Just
as existence is a light notion, so is non-existence. And just like our desire to
give a fine-grained account of existence, we might too want to give a fine-
grained account of non-existence. We can use the same move to achieve
this. In our metalanguage, we can introduce subscript letters to account
for ways objects might be non-existent. We could define p for objects that
are non-existent and possible objects and the subscript letter i for objects
that are non-existent and impossible. We describe non-existent possible
objects as “something (x)p”. We read this as something is possible. We talk
about non-existent impossible objects as “something (x)i”. We should read
this as something is impossible. If someone was so inclined, they could add
more tenses for those past, future, and non-local modes; it would just be a
matter of defining this introduction.
8.2.6 Summary
What follows is an itemised list of statements that make up the tenets of
the indexical theory of existence.
1. There is just one notion of reality, and it is restricted and fundamental.
2. To be real is to be part of the proper domain “the universe”.
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3. Existence is an indexical which picks out objects based on the speaker’s
usage.
4. Non-existence just ends up being those objects which aren’t picked
out by the speaker’s use of the indexical “exists”.
8.3 What Is Deflation?
I have suggested that the indexical theory of existence is a deflationary
theory of existence. In the following sections, I argue that those modal
realists looking for a deflationary theory of existence would be better off
with the indexical theory than Yagisawa’s relational theory.
Deflation in ordinary language is thought of as taking the air out of some-
thing, making it lighter, or removing weight. In metaphysics, we might
consider deflationism to be something different. In a discussion about onto-
logy, deflationism is sometimes juxtaposed against realism and associated
with anti-realism. But to think that deflationism is always associated with
anti-realism is false, as Tahko (2015, 73) points out. There are deflationists
such as Thomasson who take themselves also to be realists.1 To handle
this division between different kinds of realists in debates about ontology,
Chalmers makes use of the heavy and light distinction introducing heavy-
weight realism and lightweight realism (Chalmers et al., 2009, 78). Another
way we might think of deflation is in the same way as Thomasson (2014)
uses it. According to Thomasson:
1See Thomasson (2009) and Thomasson (2014).
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The deflationary approach thus involves rejecting the idea that
there is a shared substantive criterion for existence. We do, how-
ever, have a purely formal criterion for existence, namely given
by a schema (E): entities of kind K exist iff the application con-
ditions actually associated with “K” are fulfilled. (Thomasson,
2014, 116)
Both the relational and the indexical theory are deflationary in Thomas-
son’s sense; they reject that there is a substantive criterion for existence and
instead prefer a formal criterion. In the former, the criterion is whatever
is the member of the relevant set and in the case of the latter existence is
whatever is picked out by the relevant indexical. So when judging whether
one theory is more deflationary than the other, we are best off using some-
thing more like our ordinary language notion of deflation because what we
are talking about in this context is existence as something which is “meta-
physically light”. The metaphysically light notion of existence is something
like the utterance “x exists”, which commits us to very little. The less we
are metaphysically committed to, the more deflationary our notion of ex-
istence is. The stereotypical metaphysically inflated view of existence says
“x exists because x has the property of existence”.
I certainly think there are things that do exist and things which do not exist.
For me existence is doing some work. However, the work it is doing is light
work compared to the way other metaphysicians employ it. The reason
existence can be so light is that I make up for it by commitment in other
areas. I am committed to the reality of possible and impossible worlds. The
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reality of other worlds makes it quite easy to give up the weighty notion of
existence. Given the reality of possible and impossible worlds, I can set out
metaphysical boundaries by other means.
8.4 Yagisawa’s Deflationary Existence
In this section, I articulate Yagisawa’s theory of existence. Following this,
I provide some reasons as to why we might prefer my indexical account of
existence over Yagisawa’s relational account.
Yagisawa’s theory of existence ultimately has Quinean roots. Quine takes
it that “The ontological commitment of a theory is revealed in its quantific-
ational logical regimentation: to exist according to a theory so regimented
is to be eligible for being the value of a variable, i.e., to be included in the
universe of discourse over which the variables are to range” (Quine, 1969,
15). Yagisawa cashes this out as “The universe of discourse is simply a
(non-empty) set of things. So, to exist according to the theory is to be a
member of a certain set of things appropriately associated with the the-
ory” (Yagisawa, 2014, 3). Yagisawa essentially takes the Quinean idea and
expands on it. In line with the Quinean theme, Yagisawa takes the set-
theoretical relational nature of ontological commitment. That is to say, for
a thing to be ontologically committed to by a theory is for the thing to
belong to a certain set of things appropriately associated with the theory
(Yagisawa, 2014, 3). The twist that Yagisawa adds is that he suggests we
should understand existence in the same way. Existence for Yagisawa is
153
8.4. Yagisawa’s Deflationary Existence
the obtaining of the membership relation between an object and the set of
things in which the object is contained.
Yagisawa offers us a theory of existence where existence is a relation between
an object and a set.1 According to Yagisawa (2014, 2), “A thing exists or
does not exist relative to something else.” Yagisawa uses the term “thing”
very generally to include not only what more restrictive philosophers call
objects but also stuff, properties, relations, events, and states of affairs. Un-
der the deflationary position, Yagisawa is ordering existence as membership
of a given set. He says:
On any particular occasion of existential discourse, if member-
ship in the set S under discussion is to be understood along the
lines of “for any x, x is a member of S iff x is F ,” then existence
relative to S amounts to being F . Existence talk is eliminable
this way extensionally case by case. This is the sense in which
my proposal is deflationary. In general, any set of any things
may serve as the second relatum of the relation of existence. If
a given thing is a member of the set, the existence claim is true,
and if not, untrue. The general picture is as simple as that.
(Yagisawa, 2014, 3–4)
Cashed out, the statement “Pegasus exists” is true if and only if Pegasus
belongs to the set we are quantifying over (whatever this set might be). If
1In Yagisawa (2014) a slightly different but very similar definition is provided. In
this chapter, I treat Yagisawa’s position as a unified theory of existence. In conversation
with Yagisawa he has confirmed that (Yagisawa, 2014) is intended to be an elaboration
on (Yagisawa, 2010).
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the set of quantification were actuality, I would say that Pegasus doesn’t ex-
ist because there are no Pegasi at actuality. If our domain of quantification
were possible and impossible worlds, I would say that Pegasus does exist
because there could be a Pegasus at a possible or impossible world. This
domain-relative model allows us to make sense of the existence of entities
such as Pegasus. We can say meaningfully that Pegasus doesn’t exist here,
at the actual world, but that Pegasus does exist elsewhere, at a possible or
impossible world.
However, despite the seemingly straightforward analysis Yagisawa can provide,
I suggest we have good reasons for avoiding Yagisawa’s relational account
and favouring the indexical account. I make this argument for two reasons.
The first reason to prefer the indexical account is that it does not collapse
into a properties account of existence which Yagisawa admits he is attempt-
ing to avoid from the outset. The second reason for preferring the indexical
account is that if the modal realist is looking for a deflationary theory
of existence, then I argue that on balance, the indexical account is more
deflationary than the relational account. Both accounts render existence
as something easily definable and shallow. However, the indexical theory
is less committing than the relational account. If we think a lightweight
account is virtuous, then the indexical account should be preferred.
155
8.5. How Deflationary Is Yagisawa’s Deflationary Existence?
8.5 How Deflationary Is Yagisawa’s
Deflationary Existence?
Yagisawa takes it that views that consider existence to be a property are
heavyweight, while his view is lightweight. On the face of it, Yagisawa’s
position is certainly more deflationary than the position that existence is a
property. However, Yagisawa’s deflationary existence is not as deflationary
as it could be.
There are three ways that we could interpret Yagisawa’s proposal, one way
which is more deflationary than the other two, one which seems the right
way to interpret Yagisawa, while the remaining two which seem the wrong
ways to interpret Yagisawa. However, as we will see, none of these options
gives Yagisawa a truly deflationary theory of existence.
1. Existence is a relation.
2. Existence is set membership.1
3. Existence is set intersection.
In (1) existence is a metaphysical relation that holds between an object
and the set. In (1) we might think that in this case, the relation is of the
metaphysically heavy sort. That is to say, the relation is one of dependence
1Some might argue that set membership is a relation, between an object and a set.
However, there is certainly a difference in the kind of relation at play in cases one and
two.
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or some other metaphysically weighty relation. In (2) existence is to be
a member of the relevant set; this can be cashed out as “If membership
in the set S under discussion is to be understood along the lines of “for
any x, x is a member of S iff x is F,” then existence relative to S amounts
to being F”. In (3) existence is to be located at the intersection of two
relevant sets. However, none of these conceptions of existence are free from
problems. Although (3) might seem distinct from and more deflationary
than (2), (3) simply collapses into (2). Moreover, (2) either collapses into
(1) or we end up being committed to not only relations and sets, but also to
particular facts about these sets. I will spend this section showing why this
is the case and why these proposals are not really deflationary conceptions
of existence.
8.5.1 Existence Is a Relation
We might say that “x exists if it bears the existence relation to something
else y”.1 I will use the letter “E” to indicate the existence relation. We would
say that “x exists if there is a y and xEy” holds. If we think of existence like
this, then existence is a relation. Under this picture, it does not take us long
to get to a point where we might think that the existence relation is a kind of
dependency relation. However, this is a metaphysically heavy relation. This
kind of relation commits us to some things, namely the relation, whatever
that relation is like, and the relata. We might say that x depends on y
1One might suggest that existence might supervene on another relation; this, how-
ever, only serves to push the problem one step back. The theory of existence would still
involve a metaphysically heavy relation.
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for its existence, just as we might say that my existence is relational to
the universe (if there was no universe, there would be no me). In this
case, it is difficult to see why we should think of the dependence relation
as being metaphysically weighty but the existence relation as something
metaphysically light; both are relations of a similar sort. If existence is this
kind of relation, then it is not metaphysically light.
This is the metaphysically heavy way to interpret Yagisawa, and I think
it is false to think of his account in this way. In conversation, Yagisawa
confirmed that he didn’t have in mind any kind of dependency relation.
His intention was to emphasise that existence was a relation rather than a
property, i.e. a binary relation rather than a unary relation (assuming a
general theory of relations which subsumes properties as relations).
In two places, Yagisawa does give us reason to believe that he thinks exist-
ence is a relation. Yagisawa states, “I propose a relational analysis of exist-
ence...”(Yagisawa, 2014, 1). In separate work, he says (Yagisawa, 2010, 51)
“Existence is not a property but a relation...”. In these instances, Yagisawa
does clarify what he means by “relational”, and it is something a lot closer
to set membership. However, the uncharitable reader might not grant this
so readily.
8.5.2 Existence Is Set Membership
The more charitable and more accurate way to read Yagisawa’s proposal
is to interpret deflationary existence as set membership. However, this
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approach is not without its issues. The concern here is that this conception
collapses into (1) and faces the same issues. We say x (a thing) exists (E)
if it is a member of the relevant set (S). The relevance of a set is context-
dependent and can change given the speaker’s usage. We would say x exists
if x ∈ S.1 This amounts to saying that something exists in so much as it is a
member of the right set. What the right set is can vary across contexts. For
example, we might be talking about tea-bags in relation to all the things or
that of things in the kitchen. It is then true to say tea-bags exist if there are
tea-bags in the kitchen. If our set were the living room, it would be false to
say that tea-bags exist if there were no tea-bags in the living room. This,
I believe, is the correct way to interpret Yagisawa, but it is not the most
deflationary. Existence as set membership commits us to metaphysical facts
about which things belong to what sets. In the examples I have given it
cannot be that tea-bags belong, in the strict sense, to the kitchen set or it
would be uninformative to say that tea-bags exist because of their relation
to the kitchen. Existence as set membership is lighter than existence as
some kind of dependency relation. However, we are still committed to a
relation and the existence of the set. We can get lighter.
8.5.3 Existence Is Set Intersection
The final way I can think that we might interpret Yagisawa is existence as
set intersection. I am not sure if this is what Yagisawa had in mind, but
1The existential quantifier has been dropped in all cases to avoid unnecessary con-
fusion regarding existence that might come with its introduction. The English “if” has
been used to avoid confusing it with logical implication.
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it does make sense given his proposal, especially considering the context-
relevant division of sets. It seems that at any time we quantify over objects,
they always belong to some set, even if it is a singleton set that contains
just that object. Let us say that the singleton set containing just x is {x}.
Then x exists if {x} ∩ S 6= ∅. The advantage of this is that it appears like
our talk of sets amounts to nothing more than a linguistic carving of what
there is.1 Existence on this view is then just the intersection of a singleton
with a larger set.
8.5.4 Some Problems
Yagisawa faces two problems, which are explored in this section. The first
is that whichever way we cut things, this theory of relational existence is
more heavyweight than the indexical account. In (1) Yagisawa would be
committed to a metaphysically heavy existence relation, which is certainly
not deflationary. Some of us might even think that relations are more
suspect than properties. Either way, I do not think it is the correct way
to read Yagisawa’s proposal. So, it is a non-starter. The second problem
is that no matter what account Yagisawa gives, this proposal collapses into
a property account of existence, a consequence he was explicitly trying to
avoid.
1At most we are committed to there being sets, rather than sets and particular facts
about those sets.
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8.5.5 The First Problem
In cases (2) and (3), Yagisawa is committed to sets, at least.1 Problemat-
ically either (2) collapses into (1) where set membership is understood as a
metaphysical relation, or in (2) Yagisawa is committed to the reality of sets
and some metaphysical facts about these sets, that is which things belong
to what sets. There must be facts about which things belong to what sets
and not to others. If these metaphysical facts were not in place, then ex-
istence would be uninformative. For example, without these facts, there is
nothing to rule out tea-bags being part of the kitchen set in a fundamental
way. If this is the case and tea is fundamentally part of the kitchen set,
then it is uninformative to say that tea exists because it bears membership
to the kitchen set.
Someone might argue in case (3) that we have escaped commitment to
the existence relation and if we went for this option, then we would only be
committed to sets. However, not only is this conception not Yagisawa’s pro-
posal, but even if it were, it quickly collapses into (2), since a set-theoretical
formulation of (3): {x}∩S 6= ∅ is equivalent to x ∈ S. So this option doesn’t
get us very far.
1Yagisawa highlights three ways we might think about sets. (i) We might think of the
in relation as the membership relation. (ii) Another way we might understand a set or
domain is as a mereological whole. Understood this way, the in relation is synonymous
with the part-of relation (Yagisawa, 2010, 51). Understood in either of these ways, set
membership quickly falls foul of the problems facing (1). Yagisawa does provide the
alternative suggestion that a domain is a plurality. When talking of domains under
this conception consists of talking about certain individuals in a plural way that does
not involve anything other than those individuals; not the set of those individuals, the
mereological sum of those individuals, or any other object that somehow results from
those individuals. This view has been explored by Boolos (1984, 1985) and by McKay
and MacKay (2006).
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8.5.6 The Second Problem
Yagisawa faces the problem that it is unclear how existence as set member-
ship is different from existence as a property and that because set mem-
bership is a relation between a thing and a set, (2) has all the problems
of (1). However, the problem does not stop here. Since for every binary
relation, there corresponds a unary predicate, so anything that can be done
in terms of relations can be done in terms of predicates. Relations are not
any more light (or heavy) than predicates. In set-theoretic terms, we might
think that we identify the property with a set. Halmos (2017, 42) tells us
“It is ubiquitous mathematical practice to identify a property with a set,
namely with the set of all objects that possess the property”. If Halmos is
correct, then Yagisawa faces a problem: we are back where we started with
existence as a property rather than a relation.
If we think existence is just to be a member of a set, then this is just a
property. And we cannot escape this problem by saying that existence is
membership of some particular set. The reason that existence as member-
ship of some set fares no better is because of an implication of the Union
Axiom.
Axiom 1 (Union).
∀F∃A∀Y ∀x(x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A)
The Union Axiom, states that “for every collection of sets there exists a set
that contains all the elements that belong to at least one set of the given
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collection” (Halmos, 2017, 12). Given this principle of set theory, even if we
try to select a particular set, we are back to where we started with existence
as a property.1
In this section, I have shown that the relational analysis of existence faces a
number of problems. These problems arise given the fact that the relational
analysis takes existence to be a relation and rests on the axioms of set
theory; as such, the relation involved can be reduced to a property, thus
leaving those who favour the relational analysis in a position that they
wished to avoid from the outset. The indexical account does not encounter
the same issues since it does not rely on set theory or a relation for its
analysis of existence.
8.6 Conclusion
What I have presented is a different way of thinking about existence, which
maintains the distinction between reality and existence in a way that shifts
the metaphysical burden to other aspects of ontology and as an effect, we
are left with a lighter notion of existence. I have put forward an indexical
theory of existence which can be made use of by modal realists. I argue that
it has advantages over its closest competitor theory, Yagisawa’s relational-
deflationary existence. Yagisawa’s proposal is on the right lines in that it
allows for lightweight existence, but for a really deflationary existence he
needed to go further. I have also used this chapter to create some linguistic
1Thanks to Sara Uckelman for this objection.
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distinctions which aid the existence/non-existence debate. I have presented
a picture of reality that tells us that there are many objects that are real
and that some of these objects exist while others do not. I have suggested
that existence or non-existence is nothing more than an indexical term. I
use the word “real” to do the work of ontological boundary setting.
Moreover, this chapter highlights the practical benefit of the indexical the-
ory as it allows for fine-grained and precise existence talk. For precise
metaphysical talk I would be in favour of encouraging using the tensed
paraphrasings. If you follow my theory of indexical existence, you are left
with a practical and lightweight theory of existence.
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In this chapter I detail a position on truthmaking that I call accidental truth-
maker maximalism. I use this name because my commitment to truthmaker
maximalism comes as a result of my commitment to extended modal real-
ism rather than as a commitment to the truthmaking principle itself; I say
more on this in the final section of this chapter. I show how this position
functions as a solution to problems concerning truth that are involved in
the problem of non-existence. I argue that set against the metaphysics of
extended modal realism, we can easily answer questions about the truths
concerning non-existent entities. In this chapter, I also argue that by bor-
rowing and developing the Lewis–Rosen proposal, we can also handle the
problem concerning true negative existential statements, which many, such
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as Salmon (1987a), take to be the most difficult aspect of the problem of
non-existence. The Lewis–Rosen proposal is to take qua–versions of objects
as truthmakers for propositions. The Lewis-Rosen proposal will be outlined
in more detail in 9.5.
In Chapter 3 I highlighted the problems that involve non-existent entities
which extended modal realism solves. Two of those problems involve truth.
One of the problems concerning truth and non-existent entities asks how can
there be truths about things which do not exist? This chapter details that
solution. I also argue in this chapter that if modal realists and extended
modal realists are going to employ the Lewis-Rosen proposal to handle
concerns about negative existential truths, then the extended modal realist
ontology can improve on their solution and thus should be favoured.
One of the relevant problems concerning non-existent objects is a problem
about truth. One way in which this problem can be solved is by invoking
truthmaker maximalism. Truthmaker maximalism is the position that for
every truth there is something which makes it true. Extended modal realism
neatly solves the problem about truth via a commitment to what I refer to
as accidental truthmaker maximalism. I say that given the richer ontology
of extended modal realism we can easily accommodate truths about non-
existent objects. There is, however, a second and potentially more troubling
concern that relates truthmaking and non-existence. This second concern is
about true negative existential statements such as ‘no unicorns exist’. Jago




In this chapter, I argue that accidental truthmaker maximalism can over-
come both the straightforward question regarding truths about non-existents
and the hard question about true negative existential statements. What is
more, I use this chapter to reply to some concerns about the motivation for
truthmaking theory raised by Dodd (2002) and echoed by Jago (2020) that
there are issues with motivating truthmaker maximalism. I argue those
who subscribe to accidental truthmaker maximalism can, to some extent,
escape these concerns since my version of truthmaking only comes as a con-
sequence of the metaphysics that governs the universe. The reason I call
it ‘accidental truthmaker maximalism’ is that our commitment comes only
in virtue of the ontology of extended modal realism and not because of an
independent reason to forward the truthmaking principle.
The structure of this chapter is as follows, In §9.2 I highlight what truth-
maker theory is, why we might go for it and how we might start to develop
the theory. I will not examine all alternatives to the truthmaker theory of
truth as it is very much outside the scope of the thesis to do so. Then I
briefly re-articulate the problems of truth that are created by non-existent
objects and the reasons that a truthmaking theory faces problems. In §9.4,
I articulate what I take to be the solution to the problems. The solution
to the first problem comes quickly and simply in virtue of the commit-
ments of extended modal realism. However, there are two issues that relate
truth and non-existence. The first is how do we say true things about non-
existent objects. I argue that extended modal realists can accommodate
this issue straightforwardly. The second problem concerns negative exist-
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ential statements such as ‘there are no unicorns’. I argue we can respond
to this problem with a similar response offered by Rosen and Lewis (2003).
I argue that if we apply the Lewis-Rosen proposal to a metaphysics of ex-
tended modal realism, we get better results than the original Lewis-Rosen
proposal. In Chapter 10 I reply to concerns raised by Dodd (2002), Jago
(2013b) and Mumford (2007).
9.2 Truthmaking
The truthmaker principle is in short, in order for something to be true, there
must be something that makes it true. Various philosophers have taken this
to be an obvious principle. According to Austin (1950, 23), “It takes two
to make a truth...When a statement is true, there is, of course, a state of
affairs which makes it true.” Dodd (2002, 69) points out that in Austin’s
statement of the truthmaking principle, the “of course”, is revealing. Dodd
states that by using the phrase ‘of course’ Austin puts his finger on what we
might think of as a ‘prevailing mood in analytical philosophy’(Dodd, 2002,
69). “For Austin is claiming that the truthmaker principle is not just true,
but it is obviously true. It is something which no self-respecting philosopher
would wish to deny” (Dodd, 2002, 69). Dodd highlights that Armstrong
shares a similar sentiment, stating that the truthmaker principle is “fairly
obvious once attention is drawn to it” (Armstrong, 1989, 122).1
However, some philosophers such as Mumford (2007) have tried to inde-
1Dodd does not agree with the obviousness of the truthmaker principle, and I will
come onto his objections later in this chapter.
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pendently motivate the value of the truthmaker principle. Mumford sug-
gests that truthmaking is an attempt to extend the correspondence prin-
ciple. The correspondence principle in short is the principle that truths
relate to a fact or feature of the world. Mumford states:
Truthmaker theory has nevertheless been regarded as a prom-
ising programme as it could be regarded as an attempt to make
the correspondence theory of truth metaphysically substantial.
Like the correspondence theory, it understands truth to involve
some relation between logico-linguistic items, such as proposi-
tions, speech-act types or utterances, and nonlinguistic entities
in the world, some truthmaker theorists think this holds for
every truth (for example, Armstrong (2004)). They are truth-
maker maximalists and say that every truth has a truthmaker.
(Mumford, 2007, 47)
Unlike Austin and Armstrong, I do not think that the truthmaker principle
is ‘obvious’. My motivation for hoping that truthmaking turns out to be
successful is it would be a happy coincidence if truthmaking worked out.
But what is more, I suggest that truthmaking follows very naturally from
the broad metaphysical picture I am offering; we might say it “falls out”
of the metaphysics.1 The kind of truthmaking that I think sits well with
extended modal realism is what some refer to as the “weakened version” of
1I do not think that truthmaking and extended modal realism necessarily come
together for you could, in theory, give a different theory of truth while maintaining
extended modal realism but it seems that if we are extended modal realists, to begin
with, then truthmaking fits nicely.
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the principle, as articulated by Bigelow (1988, 132) in the mantra “truth
is supervenient on being”. By supervenient, Bigelow means “One sort of
thing is said to be supervenient on another when you could not have any
difference in things of the first sort unless there were some difference in
things of the second sort” (Bigelow, 1988, 132, italics in original).
Bigelow elaborates on this by expressing truthmaking as supervenience in
the following formulation:
Truthmaking: If something is true, then it would not be possible
for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which
don’t, or else certain things had not existed which do. (Bigelow,
1988, 133)
The essence of Bigelow’s position is that there is a close relationship between
truth and how things are and if how things are changes, then so does what
is true. I’ve sketched the truthmaker principle here; in the next section I
examine it in some more detail.
9.2.1 Truthmaking: A Closer Look
Dodd (2002) does not endorse truthmaking, but in his 2002 paper he does
provide good reasons why we might go for Bigelow’s weakened version of
truthmaking. In what follows, we take a closer look at truthmaking. When
we say that every truth has a truthmaker, we mean that for every truth,
there is something in the universe which makes it so. That is to say a
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truthmaker for 〈p〉 is an entity whose existence guarantees the truth of
〈p〉 (following convention I too write “〈p〉” for “the proposition that p”)
(Dodd, 2002, 71). According to Armstrong (1997, 115), such an entity
would necessitate that truth.
Armstrong says “If a certain truthmaker makes a certain truth true, then
there is no alternative world where that truthmaker exists, but the truth is
a false proposition” (Armstrong, 1997, 115). Dodd (2002, 71) interprets this
intuition as: “if an entity a is a truthmaker of 〈p〉, there exists no possible
world in which a exists and yet it is not the case that 〈p〉. In other words,
the existence of a is supposed logically to entail that p.”
Dodd (2002, 71) indicates that we can state the truthmaker principle (TM)
in the following way:1
Definition 1 (TM). If 〈p〉 is true, there must be at least one entity whose
existence entails that 〈p〉 is true.
There are some obvious cases where truths have truthmakers the way that
(TM) states. For example Graham Priest is the truthmaker for both 〈 Gra-
ham Priest exists 〉 and 〈 Graham Priest is a member of the species homo
sapiens 〉. In these cases, according to Dodd (2002, 72) so-called “essential
predications”—propositions ascribing an essential property to an object—
are made true by the objects concerned.
There are two problems that face (TM) which (Dodd, 2002, 72) indicates
should prompt us to reformulate the principle as Bigelow’s weakened ver-




sion. The first problem is related to contingent truths and the second to
negative existential truths.
9.2.2 Contingent Truths
The first reason as to why we might want to offer a more finessed version
of truthmaking is that as Dodd points out, (TM) commits its supporters
to the existence of more exotic entities (Dodd, 2002, 72). Dodd states:
〈Michael Dummett is a philosopher〉 cannot be made true by
the man: he could have existed and yet not been a philosopher.
So what of the other candidates? Equally obviously, neither the
set of the man and the property of being a philosopher, nor the
mereological fusion of the man and the property can do the job:
there are possible worlds in which these exist yet Dummett is
not a philosopher. Consequently, it seems as if there must ex-
ist a state of affairs of Dummett’s being a philosopher, if this
truth is to have a truthmaker at all. This state of affairs will be
the unity of the man and the property of being a philosopher,
something which exists only if Dummett really is a philosopher.
Dodd is concerned that in light of these issues, the direction of argument
is wrong. He notes that Armstrong argues for the existence of these states
of affairs with what he calls “the truthmaker argument” (Armstrong, 1997,
113–119). It should not be that our commitment to (TM) leads us to
posit states of affairs to satisfy (TM); rather, states of affairs ought to
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satisfy (TM) from the start. As we will see, this concern is not one that
faces those who support extended modal realism. What is more, while
some philosophers might be of the opinion that ‘exotic entities’ ought to be
avoided, I, for one, welcome them and all the advantages that they bring.
9.2.3 Negative Truths
The second reason that Dodd (2002, 72–73) highlights as a reason as to
why we might want to reformulate (TM) is the presence of negative truths
a point he makes by referring to a quote from Lewis:
...it is the case of negative truths which has led many who are
sympathetic to (TM) to think that it nonetheless stands to be
true, not because certain things exist (to make it true), but
because counterexamples do not exist (Lewis, 1992, 216).
Dodd highlights that those in favour of (TM) are left in a position by
which they must make a choice to stand by (TM) taking 〈 Unicorns do not
exist 〉 to be made true either by a negative state of affairs or a totality
state of affairs. Or, if they prefer a less metaphysically weighty option,
they might wish to limit the scope of (TM), suggesting that only atomic
truths have corresponding truthmakers, and that molecular truth is derived
from atomic truths. The final option is to reformulate (TM) in a way which
captures the essences of (TM) without committing ourselves to the existence
of truthmakers for negative truths. The intuition we want to uphold is that
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what exists determines what is true. This gives us the position of Bigelow
(1988, 132) that truth supervenes on being.
We can reformulate (TM) in a weakened way:
Definition 2 (ST). 1
If 〈p〉 is true, then either at least one entity exists which would not exist,
were 〈p〉 false, or at least one entity does not exist, were 〈p〉 false. (Bigelow,
1988, 133)
9.3 Problems for Non-existent Objects and
Truthmaker Theory
I have shown how we would want to formulate the truthmaker principle
and looked at some initial motivations for adopting the position. In the
following section, I look at two problems that non-existent objects cause
for truth. The first problem is straightforward: how can we say true things
about non-existent objects? The second problem is more challenging and
concerns true negative existential statements.
9.3.1 Truths about Non-existent Objects
Crane (2013) explains the problem non-existent objects make for truth-
maker theory in the following way: If non-existent things are not part of
reality, then how can there be any truths about them?
1(ST) stands for supervenience thesis; it is a weakened version of (TM).
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That is to say, if we have a broadly truthmaking account of truth and think
that non-existent things are not part of reality, then how can we say true
things about them? For example, how can it be true that Holmes lives at
221B? But other than truths about fictional entities there are more concern-
ing cases. We might think that being worried about truths about fictions is
rarefied to the philosophy seminar. But there are other more normal cases
of non-existents that we often want to say true things about: the past, the
future and counterfactual situations. As for temporal statements we might
want to say it was true that there were dinosaurs, and it will be true that
the sun will rise tomorrow. We might also want to say true things about the
way things could be; we might say it is true that I could have been wearing
a red shirt at the time of writing this (for I am wearing blue actually).
We might even want to express truth about impossible states of affairs; we
might want to say true things about the square-circle or Bertie the beagle
who is both portly and not-portly.1
The fact that for there to be truths about non-existent objects they must be
part of reality and the fact we do seem to want to make truth-apt statements
about non-existent things do not sit well together. This is one problem of
non-existence and truth.
1To use the example discussed by Jago (2013a) and Yagisawa (2015).
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9.3.2 Negative Existential Truths
Another problem that non-existent objects create are problems about neg-
ative existential truths. Take the following:
〈There is not a hippopotamus in this room.〉 (9.1)
It seems like the proposition 〈 There is not a hippopotamus in this room 〉
is one which is capable of being true. But Russell (2012) notes something
was difficult about statements which take a similar form to 9.1: statements
of this kind seem to lack an obvious truth maker, for there doesn’t appear
to be a hippopotamus in the room. Mumford (2007, 45) says: “For any
statement that says how things are not, it is difficult to know in virtue of
what it is true.”
By contrast, if we took the statement
〈There is a hippopotamus in this room〉 (9.2)
If true, 9.2 is true in virtue of something in the world. Specific-
ally, 9.2 would be true in virtue of the hippopotamus that is in
this room. If we tried to generalise from 9.2, and say that all
truths are true in virtue of something in or about the world,
then what of apparent truths like 9.1? What is it in the world
in virtue of which statements like 9.1 are true?
(Mumford, 2007, 45)
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This is the problem of negative existential truths.
Armstrong (2004, 51) says:
Problems about not-being have been with philosophy since the
time of Parmenides, at least. They constitute some of the
most difficult problems in the discipline of metaphysics. Within
truthmaking theory they appear as the question what truth-
makers we are to provide for truth of non-existence, for instance
the truths that centaurs and unicorns do not exist, and all the
true denials that things that do exist have certain (positive)
properties or relations, for instance the lack of whiteness of cer-
tain swans.
However, Armstrong’s strategy will not work for those with modal realist
inclinations for we will want to appeal to a relation between things to solve
the problem rather than appealing to relations between facts. Armstrong
offers a solution for those with a Factualist ontology rather than a Thingist
(Reist) ontology; modal realism is most certainly a Thingist ontology.1
1The Factualist view is that all there is is a world of states of affairs; this view is very
close to Wittgenstein’s view that the world is a world of facts not things. Armstrong
(1997, 1) says that these two views are “substantially the same”. Armstrong (1997, 1)
characterises states of affairs in the following way:
A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular (at a later point to
be dubbed a thin particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds
between two or more particulars. Each state of affairs, and each constituent
of each state of affairs, meaning by their constituents the particulars, prop-
erties, relations and, in the case of higher-order states of affairs, lower-order
states of affairs, is a contingent existent. The properties and the relations
are universals, not particulars. The relations are all external relations.
178
9.3.2. Negative Existential Truths
Armstrong claims that for those with Thingist views, negative truths are
problematic since you can only point to what there is and nothing else
(Armstrong, 2004, 53). Armstrong thinks that the world is a world of facts
(states of affairs, in his lexicon) and thus avoids the problems that face
Thingists.1 The sketch of Armstrong’s position is that ‘general facts are
required (at any rate given that they are contingent). But I [Armstrong]
will argue in addition that provided we allow ourselves general facts then
no further negative facts are needed among our truthmakers’ (Armstrong,
2004, 54, italics in original). For Armstrong there is no need to introduce a
special sort of state of affairs to account for existential statements when ex-
istential facts supervene on monadic and polyadic facts.2 Take the example
that there exists one horse; for Armstrong it is monadic and polyadic states
of affairs that involve horses which would be truthmakers for the truth
that at least one horse exists; according to Armstrong, this is satisfact-
ory and nothing needs to be added. When it comes to negative existential
statements such as 〈 Theaetetus is not flying 〉 Armstrong considers two
options; first he argues “that the conjunction of states of affairs [facts] that
exhausts Theaetetus’ positive properties is a necessary part of the truth-
maker for 〈 Theaetetus is not flying 〉”(Armstrong, 2004, 56). Armstrong
points out that this conjunction, when taken by itself, fails to necessitate 〈
Theaetetus is not flying 〉. It may well be the case that the big conjunction
could exist but Theaetetus may be flying. Armstrong’s solution to this is
1I take it that Armstrong uses the term state of affairs rather than fact to distinguish
his position from the broadly Wittgenstein position by which he was influenced.
2The use of ‘special state of affairs’ signifies a difference from Armstrong’s state of
affairs that are more like facts.
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to make additions to his big conjunction: “If we had, in addition to the
list, the truthmaker for 〈 this is the conjunction of all Theaetetus’ positive
properties 〉 then, it seems, we could have a necessitating truthmaker for
〈 Theaetetus is not flying 〉” (Armstrong, 2004, 57). However, ultimately
Armstrong concludes this first strategy would be more uneconomical and
instead offers a solution in this general form:
...for every negative truth ¬q there exists a positive truth p that
is incompatible with q. The truth that p will have a straightfor-
ward truthmaker. By the Entailment principle (valid in general,
at least) this will also be a truthmaker for ¬q.(Armstrong, 2004,
60)
Armstrong goes some way to solving the problem for those who think the
world is one of states of affairs and what is more, Lewis admits that his
solution — to which mine is very close — is potentially very similar (albeit
preferable) to Armstrong’s. I will leave Armstrong’s proposal for now and
pick it back up after I have detailed Lewis’s proposal.
9.4 The Modal Realist Approach
I start with the problem concerning truths about non-existent objects for
it can be solved fairly quickly, then move onto the concern about negative
existential truths which requires significant development, and I explore a
way to elaborate on the Lewis-Rosen proposal in the following section.
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9.4.1 Truths About Non-existent Objects
The concern is how can we say true things about that which does not exist.
However, as we have seen, Crane tells us that the condition for something
to have truths said about it is for it to be part of reality. If this is the
condition which must be met, then extended modal realism clearly meets
it.1
The extended modal realist metaphysics is one where the universe is ex-
tended in five dimensions; the universe includes all temporal and modal
dimensions, all equally as real as each other. The dimensions I am referring
to are the three spatial dimensions, one temporal and one modal. It is easy
for the extended modal realist to meet Crane’s condition since that is what
our metaphysics dictates is the case. To use the example of Bertie again,
it is true Bertie is not-portly at the actual world because there is a stage
(the actual-world stage) of Bertie that is not-portly; it is true that Bertie
could be portly because there is a possible-world stage of Bertie where he
is portly; and it is true that Bertie is portly and not-portly because of an
impossible-world stage of Bertie.2
A potential reason why the solution comes so quickly is that it seems im-
plicit in Crane’s articulation that truth ought to supervene on being which
1See Chapter 2 and Chapter 7 for what we mean by the term ‘reality’.
2Someone might object, that it is unclear how anything could be false. In response to
this, I say we must remember that judgements of truth must be understood as quantified
statements. Thus within a restricted domain, there will only be the relevant truthmakers
associated with that statement. If we were to examine our statements in the broadest
possible sense, we will in a sense be able to find a truthmaker for any statement we
desired, but this is just trivial truth. This is what we ought to expect from a metaphysics
that includes possibilia and impossibilia.
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is exactly the kind of truthmaking principle that falls naturally out of ex-
tended modal realism.
When it comes to fictional entities, the extended modal realist handles them
in the following way. Say we take the statements
There is no Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
Sherlock Holmes is just a fictional character(Braun, 2005).
(9.3)
Extended modal realists take (9.3) to be consistent when examined through
the lens of extended modal realism. Such a statement appears contradict-
ory for we are predicating about an entity which we state does not exist.
However, Yagisawa points out that the apparently contradictory nature of
the statement can be explained in the following way:
What the first conjunct of (1)[9.3] says, when charitably inter-
preted, is that there actually is no Sherlock Holmes. In fact,
being fictional entails not actually being existent. But true pre-
dication requires the reality of what the predication is of. Thus,
if the third conjunction of (1)[9.3] is true, then there is such a
thing as Sherlock Holmes in reality at large. (Yagisawa, 2010,
259)
Thus truths about fictional entities are made true by truthmakers not at
the actual world but at some other world.1 It seems therefore that the
1Yagisawa (2010, 259–277) motivates the claim that Holmes would be an entity at
an impossible world.
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extended modal realist has an easy time solving this puzzle.
9.5 Solving the Problem
I deal with the second more difficult problem concerning negative existential
truths. Ultimately I endorse a position close to Lewis’s revised opinion on
truthmaking, which I detail first. Followed by Lewis and Rosen’s treatment
of negative existential statements, here I also highlight the gap which I think
can be filled when extended modal realism is applied. I end this section with
a comparison of Armstrong’s and Lewis’s positions. Lewis notes that the
two might end up being closer than expected; I argue that even if the two
are close, we have good reason to go for Lewis’s proposal over Armstrong’s.
In the following section I provide some developments on what I refer to as
accidental truthmaker maximalism.
9.5.1 Lewis and Truthmaking
Lewis previously rejected the truthmaker theory on the grounds that truth-
makers demand necessary connections between distinct existences, which
Lewis thought conflicts with his Humeanism (Lewis, 1999, 219). Lewis “ar-
gued that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predication. But
states of affairs violate Hume’s prohibition of necessary connections between
distinct existences” (MacBride, 2005, 128). After Lewis changed his mind
about truthmaking, he characterised the principle as follows:
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Any proposition has a subject matter, on which its truth value
supervenes. (Lewis, 2003, 25)
Given the general modal realist picture, this alone would get us pretty far
as I have shown in the section above. There are many objects at many
worlds which the truth of propositions can supervene on. The question for
Lewis is how we can square this position with Humeanism and what to do
about negative essential statements.
However, Lewis (2003) and Rosen and Lewis (2003) found a way to recon-
cile truthmaking with Humeanism. Lewis was able to make this move by
invoking his counterpart theory (Lewis, 1971, 1986). For Lewis, something
can be essentially F without being intrinsically F. Under Lewis’s picture, I
am identical to my body, yet I’m essentially a person whereas my body is
not.
Lewis found a way to endorse truthmaking and Humeanism (Lewis, 2003)
by making use of his already established counterpart theory (Lewis, 1971,
1986). Under counterpart theory, “an object has the property of being F iff
in some possible world a counterpart of x has F . Therefore x is essentially
F iff every counterpart of x is F” (MacBride, 2005, 127). The counterpart
relation is one of similarity rather than of identity. Counterparts of x are
just those objects which are similar to x in certain respects. What is more,
different conversational contexts are enough to make different similarities
relevant.
For any object x its counterparts are selected relative to a counterpart rela-
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tion R. In cases where all the counterparts of x are F then we can say x is
essentially F . However, by a different counterpart relation R∗, a different
selection of counterparts will be chosen and some of these may turn out not
to be F ; thus x can turn out to be only F accidentally. MacBride (2005,
127) argues that this shows that “counterpart theory is able to provide a
relativistic account of essentialism...since the truth of essential judgements
are relative, relative to the counterpart relation conversational cues select.”
Lewis noticed that a benefit of counterpart theory is to be able to make use
of truthmakers without invoking necessary connections between distinct ex-
istences. Remember we can define truthmaking as Armstrong (1997, 115)
does: “if a certain truthmaker makes a certain truth true, then there is
no alternative world where the truthmaker exists but the truth is false.”
In other words: a truthmaker for a 〈p〉 is a thing that merely by existing
necessitates the truth of 〈p〉. In short Lewis’s proposal is to treat neces-
sitating the truth of 〈p〉 like any other modal property we might attribute.
The modal property is possessed relative to some counterpart relations but
not others.
Under Lewis’s counterpart theory, something can be some way F without
being F intrinsically. Jago elaborates on Lewis’s move:
In Lewis’s story, I am identical to my body, yet I’m essentially a
person, whereas my body is not. Since the counterpart relation
is one of similarity, which is a matter of contextual salience,
attributions of essential properties vary with context. Picking
me out qua person raises my personhood to salience, creating a
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context in which only people are my counterparts and hence in
which I’m essentially a person.
Lewis (2003) treats truthmaking in a similar way. The truth-
maker for 〈this lemon is juicy〉 is the lemon, qua juicy. That
entity is just the lemon, insofar its juiciness is raised to salience
(the effect of the ‘qua juicy’ locution). It is perfectly consistent,
in some other context, to hold that the lemon might not have
been juicy. (Jago, 2013b, 465)
This statement deserves some unpacking, and MacBride (2005, 129) provides
comments that are very helpful:
It is important to bear in mind that essential properties are
relative, relative to a counterpart relation. If some of a’s coun-
terparts fail to be F that it is because we are thinking about a
under a relation R that selects counterparts of a regardless of
whether they are F . But if we select some more fine-grained
relation R∗ that selects only F counterparts of a then a will be
essentially F (relative to R∗). The operator “... qua F” may
be employed to evoke this counterpart relation. Every world
where a qua F is a truthmaker for the proposition that a is F .
This is not an isolated case. a qua just as she, he is, it is is
also a truthmaker for a is F . This name evokes an especially
fine-grained relation, one that selects only counters that are in-
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trinsic duplicates of a and relative to which a has all its intrinsic
properties essentially.
The following example is helpful: consider my black cat Kellogg. Kellogg
cannot be the truthmaker for 〈 Kellogg is Black 〉 since we know that Kellogg
might have been some other colour. However, if we focus on Kellogg qua
black, the difference between the object-simpliciter and the qua-version of
the object emerges. Whereas Kellogg is accidentally black but Kellogg qua
black is essentially black. That is to say in all worlds in which Kellogg
qua black has a counterpart is a world where Kellogg is black. Therefore,
Kellogg qua black is a truthmaker for 〈 Kellogg is black 〉.
To some this might seem odd; someone might object that Kellogg and
Kellogg qua black are distinct since they have different modal properties.
Kellogg could survive the loss of his black colour but Kellogg qua black
could not. However, those who make this objection have forgotten their
counterpart theory. As MacBride (2005, 130) reminds us, “things have
their modal properties relative to counterpart relations. So a qua F can
be identified with a because when we attribute different modal properties
to it we do so relative to different counterpart relations. Again it is the
use of names—in this case “a qua ‘F ’ and ‘a’—that are key to use with
the relevant relations.” Given this, it looks like what we are left with is an
account of truthmaking that doesn’t involve any unexplained connections
between distinct existences. Although it is true that a qua F exists just in
case a if F —some of you might say there is a necessary connection— but
it does not occur between distinct existences since, a qua F just is a. This
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account is also not mysterious; the connection obtains in virtue of being F
is part of what it takes to be a counterpart of a qua F (MacBride, 2005,
130).
9.5.2 The Case of Negative Existential Statements
Lewis and Rosen extend this move to deal with negative existential state-
ments. The Lewis-Rosen proposal is to accept that if we can take qua-
versions of things as truthmakers — that is to say “if we are entitled to
take ordinary things as truthmakers by supposing that they make propos-
itions true relative to peculiar counterpart relations that are evoked by
peculiar names for ordinary things — then the suggestion is to apply it to
cases of negative existentials (Rosen and Lewis, 2003, 39).
However, Lewis (2003, 32) points out that without development, his ori-
ginal account could be “parodied to its discredit”. Rhetorically Lewis asks
would it be possible to deal with negative existential statements in exactly
the same way as existential statements. Take another example of a cat
called Long. “Long qua unaccompanied by unicorns” may be another name
for Long, one which evokes a peculiar counterpart relation. Under this pe-
culiar counterpart relation, a counterpart of Long will meet the following
conditions provided to us by Lewis (2003, 32):
1. it is one of his counterparts under the ordinary counterpart
relation evoked by the name “Long” (pretend for simplicity
that this is fully determinate); and
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2. it is unaccompanied by unicorns — that is, it is in a world
where there are no unicorns.
We end up in the position where Long qua unaccompanied by unicorns
is a truthmaker for there are no unicorns. On the grounds that any world
where he exists, any world where he has a counterpart under the counterpart
relation evoked by the named Long qua unaccompanied unicorns, is a world
where there are no unicorns. Lewis thinks this is a cheap trick since,
the ‘peculiar counterpart relation’ is so very peculiar as not to
be a genuine counterpart relation at all. The ‘similarity’ if we
may call it that, between things that are unaccompanied by uni-
corns is, in the first place, one that would strike us in almost any
context as utterly unimportant similarity. It is, in second place,
an entirely extrinsic similarity. Two things both unaccompan-
ied by unicorns could be as different as you please intrinsically.
Their surroundings too, both nearby and remote, could differ
intrinsically in any respect other than the absence of unicorns.
(Lewis, 2003, 32–33)
For a counterpart relation to be satisfactory, it must be based on sim-
ilarities that appear to have some importance and they should also rest
predominantly on intrinsic similarity. Lewis (2003, 33) elaborates: “...a
satisfactory counterpart relation will often give a lot of weight to intrinsic
similarity between the contexts in which the counterparts are embedded
in their worlds. For instance, in the case of match of origins, we have
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the intrinsic similarity of the parts from which the two counterparts have
originated.”
The difference according to Lewis between “Long qua unaccompanied by
unicorns” and “Kellogg qua black” is that the first statement does not meet
the similarities that we would find important nor does it meet intrinsic
similarity. However, in the second case more weight is given to the intrinsic
similarity than the counterpart relation evoked just by “Kellogg” (Lewis,
2003, 33).
Lewis and Rosen, when developing Lewis’s original proposal, suggest that
we cannot take cat Long qua unaccompanied by unicorns as a truthmaker
for the truth that there are not unicorns for this makes use of a ‘peculiar
counterpart relation and a peculiar counterpart relation is not a genuine
counterpart relation at all, being founded on an unimportant and unduly
extrinsic respect of similarity’ (Rosen and Lewis, 2003, 39). However, if we
were to use the qua-version of a better chosen thing, we can establish a
more satisfactory counterpart relation (Rosen and Lewis, 2003, 39).
Let us begin a fairly simple case of restricted negative existentials—cases
where a particular domain is specified. Take the truth that there are no
unicorns in this room. (At the moment, but let that restriction remain
tacit.) We then say that this room+ consists of this room and everything
in it, including the air, the furniture, and if there are any, the unicorns.
This room+ qua including no unicorns is a truthmaker for the truth is that
there are no unicorns in this room. Rosen and Lewis (2003, 39) point out
that “This time, the peculiar counterpart relation evoked is founded on an
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entirely intrinsic and salient respect of similarity. But we could instead
have used this room qua containing no unicorns; the counterpart relation
is still satisfactory, being founded on intrinsic similarity not between the
counterparts themselves — the rooms — but between the more inclusive
things — rooms+ — that are saliently related to the counterpart rooms.”
Lewis and Rosen believe they can extend their account all things being equal
to less restricted negative existential truths such as there are no unicorns
on this planet, or even that there are no unicorns in this galaxy and even,
in this galaxy and throughout its history.
Rosen and Lewis (2003, 39) then turn their attention to unrestricted neg-
ative existentials. For example, the truth that there no unicorns anywhere,
they suggest that we ought to take as truthmaker for a qua-version of the
entire world and consider various options. (i) The totality of everything
there actually is. That way, our counterpart relation can again be founded
on intrinsic similarity. What is a counterpart of the world? One opinion is
to say it would be an entire possible world, the totality of all there is in its
world. (In that case, a counterpart of the actual world in a world W would
have to be the world W itself, nothing less). (ii) Another option would
be for it to just be a proper part of a world. If this were the case, might
our four-dimensional world have as a counterpart a four-dimensional slice
of some five-dimensional world? Ultimately they are forced to leave this
matter open, stating: “We suppose this is one of those questions about the
counterpart relation that has no determinate answer; in other words, there
are counterpart relations under which the world is essentially total, and
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there are counterpart relations under which it is not” (Rosen and Lewis,
2003, 39–40). I will return to this issue shortly.
Lewis and Rosen say it is not their present purpose to give an account of the
counterpart relation for the world itself; rather, it is their aim to examine
whether the counterpart relation is a satisfactory one. They argue yes on
the grounds that:
Being unaccompanied is an extrinsic property, to be sure (Lewis,
1983; Langton and Lewis, 1998). So similarity in respect of be-
ing unaccompanied is an extrinsic respect of similarity. How-
ever, the property of being completely unaccompanied (unlike
Long’s property of being unaccompanied by a unicorn) does
seem quite important to the character of anything that has it.
Further, it is normally linked to quite an important intrinsic
property: being, at least ostensibly, self-contained because the
world is completely unaccompanied it will never, short of a mir-
acle, be affected by signals or visitors suddenly arriving as if
from elsewhere. (Rosen and Lewis, 2003, 40)
In the case of specific (restricted) negative existential statements such as
〈there are no hippos in the lake〉 (9.4)
We get a specific truthmaker: the lake qua unaccompanied by hippos. Jago
(2013b, 465) admits that this approach is parsimonious, stating “all the
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entities referred to by qua-phrases are already required by Lewis’s modal
realism. It’s also (by design) compatible with Lewis’s Humeanism, which
many take to be an advantage.” Jago criticises this proposal on the grounds
of triviality which I will handle in a later part of this chapter. For now, I
would like to express another concern with the Lewis and Rosen proposal
on which extended modal realism easily overcomes.
9.5.3 Extending the Lewis-Rosen Proposal
Rosen and Lewis (2003, 41) suggest it does not matter what our metaphys-
ical commitments to possible worlds are and that one could equally be a
fictionalist about possible worlds or a realist. In this section I argue it does
matter and that by adopting the extended modal realist’s framework we
can develop, with benefit, the original Lewis-Rosen proposal by filling in
some of the gaps left in their articulation of the theory.
In the restricted cases the proposal looks like it fares well and can straight-
forwardly be applied to the extended modal realist metaphysics. However,
in the unrestricted cases, there is a problem for Lewis and Rosen as they say
they cannot give a definite answer as to what the counterpart of the world
might be. I argue extended modal realism can supply an answer here.1 The
extended modal realist has two potential answers to the question. The first
answer is an easy one. The extended modal realist is at liberty to say that
a counterpart of the world is just a world-stage in the five-dimensional uni-
1In true Lewisian style I also suggest that if a theory is more explanatory, then we
have good reason to consider it preferable compared to its competitors.
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verse (where modality is the fifth dimension). This is a feature of extended
modal realism not present in Lewis’s theory.1 The second answer is that
the extended modal realist would treat all cases as restricted cases, and this
question would not really arise for them. Yagisawa tells us that:
I reject an absolutely unrestricted collection of anything, whether
it forms a domain for quantification or not. But I appear to
embrace reality as completely unrestricted; anything whatever
is real. Is this not incoherent?...I refuse to envision an abso-
lutely unrestricted domain, totality, whole, or what have you
along those lines. But I do envision reality. So, reality is
not an absolutely unrestricted collection (or domain or total-
ity...).2(Yagisawa, 2012, 79)
The extended modal realist can not only straightforwardly answer Lewis
and Rosen’s questions about what a counterpart of the world would be
given its metaphysical commitments to the universe as a whole, but what
is more the very same question does not even arise on extended modal
realism given the denial of unrestricted quantification. I suggest therefore
that the extended modal realist goes forward with a maximal truthmaking
account much like the Lewis-Rosen proposal but with a metaphysics that
helps avoid some of the troubling questions that arise if we operate with
Lewisian modal realism.
1Nor in fictionalist versions of Lewis’s theory à la Rosen.
2See Chapter 8 for how I try to square Yagisawa’s claim.
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9.5.4 Comparing Armstrong and Lewis
We’ve now seen Armstrong’s and Lewis’s solutions for handling negative
existential statements. Lewis thinks there is similarity between his position
and Armstrong’s. Lewis (2003, 34–35) provides five comparisons between
his view and Armstrong’s which I will summarise below.
1. “States of affairs are particulars, spatio-temporally located and unre-
peatable” (Lewis, 2003, 34). The state of affairs of Kellogg’s being
black is located exactly when and where Kellogg is. The same is true
for qua-versions of things. Kellogg qua black is nothing else other
than Kellogg therefore of course Kellogg qua black is located exactly
where Kellogg is.
2. “Necessarily, the state of affairs of a’s being F exists just in case a
thing a and property F exist and a has F” (Lewis, 2003, 34). Take
the example of Kellogg being black exists just in case Kellogg is black.
The connection between Kellogg and being black holds just in virtue
of blackness being part of what it takes to be Kellogg’s counterpart,
under the peculiar counterpart relation evoked by the name ‘Kellogg
qua black’. And not for any other mysterious reason.
3. The state of affairs of a’s being F can be described as being composed,
but in a non-mereologically way of two constituents: the particular
a and the universal F.1 Lewis provides an analogy to help us un-
1It seems hard to understand what exactly states of affair are, given this if mere-
ology is the general theory of composition it makes no sense to talk of things which are
composed in a non-mereological way; this is not something I will get into in this thesis.
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derstand this. “If necessary connections between distinct existences
are forbidden, then mereological composition (in which the whole is
not distinct from its parts but rather is partially identical to each of
them) becomes a licence for necessary connections. Maybe it means
to say that a state of affairs that is unmereologically composed of
its constituents bears a necessary connection to them: the necessary
connection considered in the previous paragraph. If that is what the
claim of unmereological composition means, we already have seen that
it applies just as well to Kellogg qua black”.
4. It is denied that states of affairs are composed mereologically of a
and F. Otherwise, the blackness of Kellogg would exist if Kellogg and
blackness did, irrespective of whether Kellogg was black or not, and
“at least under a counterpart relation that validates mereological es-
sentialism”(Lewis, 2003, 35). Kellogg qua black is not mereologically
composed of Long and blackness either for Lewis. Kellogg is part of
Kellogg qua black because Kellogg is part of the whole Kellogg qua
black, but the same does not go for blackness (Lewis, 2003, 35).
5. Finally, and importantly, Lewis points out, “We are not given a fully
general denial that states of affairs are identical to ordinary particulars
that are the subjects of predications” (Lewis, 2003, 35). Lewis does
provide one special case in which this identity is asserted. “Let F
be the complete intrinsic character of a, including all of a’s intrinsic
properties, or, at any rate all of them that are genuine universals. (I
shall assume questionably perhaps, that all the rest supervene upon
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these.) Let a be a so-called ‘thick’ particular, taken to include the
whole of F. (‘Include unmereologically’, whatever that means.) Then
the state of affairs of a’s being F is identified with a itself” (Lewis,
2003, 35). Lewis thinks his proposal matches this. Kellogg the ‘thick’
particular has the same existence conditions as Kellogg qua F where
F is ‘just as he is’. Kellogg the thick particular and Kellogg qua just
as he is, acts as a truthmaker for all true predications with Kellogg as
the subject. And Kellogg qua just as he is, like all other qua-versions
of Kellogg, is identical to himself (Lewis, 2003, 35).
Lewis states:
So in the end, the only difference I can find between Armstrong’s
proposal and mine is that I claim in full generality, and Arm-
strong claims only in a special case, that the truthmaker for a
true predication is identical with the subject of that predication.
(Lewis, 2003, 35)
What is more, even though this is all Lewis can find, he thinks that the
prima facie similarity of the two proposals is because they are “constrained
alike by the goal of finding truthmakers for predications” (Lewis, 2003, 35).
Even if the two views are similar, Lewis seems to have the advantage of gen-
erality. However, I think there is a second reason as to why I should prefer
Lewis’s proposal. Armstrong’s influential solution seems to be generally
incompatible with the background ontology I am operating with if we take
seriously his distinction between Thingist and Factualist ontologies. In this
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project I am preserving our reist intuitions when it comes to non-existent
objects and if we were to go with Armstrong’s solution it would undermine
these reist tendencies. But what is more, not only do Lewis’s comments
highlight a similarity between his and Armstrong’s position, Lewis might
also be indicating that the distinction between Thingist and Factualist on-
tologies (especially when by facts we mean states of affairs) are not so big
either. For if “States of affairs are particulars, spatio-temporally located and
unrepeatable” (Lewis, 2003, 34), then there is very little difference between
states of affairs and entities located at other worlds acting as truthmakers
(especially in the case of extended modal realism). It seems that if there is
to be a collapsing on Factualist and Thingist ontologists, the direction of
collapse is towards the Thingist; it is for this reason we are better off with
Lewis’s proposal than with Armstrong’s.
9.6 Accidental Truthmaker Maximalism
We’ve seen that truthmaking plus extended modal realism is useful for solv-
ing problems about truth and non-existents. I’ve shown that even though
Lewis and Rosen believe their account of truthmaking to be ontologically
neutral when it comes to one’s stance on possible worlds, there are signi-
ficant advantages to adopting the approach of the extended modal realist,
for it can fill in the gaps left in their initial exposition of the theory.
Here I detail why I call this accidental truthmaker maximalism. The reason
for calling this kind of truthmaking accidental is that a feature of extended
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modal realism is that there is as part of the universe anything we could
want to quantify over. Therefore, for any proposition there is naturally a
truthmaker for that proposition, provided it can be obtained with a suitable
qua object and a satisfying counterpart relation. Consequently truthmaking
of the kind offered by Lewis and Rosen and extended modal realism go
hand in hand. I have shown how in conjunction with extended modal
realism it can straightforwardly solve the two problems concerning truth
that are caused by non-existent entities. Extended modal realism fares
well with these cases because it has the right kind of ontology to do so.
Once made explicit, we see that there is no issue with the employment of
a truthmaking-style theory. I have shown we can easily handle cases about
truths concerning non-existents and how with some development we can
employ an improved version of the Lewis-Rosen proposal. However, there
is the upshot that many propositions will accidentally come out as true.
First, it seems that for almost any proposition we could offer, there will
be a truthmaker for it in the five-dimensional universe; for this reason it
is important to be precise about how we restrict quantification.1 What
is more, it seems as if even seemingly impossible propositions might have
viable truthmakers. Using Lewis’s schema of proper name and intrinsic
property we can construct the following example: Kellogg is qua calico and
black. We might think that this qua-version of qua picks out an impossible
counterpart by which Kellogg is calico and black; however, we know that
such a situation is already permitted under extended modal realism. For
Yagisawa (2015) points out there is an impossible world stage of Bertie
1See Chapter 8.
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in which he is both portly and not-portly. Being portly seems to be just
as much of an intrinsic property as colour does. If such a situation could
occur, then according to extended modal realism, there is a truthmaker for
Kellogg is qua calico and black; it just is not a counterpart at this world,
but at some impossible world. This seems like a quirk of the theory but
one we should expect.
Despite all this and the benefit of truthmaker maximalism, it is a conten-





In the previous chapter I outlined accidental truthmaker maximalism, a the-
ory that develops on the Lewis-Rosen proposal with a different background
metaphysics, which fills some of the gaps not explained in the initial ex-
position of the Lewis-Rosen view. In this chapter, I reply to a range of
objections against not only the Lewis-Rosen style strategy but also against
truthmaking in general. I also look at one alternative theory of truthmak-
ing that some might think would have been a good option to take and
show why I think it is unappealing. The structure of this chapter is as
follows: in §10.2 I provide an argument to defend accidental truthmaker
maximalism against a potential objection from Jago. In §10.3 I examine an
alternative way to handle negative existential statements. I highlight that
in Mumford’s way of handling negative existential statements overlooks the
viable option of invoking a modal realist style theory. Moreover, I show
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that Mumford’s own position is problematic. Finally, in §10.4 I respond to
some general concerns about invoking the truthmaker principle.
The objections in this chapter can broadly be split into two kinds: problems
against the motivation for the truthmaker principle and problems against
the truthmaking principle itself. When it comes to motivation for the truth-
making principle, Dodd (2002) argues that there is no satisfactory motiva-
tion for a truthmaking account (of any kind). I argue contra Dodd that the
accidental nature of my account can answer some of his worries and his ma-
jor concern seems to be alleviated given what follows from modal realism.
Although Jago (2020) argues in favour of truthmaker maximalism, he hits
on a similar point; it is not the inconsistency of the principle but rather the
motivation that puts people off truthmaker maximalism. He states:
Arguments against maximalism rarely attempt to demonstrate
inconsistency. Perhaps truthmakers for ‘negative’ truths are
ruled out by some metaphysical principle (Molnar, 2000, 84).
Perhaps true negative existentials are ‘true for lack of false-
makers’ (Lewis, 1992, 216). Perhaps truthmaking does not re-
quire entities as truthmakers (Melia, 2005; Schneider, 2006).
Perhaps truthmaker theory as a whole ‘lacks a proper motiv-
ation’ (Liggins, 2008, 192), so that ‘we have no reason to be-
lieve the principle’ (Williamson, 1999, 253). Even if true, none
of this shows that maximalist friendly ontology is inconsistent.
An entity may be logically possible even if it conflicts with a
metaphysical principle, even if it is theoretically unnecessary,
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and even if all arguments for it are poorly motivated.1 (Jago,
2020, 2)
To concerns about motivation, in short, I say, the kind of truthmaking max-
imalism I am offering shifts the location of motivation to a commitment to
a foundational metaphysical theory. If you accept this metaphysical theory,
then it would be reasonable for you to accept truthmaker maximalism too.
If you reject the theory, it is no wonder you reject maximalism. I am not
asking that you accept truthmaker maximalism in virtue of a strong belief
in the value of the truthmaker principle but rather I am arguing that the
truthmaker principle is a natural companion of extended modal realism.
The second kinds of objections are ones against the truthmaking principle
itself. Jago (2013b) provides a triviality objection that can be run against
the Lewis-Rosen proposal. However, I argue that in some respect this is
what we should expect and thus I intend to show that this is not something
we should be worried about and also demonstrate that the setup of Jago’s
criticism is in conflict with comments from Lewis (2013). Mumford (2007)
ignores the explanatory power that a suitable metaphysics can offer, and it
looks like his own account will suffer in cases where we introduce statements
about broader domains.
I’ve partially responded to concerns about motivation here and for now I
will focus on the second kind of objection. Jago and Mumford each have
1Jago (2020, 2) hits on the kind of maximalist metaphysics I have in mind although
he explicitly does not endorse it. He says, “Even if all these ‘negative’ entities fail the test,
there are other maximalist approaches. Rosen and Lewis (2003) rely on possibilia and
tricks with counterpart relations. I doubt mere possibilia exist, but Lewis’s pluriverse is
surely consistent.”
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their own criticism which I provide in 10.2 and 10.3 and reply to. I return
to concerns about motivations in §10.4.
10.2 Reply to Jago
Jago (2013b, 465) objects to the Lewis-Rosen proposal on the grounds that
it faces a triviality objection. Consider:
〈Vulcan does not exist〉 (10.1)
According to Lewis (2003, 32), we would not want to claim that Elvis,
qua unaccompanied by Vulcans, is what makes 10.1 true. Elvis has nothing
whatsoever to do with Vulcans so, why should it be that 10.1 is made true by
the unaccompaniment of Elvis? Elvis has nothing to do with whether there
exists Vulcans. This would just be an example of what Lewis referred to as
a ‘cheap trick’ in the previous chapter. Lewis says in the genuine account,
the invoked counterpart relations must “rest upon similarities that strike us
as having at least some importance” and “rest predominantly upon intrinsic
similarity” (Lewis, 2003, 33).
However, Jago (2013b, 465) contends that even with this restriction in
place, we can still run the triviality objection.1 He asks us to consider all
the intrinsic duplicates of Elvis. All these duplicates are intrinsically similar
to Elvis in many ways. If we were to select from the duplicates those which
1Trivial in the sense that our proposition is made true by things we think should not
be relevant truthmakers.
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are unaccompanied by Vulcans, they will remain exactly similar to Elvis in
many respects but differ extrinsically from Elvis in the respect that they
are not accompanied by Vulcans.
But Jago says “our way of selecting those Elvis duplicates as a group in this
way rests on many, many intrinsic respects plus just one extrinsic respect.
So ‘intrinsic duplicates of Elvis unaccompanied by Vulcans’ is a way of se-
lecting counterparts that rest predominantly (albeit not totally) on intrinsic
similarity, just as Lewis requires” (Jago, 2013b, 465).
Lewis and Rosen take 10.1 to be made true by the world, qua unaccompan-
ied by Vulcans.
Jago continues that even on Lewis’s own grounds, picking out Elvis qua
intrinsically as he is and not accompanied by Vulcans provides the context
for us to treat Elvis as a truthmaker for proposition 10.1. And thus Jago
says:
Triviality has not been avoided. (True, it is not clear to what
‘rest[ing] predominantly upon intrinsic similarity’ amounts. Yet
Lewis needs this notion to avoid his own ‘cheap trick’ objection,
and so the onus is on him to make precise sense of the notion in
a way that avoids this kind of objection.) (Jago, 2013b, 465)
The first point of response against Jago is that it seems to sit poorly with
how Lewis sets up the tenets of modal realism. Lewis seems to reject situ-
ations in which there is singular change, and all else remains the same,
whereas Jago’s criticism seems to be prefaced on this. Lewis (2013, 9) says:
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We might think it best to confine our attention to worlds where
kangaroos have no tails and everything else is as it actually is;
but there are no such worlds. Are we to suppose that kangaroos
have no tails but their tracks in the sand are as they actually
are?
The setup of Jago’s challenge appears to rest on the very thing (or some-
thing close enough) to that which Lewis rejects in this passage.
What is more, Jago’s objection is hard to place in light of our developed
Lewis-Rosen proposal in the ‘unrestricted cases’ ranging over a universe
with every way things could be and could not be present. It seems that
triviality is what we should expect to find. Therefore it seems that in light of
my adjustments that the objection of triviality, although accurate, doesn’t
come with much bite.
10.3 Reply to Mumford
My reply to Mumford is not so much a reply but a pointing out of a serious
neglect.
In his 2007 paper, Mumford sets himself up to reply to Molnar. Molnar
(2000, 84–85) claims that there must be negative truths because that con-
clusion is entailed by the following four premises:
Mi The world is everything that exists.
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Mii Everything that exists is positive.
Miii Some negative claims about the world are true.
Miv Every true claim about the world is made true by something that
exists.
Mumford counsels correctly, pointing out that Molnar cannot find positive
truthmakers and maintain these four conditions. So something must be
denied.
Mumford ultimately develops a response that amounts to the rejection of
Miii. And he provides arguments as to why we ought to maintain Mi and
Miv. For Mii Mumford says:
Mii has almost a ring of apriority about it. How can these facts
both exist and be negative? Indeed, how can any existent really
be negative?1 (Mumford, 2007, 49)
As for Miv, Mumford says:
Because of such difficulties with negative facts, other truthmaker
theorists are prepared instead to sacrifice [Miv] and forego max-
imalism (for examples Simons 2005). This is an admission that
there are some truths for which truthmakers theory does not
hold. The theory would be applicable only to positive truth,
1Jago (2020) disagrees with the move Mumford makes here but I will not get into
their debate.
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which says something is. For negative truth, which says some-
thing is not, we have to concede that they are true but without
having truthmakers. The weakness of this response, however, is
that it dispenses with the very claim that is the initial motiva-
tion of the theory. (Mumford, 2007, 49)
But when it comes to Mi, Mumford just says: ‘The rejection of Mi seems out
of the question’ (Mumford, 2007, 67). To not argue as to why we ought to
maintain Mi and not reject it is to ignore the most straightforward solution
to the inconsistent tetrad. This is simply a case, I argue, of missing out on
explanatory power by insisting on employing an impoverished ontology. If
we approached Molnar’s inconsistent tetrad with the right tools for the job,
we would see quickly that denying Mi would be an obvious solution and be
the one we should take.
So far, I have cast doubt on why we might go for the Mumford proposal in
the first place given that it ignores the advantage of going for what looks
like the most straightforward option and thus suffers dialectical issues. Here
I look at one reason why even if we were to accept the Mumford proposal
it would be problematic.
Mumford’s position is to treat negative truths as falsehoods. He suggests
that the following two statements are equivalent.
1. t〈p〉 ↔ ¬f〈p〉
2. f〈p〉 ↔ ¬t〈p〉
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Mumford uses some examples to make his point clear: Take the statement:
〈It is raining〉 (7O)
According to Mumford, a ‘typical philosophical articulation’ of 7O might
be:
t〈It is raining〉 (7P )
We might understand this as “It is true that it is raining”. Mumford (2007,
52) notes that according to the truthmaker theory, as he outlined it, “t〈p〉
when 〈p〉 has a truthmaker T...” This gives us the existential commitment
of (7P ), namely:
〈It is raining〉has a T (7M)
Turning to negative truth, Mumford examines the statement:
〈It is not raining〉 (8O)
Mumford suggests this ought to be translated as
f〈It is raining〉 (8P I)
Mumford continues, stating:
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I am going to stick with (8P I) as the correct philosophical ac-
count and I interpret the metaphysical commitment of (8P I) as:
(8M) 〈It is raining〉 has no T.
Here I argue that when we introduce truth in a set domain, the Mumford
account does not handle it well. Take for example “It is not raining outside
my window now”; Mumford would say this is a falsehood because it does
not have a truthmaker (it is not presently raining outside my window).
However, what if we take the example ‘It is not raining in the North East
of England’ and imagine that in Newcastle there is a heavy downpour, but
in Tees Valley, it is a bright day. How is Mumford’s account supposed to
make sense of this? For there appears to be both a truthmaker (the bright
day in Tees Valley) and a non-truthmaker (the rain in Newcastle) for the
statement in question. What is more, given the climate of the North East
of England, this is a very likely state of affairs to occur. The standard
account gives a direct answer, that it is raining in the North East in virtue
of the Newcastle truthmaker and does not take into account the potential
false-maker of Tees Valley. We get a straightforward but potentially coarse-
grained answer, but this is exactly what we should expect when giving such
a wide-scope quantification.
Mumford on the other hand would presumably say the claim has to be
treated as it is false 〈 it is raining in the North East 〉 and this is incorrect
because 〈 it is raining in the North East 〉 has at least one truthmaker, in
Newcastle. But it isn’t clear how this gets Mumford out of any kind of
trouble for his equivalent statement that it is false that it is raining in the
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North East is directly contradicted by the Tees Valley truthmaker, which
is surely an unwanted consequence. The Mumford account must recognise
the presence of the truthmaker at Tees Valley unlike the standard account
where it can be ignored at the sacrifice of fine-grainedness. However, this
lack of fine-grainedness is of no real concern for it can be remedied with
restricted quantification.
Therefore it appears the equivalence that Mumford introduced between:
1. t〈p〉 ↔ ¬f〈p〉
2. f〈p〉 ↔ ¬t〈p〉
just does not hold once we start thinking about truth in a set domain. If
we try to force the equivalence to hold, we get the unwanted consequence
of apparently directly conflicting statements, both of which end up being
verified under the Mumford account.
10.4 Reply to Dodd
I end this part of the chapter by highlighting and replying to some meth-
odological concerns raised by Dodd (2002). Briefly, Dodd’s concern is that
any version of the truthmaker principle is not well motivated and cannot be.
His main concern is not with any technical problem concerning the principle
but with the principle itself. Rather, Dodd (2002, 70–71) is concerned that
those who employ the truthmaker principle are not able to justify it. Dodd
states:
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I believe there to be a reason for this: It cannot be justified.
As we shall see, John Bigelow circumvents the truthmaker the-
orist’s traditional problems with negative truth by diluting the
truthmaker principle until it is restatable as the thesis that truth
supervenes on being, in which ‘being’ is construed as whether
things are. My contention is that the truthmaker principle, even
when weakened in the way Bigelow envisages, cannot be respect-
ably motivated. It only gains its patina intuitiveness by virtue
of confusion of fallacious argument. (Dodd, 2002, 70–71)
Since I employ Bigelow’s thesis or something very close to it, Dodd’s con-
cerns are ones I should address.
Dodd (2002, 73–74) raises the objection that “the truth value of 〈 the ball is
red at t 〉 seems to supervene, not on whether things are, but on how things
are.” Dodd points out that it seems possible for there to be two possible
worlds which contain the same existent, only in one the ball is red at t and
the other it is not red at t. It therefore seems what is different in the case
of these two worlds is not in what exists but in how things are in respect to
what exists.1 In one world the ball instantiates redness at t; in the second
world it does not.
Dodd (2002, 73–74) states “The truth of 〈 The ball is red at t 〉 is not, it
seems determined by the existence of some entity (viz. a state of affairs
1It is this feature which distinguishes this problem from the problem of contingent
truths raised in 9.2.2. The problem raised in 9.2.2 argues what exists is contingent; the
problem here argues it is not what exists that is important for truthmaking but it is how
the existing things are which is important for truthmaking.
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of trope); it would seem to be because some entity (viz. the ball) has the
property in question t.”
It is unclear what exactly Dodd’s objection is here if we remain true to our
modal realist inclinations. The objection is, in short, that if our guiding
principle is that truth supervenes on what exists, then there are cases where
this principle fails. Consider our case of the ball: here it would seem the
guiding principle would fail, for truths about the ball would be true not
in virtue of what exists but rather in virtue of what there is. However,
for a modal realist (at least for those who subscribe to some variety of
counterpart theory) what there is and how things are are just one and
the same. This might strike some readers as a strange statement so I will
spend some time developing it. If we consider the totality of what there
is, there is no difference from a God’s-eye perspective between what there
is — what exists — and how things exist. Recall the counterpart relation
explained in the previous chapter. I exist just as I am at this world; to
explain how things might be different, we have to examine a different world
and a different counterpart, but then we are just talking about what exists
at that world, and how things are remain the same. Let me provide another
example. Take this mug in front of me: it is blue but it might have been red,
or some other colour. To explain how things might be different in respect to
the colour of my mug, we would examine a different possible world, but then
all this amounts to is examining what exists at a different world. Therefore,
given our metaphysical background it makes sense to collapse what exists
and how things exist into one and the same thing, given that modal realists
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can make sense of difference by the counterpart relation across worlds. It
is then hard to see a distinction between how things exist and what exists
and ultimately, difficult to make sense of Dodd’s objection when we keep in
mind our metaphysical system in operation.
Therefore Dodd’s initial concerns seem untroubling. Dodd even concludes:
If the claim that truth supervenes on being means that truth su-
pervenes on how things are, then it should command our assent.
(Dodd, 2002, 84)
Therefore it seems that even in light of Dodd’s concern, truthmaking in
conjunction with an extended modal realist position is one that we have
good reason to think of as a strong one.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided some responses to three potential issues
concerning truthmaking. First I have looked at direct objections to the
Lewis-Rosen proposal. I have shown that we can defend against Jago’s
objection on the grounds that the setup of his objection is in direct conflict
with the setup of modal realism. What is more, given the commitments of
extended modal realism, an outcome of triviality might be what we should
expect.
I have looked at an alternative suggestion for making sense of truthmaking
in the case of negative existential statements, one which involves a lot less
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metaphysical baggage and I have shown why we might want to avoid it. I
say to Mumford’s concerns not only do they ignore modal realism as a viable
option but it also looks like Mumford’s own theory fares poorly. Finally,
I address concerns about generally motivating the principle. I have shown
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The problem of intentional inexistence was originally raised by Brentano
(2012, 1874) and has notably been developed by Prior (1971) and Crane
(2013). The concern is that, if intentionality is a relation between two
objects, then for a relation of this structure to hold, it requires the existence
of both its relata. The problem is essentially, How can we stand in an
1This chapter is published in Philosophia as a paper by the same name; thank you




intentional relation with an object if that object does not exist? Dummett
states that “intentionality is naturally taken to be a relation between the
mental act, or its subject, to the object of that act”. Dummett continues
by articulating the problem: “how can there be a relation when the second
term of the relation does not exist?” (Dummett, 2014, 36).
There are four ways one can go to solve this puzzle. First is to deny that in-
tentional acts towards non-existent objects are possible. Second, one could,
like Prior, challenge that intentionality is a relation. Crane developed this
line of thought and challenged whether intentionality is always a relation.
However, this move, made by Crane (2001, 2013), is a reaction to the prob-
lem of intentional inexistence and is seemingly not independently motivated.
Thus, we might think it is the standard or common-sense position to think
of intentionality as a relation. Alternatively, Priest (2016, 58–59) favours
the approach that we can stand in intentional relations with non-existent
objects. Another option is to suggest that the objects of our intentions exist
as parts of possible worlds. The view that there are real modalities other
than the actual one is known as modal realism. Traditionally this view
is attributed to Lewis (1986). However, Lewis’s modal realism is not the
only option available. Since Yagisawa (1988), a version of modal realism
called extended modal realism has been in development. Under extended
modal realism existence is a set-theoretic notion.1 Modal realists such as
Lewis think that there are non-actual concreta of which possibilia are a
1Under extended modal realism objects exist only if they bear the membership rela-
tion to a given set. See Yagisawa (2014) for Yagisawa’s theory of existence.
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kind and we stand in intentional relations with such things.1,2 Extended
modal realism succeeds with the problem of intentional inexistence where
Lewis’s modal realism could not. extended modal realism was introduced
as an extension of the Lewisian project in Yagisawa (1988) and developed in
Yagisawa (2010). Although it was not intended as an answer to this prob-
lem, it works well. As far as I am aware, Yagisawa has not yet formulated
an explicit answer to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, it is
clear he is aware of its usefulness from his comments (Yagisawa, 2014, 14).
In this chapter, I respond to Kriegel who dismisses modal realism as a
solution to the problem of intentional inexistence on the grounds that even
presented in its strongest form it does not meet the principle of represent-
ation (Kriegel, 2007, 311). The modal realist would attempt to solve the
problem of intentionality by suggesting that the objects of intention are not
non-existent but rather exist as a part of a possible world. The principle
of representation is that causal contact is a precondition for the possibility
of representation (even if it is not constitutive of the representation itself).
Under the most well-known form of modal realism, that of Lewis, possible
worlds are spatiotemporally isolated wholes, and according to Kriegel the
fact that Lewisian possible worlds are causally isolated renders modal real-
1What exactly possibilia are depends on ones ontology. For Lewis (1986) they are
parts of concrete possible worlds. Whereas Yagisawa remains non-committal on the
concreteness of his worlds (Yagisawa, 2010, 179: fn 7). However, it is still open as to
whether the world-stages of objects are concrete or not. To do justice to different kinds
of modal realism, when defending modal realism in this chapter, I will use the term
‘non-actual objects’. This term ranges over possibilia and impossibilia remaining non-
committal on their concreteness. The concreteness of worlds and world-stages is a point
where extended modal realism would benefit from some clarification and development.
2Although Kriegel’s primary concern is with possibilia, I anticipate that the same
criticisms made against possibilia would also be made against impossibilia.
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ism insufficient to pass the principle of representation. However, extended
modal realism can respond to this problem.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: in §11.2, I provide some comments
on the nature of intentionality and its structure. Here I also motivate the
problem of intentionality formulated as an inconsistent triad. In §11.3 I
outline some responses to the problem of intentionality, then in §11.4, I
provide Kriegel’s description of modal realism and I highlight why Kriegel
thinks modal realism fails. In §11.5, I provide a brand of modal realism
(Extended modal realism) that Kriegel did not consider and show how it
meets the principle of representation. I end with the disjunctive conclusion
that either extended modal realism passes the principle of representation
or that the principle of representation should be rejected since it cannot be
satisfied by many other theories. If the former is correct, then on Kriegel’s
grounds I have established a successful modal realist solution. If the latter
is correct, then we have reason to reject the principle of representation
as a reasonable criterion by which to judge a response to the problem of
intentional inexistence.
11.2 Intentionality
Kriegel gives us no definition of intentionality. However, since Kriegel wishes
to establish intentionality as an adverbial property rather than a relation
it would be helpful to have a grasp on the term in question. For Brentano
intentionality characterised mental activity (Brentano, 2012, 88). Berto
220
11.2.1. Intentionality and Representation
elaborates and points out that Brentano might have been wrong by claiming
that all mental states bear intentionality. However, most scholars agree that
at least some mental states do (Berto, 2018, 3). Crane (2013, 4) tells us that
“every intentional state or episode has an object — something it is about
or directed on”. Yablo defines intentionality in terms of aboutness: “the
relation that meaningful items bear to whatever it is that they are on or of
or that they address or concern” (Yablo, 2014, 1). Sometimes intentionality
is simply described in terms of directedness or aboutness (Mumford and
Anjum, 2011, 185). As I consider the problem of intentional inexistence, I
have in mind Mumford and Anjum’s definition. I have elected to employ
this definition since it is neutral on whether intentionality is a relation or
not, and establishing whether intentionality is a relation or not is not the
primary purpose of this chapter.
Figure 11.1 outlines the standard structure of intentionality, where we have
an existing agent a bearing an intentional act towards an existing object x.
The direction of the intentional act F is indicated by the arrow symbol.
a x
F
Figure 11.1: The structure of intentionality
11.2.1 Intentionality and Representation
Before I begin in full there is a quick aside. I should note that Kriegel is
happy to switch the terms representational and intentionality. He states,
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“what all these have in common is that they involve intentionality or rep-
resentation: they represent something” (Kriegel, 2007, 308, Kriegel’s em-
phasis). Kriegel also reorganises the problem of intentional inexistence,
replacing the obviously intentional term “thinking of” with the less obvi-
ously intentional term ‘represents’ (Kriegel, 2007, 308). It is not entirely
clear what Kriegel aims to achieve by switching the terms ‘representation’
and “intentionality”. It is Kriegel’s project to establish that representa-
tion and intentionality are not relations and thus this general project might
have something to do with the shift in terminology. It is undeniable that
intentionality is a kind of representation. One could argue that Intention
is a particular genus of the family of Representation. Priest states, “The
intentionality of mental states is one kind of representation. It is not the
only kind” (Priest, 2014, 160). Even if it is true that representation is not a
relation, this says nothing about intentionality, unless Kriegel thinks what
is true of the family is true of all its “genera”, which is plainly false. What is
true of some Canidae is not necessarily true for all Caninae. For example,
Caninae have distinguishing characteristics including small, simple, well-
spaced premolars and a humerus without an entepicondylar foramen. The
fact that Intentionality belongs to the family Representations does not mean
Intentionality cannot have distinguishing features, such as being relational.
If Kriegel thinks the terms are equivalent, then a switch is permissible.
However, there is reason to think that the terms are not strictly equivalent
and therefore a switch is not acceptable. My thinking about the lion is an
intentional act that represents the lion. However, a map of Newcastle also
represents Newcastle but the map’s representation is not intentional in the
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same way that thinking about a lion is. Given the fact that there are some
representations that are not intentional in the same way mental acts are,
the two terms cannot be switched salva veritate.
In order to do justice to both sides of this debate over whether intention-
ality and representation are relations, I will assume that intentionality and
representation are equivalent. I use the letter “F” to indicate the presence
of intentionality or representation. Since if intentionality and representa-
tion are equivalent, then using a neutral letter to indicate the presence of
either term is fair. However, if the terms are not equivalent and there is
an objection to using a neutral letter to signify their presence, then Kriegel
has made an argumentative misstep which needs to be addressed. The mo-
tivation for this might be that it seems less controversial for us to think
of representation as non-relational than intentionality as non-relational.
Kriegel’s argument rests on developing Chisholm’s account of perception
as a non-relational form of representation. Therefore, it is of obvious be-
nefit to Kriegel if he can bring intentionality closer to the same kind of
representation as Chisholm had in mind (Chisholm, 1957).
With this aside out of the way, I will return to the problem at hand.
11.2.2 The Problem of Intentional Inexistence
The problem of intentional inexistence can be broken down into three pro-
positions.
1. An agent (a) F s something (x) non-existent.
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2. An agent (a) cannot F something (x) non-existent if F is a relation.
3. F ing something (x) constitutively involves bearing a relation to it.
The first statement seems obvious; you can think of a non-existent object
even though that object is non-existent. For example, you can think of
Pegasus, the future, a square circle, or other ways the world could have
been even though these objects do not exist.1
On the face of it, the second claim is also straightforward; it relies on the as-
sumption discussed by Hawthorne and Manley that no relational expression
can be about an object unless that object exists (Hawthorne and Manley,
2012, 9).
The final claim is more controversial; it rests on the concept of intentional-
ity as a relation. You might choose to get off the bus here and disagree over
whether intentionality is a relation. However, for those who want to main-
tain the relational structure of intentionality, the problem of intentional
inexistence is one problem they must consider. The problem of intentional
inexistence is: “how can we represent something that doesn’t exist, given
that representation involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear a
relation to something that doesn’t exist” (Kriegel, 2007, 307).
The problem arises when there is an existing agent standing in an inten-
tional relation with a non-existent object. The indeterminate nature of
1Under the metaphysics I offer some of these objects do exist but for the sake of
setting up the problem, let’s say they do not. Furthermore, some philosophers might
try to tell me I cannot represent impossible things such as square circles or positively
charged electrons. In response, I can provide two cases where this feat is achievable, see




non-existent objects prompts the question, What is in the object box?
11.3 Responses
There are a number of responses which Kriegel deems to be unsuccessful.
Before I reach the one I would like to defend I will sketch two others, namely
the “abstracta” and “mental concreta” views, which are two forms of the
same idea. The idea behind both of these responses is that when we are
thinking of non-existent objects, we are thinking about something. In the
first form our intentional act is about existent abstracta and in the second
form of the idea our intentional act is about mental concreta. When you
think of Sherlock Holmes you are thinking about something which exists,
but only an “abstract entity that ‘lives’ altogether outside space-time or of
a mental object that ‘lives’ only in your mind” (Kriegel, 2007, 310).
Kriegel dismisses both these options on the charge of “familiar intuitive, on-
tological, epistemological, and phenomenological difficulties” (Kriegel, 2007,
310).
1. Intuitively, Bigfoot seems to be a non-mental concretum, though one
that does not exist, rather than an existing abstractum or mental
concretum.
2. Ontologically, commitment to abstracta and mental concreta is a li-
ability that we should not have to incur merely to account for the
facts of representation.
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3. Epistemologically, the notion that we are in direct representational
contact with abstracta or mental concreta throws a veil of appearances
over the realm of external concreta, producing a corrosive scepticism
about our knowledge thereof.
4. Phenomenologically, the entities we are aware of when we think of
dragons and parrots present themselves to us, from the first-person
perspective, as external concreta, not as mental concreta.
(Kriegel, 2007, 310–311)
11.4 Aborted Modal Realism
The problem of intentional inexistence is an inconsistent triad (Kriegel,
2007, 309). To escape inconsistency we need to deny one of three propos-
itions. The standard modal realist response amounts to denying the first
proposition, (1). Kriegel quickly discusses modal realism in the following
way: ‘A more recent version of the view under consideration is that, when
we seem to ourselves to think of dragons, we are thinking of possibilia’
(Kriegel, 2007, 310).1
Kriegel explains that against one ontology, ersatz modal realism, modal
realism simply collapses into the abstract view. However, against a back-
1Kriegel does not mention by name anyone who actually holds this position. I know
of no one who genuinely held this position in 2007. However, since the publishing of
Kriegel’s paper, a closer view has emerged. Now the closest position I know of is a view
held by Bourne and Bourne (2016). However, their focus is on time in fiction rather than
intentionality.
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ground of Lewis’s modal realism, the suggestion is that we are thinking
about non-mental concreta that do not exist in the actual world; they do
exist elsewhere in modal space simpliciter (Lewis, 1986, 3).1 By Kriegel’s
own admission this solution does avoid the problems associated with the
abstracta and mental concreta views (Kriegel, 2007, 311). Despite it being
successful in avoiding some objections, according to Kriegel, modal realism
should be aborted on other grounds.
11.4.1 Lewisian Modal Realism
Lewisian modal realism is the view that there is a plenitude of other worlds
where all manner of possibilities take place. It is the view that what could
have been the way at this world is the way things are at some other world.
Lewisian worlds are concrete wholes made of parts and individuals. These
parts and individuals are referred to as possibilia.
According to Kriegel, the Lewisian version of modal realism is not a viable
option to solve the problem of intentional inexistence. Kriegel has two ob-
jections. The first is that modal realism exacerbates the ontological problem
inasmuch as it commits us to the existence of non-actual concreta (Kriegel,
2007, 331). Kriegel’s second objection is that modal realism is inconsist-
ent with the principle of representation. Kriegel defines this principle as
follows:
...representation is always grounded in causal contact with the
1By “simpliciter” Lewis means that objects exist in the same way objects at actuality
exist.
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represented. On some views, causal contact is constitutive of
representation. The requirement I have in mind is much weaker:
that causal contact is a precondition for the possibility of rep-
resentation (even if it is not constitutive of the representation
itself). Since there is no trans-world causation, representation of
non-actual concreta is inconsistent with this principle. (Kriegel,
2007, 311)
Kriegel argues these two reasons are good enough to abandon modal realist
solutions to the problem of intentional inexistence. In the following section,
I take each reason in turn and provide counter-arguments to both.
11.5 Modal Realism Defended
11.5.1 Defence 1
The first defence of modal realism I offer is against the challenge that its
introduction “exacerbates [2] the ontological problems, inasmuch as it com-
mits us to the existence of non-actual concreta” Kriegel (2007, 311). This
is a methodological concern which comes about due to what you are willing
to buy into and trade-off. It is clear that Kriegel is not willing to accept
non-actual objects, and thus their advantages are not available to him. If
you are willing to accept non-actual objects then you gain access to philo-
sophical benefits that come with them. One of which is a simple answer to
the question “What goes in the object box?” in the case of agents bearing
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intentional relations to a non-existent object. If you choose to decline non-
actual objects then you must also abandon their benefits. This is a position
Kriegel has put himself in, and it is not a deficiency of modal realism itself.
What is more, Kriegel opens himself up to criticism on the grounds of
employing false parsimony. Kriegel’s reaction to non-actual objects reveals
he is sympathetic to economic theories and implies that he believes more
economic theories are somehow superior to less economic theories. However,
this is to misuse parsimony. Sober (1981, 1, italics original) states, “The
principle of parsimony counsels that we should hypothesise that an entity
does not exist if its postulation is to no explanatory point.” With Sober’s
formulation to hand, it is clear that non-actual concreta are no threat to the
violation of the principle of parsimony. The presence of non-actual objects
play an explanatory role and therefore we are on no grounds to cite them
as “strange” metaphysical entities that ought to be avoided.
11.5.2 Defence 2
The second concern that Kriegel highlights is that modal realism fails to
meet the principle of representation. This criticism targets a feature of
Lewis’s version of modal realism under which there is no trans-world caus-
ation since Lewis’s worlds are totally isolated from each other.1 Thus,
modal realism set against this ontology cannot meet what is asked of it
by the principle of representation. However, Lewis’s modal realism is not
1Lewis believes his worlds are both spatiotemporally and causally isolated; see Lewis
(1986, 70) and Lewis (1986, 78).
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the only brand of modal realism on offer. Extended modal realism is a
brand of modal realism under which there are both possible and impossible
worlds. Under extended modal realism, worlds are points in modal space.1
In extended modal realism, objects are not only temporally extended but
they are also modally extended.2 To use the temporal analogue, we might
say that I have past and future stages; likewise, we might also say I have
possible and impossible stages.3 However, unlike Lewis’s modal realism, in
extended modal realism there is only one universe in which all objects and
their stages belong.
Another dissimilarity between Lewis’s modal realism and extended modal
realism is that under extended modal realism my modal stages are related
in part-hood to my actual stage. Given this part-hood relation and the
single universe, the possible and impossible stages of objects are not totally
isolated as they would be if they belonged to different Lewisian worlds. The
part-hood relation does not mean that there can be some kind of butterfly
effect between modal parts. The actual parts of an object cannot change
the way the possible or impossible parts of objects are, at least not in a
chain-like way. Yagisawa clarifies the relationship between possible worlds:
“I regard what Lewis calls ‘possible worlds’ as modal parts of one and the
same universe. The universe’s modal parts are not possible worlds, but
the universe itself as it is at possible worlds, its world-stages” (Yagisawa,
2010, 44). He continues: “my modal space (collection of all possible worlds
1Extended modal realism was originally introduced in (Yagisawa, 1988) and de-
veloped in (Yagisawa, 2010).
2Yagisawa (2010, 44–45) plays up the temporal analogue between modal realism and
eternalism, an analogue that Lewis plays down.
3Yagisawa calls these modal stages “world stages” (Yagisawa, 2010).
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I embrace and all objects existing at them) contains many concrete objects
all of which are modal parts of one and the same universe” (Yagisawa, 2010,
44). The best way to understand the relationship between world-stages is to
compare them to Lewisian worlds. For Lewis, worlds are spatiotemporally
unrelated by definition. However, this is not quite the case under extended
modal realism, since “The space and time of one world are the same space
and time of many other worlds. Space and time permeate many different
worlds. The space and time that exist at the actual world, however, do
not exist at some remote possible worlds, being replaced by alien space
and time, or no space or time at all (if that is possible)” (Yagisawa, 2010,
45–46).
Let us consider Jane as she is in a spatial region r at a time t at a world
w1, and John as he is in r at a different world w2. The proponent of exten-
ded modal realism supplies two ways we could understand spatiotemporal
relations:
1. The first way we could understand the spatiotemporal relation is as
“Jane at w1 is in r at t, and so is John at w2. They are in the same
region of space at the same time. They are also in the same universe,
albeit at different modal points. In that sense they are certainly
spatiotemporally related.”
2. The second way is as a physical relation between Jane and John.
“Jane at w1 could not reach out and touch John at w2, or anyone or
anything at w2, no matter how fast or how far she travels through




In sum, the answer Yagisawa gives to the question as to whether possible
worlds are spatiotemporally related is yes. By this, he means that two
or more worlds can have the same space-time. Objects at possible worlds
can share the same spatial and temporal regions but differ in their modal
location.
What remains is to question what is meant by “causal contact”. If causal
contact in the principle of representation comes down to spatiotemporal
relations then Yagisawa provides two ways to interpret this. The first way
that we could interpret causal contact is that causal contact amounts to
the space-time being the same at different worlds. The second way we
could interpret causal contact is in the physical sense in which Jane could
reach out and touch John. Let us call them causal contact1 and causal
contact2 respectively. If causal contact requires agents to be connected to
the objects of our intentions in Yagisawa’s second sense, causal contact2,
then the condition is absurd and should be rejected. There is no way that I
could be causally connected in this way with many kinds of ordinary objects.
The reason for this might come down to a number of factors, including
practical possibility, physical possibility, or metaphysical possibility. For
example, I can think about the centre of the earth without being causally
connected2 to it. I can think of stars that are billions of light years away
without being causally connected2 to them. And I can think of Sherlock
Holmes without being causally connected2 to him either.1 If we take causal
1A critic of my position might insist that we could be causally connected2 to the
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contact to mean causal contact2 then it reduces the objects of our intention
to only those objects which are spatially accessible to us, which is absurd.
However, if the requirement is set with Yagisawa’s first sense in mind, causal
contact1, then extended modal realism meets this condition in virtue of
some worlds and their objects being unified by spatiotemporal relatedness
(Yagisawa, 2010, 45). Under extended modal realism, at least some worlds
are spatiotemporally related, the ones where the space and time are the
same. If all that is required for causal contact is spatiotemporal relatedness
then extended modal realism can, at least in some cases, meet this minimal
demand. However, an objector might say spatiotemporal relatedness in
this sense does not seem to capture what is wanted from the principle
of representation. The principle of representation seems to require direct
causal contact between the representer and the represented. Modal realism
is not out of the woods just yet. Our final option is to challenge the principle
of representation.
11.5.3 Defence 3
My third and final defence of modal realism is to argue that the principle
of representation is asking too much from any theory. It seems to be used
centre of the earth via a chain of causal connections. And although we are not directly
connected to the centre of the earth, this chain of connections is sufficient to be causally
connected2 to the centre of the earth. By way of response I say that there is no way there
can be a complete chain like this which is causal connects2 an agent to an object which we
are not in direct acquaintance with. Causal connect2 requires a direct connection. This
challenge admits we are not in direct acquaintance with the object and thus this isn’t a
case of causally connect2. A chain of this kind would be one of causal connect1 which
we know extended modal realism can satisfy. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for
alerting me to this possible criticism.
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as an ad hoc condition to rule out modal realism as a viable solution to
the problem of intentional inexistence. The inclusion of the principle takes
too much else with it, including Kriegel’s own solution. The principle of
representation states that causal contact is a precondition for the possibil-
ity of representation. However, we have already seen that there are plenty
of objects that we are not in causal contact with which we can repres-
ent with ease, fictional characters and distant stars for example. It seems
that set against many ontologies, not just modal realism, this principle is
troublesome. It precludes anyone with an anti-realist ontology of fictional
characters from representing them. It also limits those with Meinongian
ontologies in the same way. Realists are no better off. Unless the objects
of our representations are located at actuality in the strict sense and even
when this is the case, what it means to be in causal contact with an inex-
istent object located at actuality seems difficult to define if not impossible.
Acceptance of the principle limits the scope of the relevant objects of our
representation too much. Moreover, if we take this principle seriously not
even Kriegel’s own account survives, unless he thinks we are in causal con-
tact with Bigfoots (Kriegel, 2007, 314). The principle of representation says
nothing about only applying to relational accounts of representation and




Modal realism can minimally meet the principle of representation in certain
cases. Or we take the more sensible option and reject the principle of rep-
resentation altogether. It is a restrictive principle that rules out too many
instances of standard representational acts with no good reason and seems
inadequate to deal with cases of intentional inexistence. I have shown that
there is still hope for a modal realist answer to the problem of intentional
inexistence by rejecting that a direct causal connection need hold between





Those of us with extended ontologies often attempt to answer the problem
of non-existence by suggesting our thoughts are about non-existence or non-
actual yet existing (simpliciter) objects. However, a problem for these kinds
of responses is they neglect to tell us how we can think about such objects.
“Thinking about” is normally understood to involve some variety of the
“acquaintance relation”, which given the nature of the target objects cannot
easily be achieved. In this chapter, I argue that semantic instrumentalism
allows those with extended ontologies — specifically those with a modal
realist ontology — to sufficiently respond to this concern regarding the
problem of non-existence.
There are some philosophers who respond to the problem of non-existence
by broadening their ontology and include among the viable objects of thought
non-actual entities. They might say that those objects which are non-actual
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are non-existent. I am one of these philosophers. However, these solutions
are often unpopular and often associated with Meinongian-style ontologies.1
Burge (1983, 83) is particularly negative about such positions, stating that
“A few theorists have found Meinong’s idea worth pursuing. But I shall
not discuss them. My view, which appears to have been Russell’s, is that
quite apart from various more technical objections that might be raised,
Meinong’s approach is, to put it bluntly, silly.” Although I do not offer
a Meinongian-style solution to the puzzle of non-existence, I do offer one
which also has the result of extending one’s ontology beyond what is actual.
I suspect my suggestion would be subjected to similar criticism from those
people who are sympathetic to Burge’s naysaying. My proposed solution
to the problem of non-existence is to employ a variety of modal realism,
known as extended modal realism.2
I take it that part of the reason why philosophers are suspicious of these
kinds of solutions is that they, like Quine (1948, 23), have an aesthetic
preference for desert landscapes. However, there is a more serious reason
why solutions that extend their ontologies are unpopular as ways of handling
the problem of non-existence, that is they only get us so far regarding
a solution to the problem of non-existence. The puzzle of non-existence
can be divided into two questions. The first question is, when Alexius is
thinking about a square-circle, what is it that he is thinking about? The
second question is, how can James be having a singular thought about
1The most recent and detailed of which I am aware of is from Priest (2016).
2I will not retell the extended modal realist ontology in detail. For an overview of
extended modal realism, see Yagisawa (2010). To see how this can be usefully applied
to the problem of non-existence, see Thomas (2019).
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that kind of object if that object is non-existent? Most philosophers take
it that acquaintance of some variety is involved in this kind of singular
thought.1 Of course, no one, not even those of us with exotic ontologies,
would endorse the position that we are straightforwardly acquainted with
non-actual objects. Thus, those of us who think that extended ontologies
are helpful regarding the problem of non-existence must provide an account
of singular thought that does not rely on acquaintance.
In this chapter, I argue that semantic instrumentalism is an option for
those with extended ontologies —particularly extended modal realism — to
introduce singular thought about non-actual objects without acquaintance.
Semantic instrumentalism is not a new position and was most famously
articulated by Kaplan (1989b), although originally put forward in a short
paper by Harman (1977). The view has received recent attention from
Jeshion (2010) who builds on semantic instrumentalism and develops her
own position called “Cognitivism”. What is more, it appears that Yagisawa
(1983) also holds a similar view, which is rarely mentioned in the literature
on semantic instrumentalism. The fact that Yagisawa holds such a position
is significant given his extensive contribution to the Extended Modal Realist
project.
Even though semantic instrumentalism is not a new view, its combination
with an extended ontology like extended modal realism is an underexplored
strategy. Yet the combination is a natural suggestion. The pairing leads to
1For acquaintance theories see: Russell (1910), Burge (1977), Donnellan (1979),
Lewis (1979), Evans (1982), Boer and Lycan (1986), Bach (1987), Salmon (1987b),
Kaplan (1989a), Brewer (1999), Recanati (1993), Soames (2003, 2005) and Pryor (2007).
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a powerful solution to the problem of non-existence.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: in §12.2 I introduce the problem
of non-existence as articulated by Prior (1971) and do some housekeeping
which involves collapsing the distinctions between, intentionality, singular
thought and de re thought which have previously been made by Crane
(2013). I recap the important parts of the Extended Modal Realist solution
to the problem of non-existence in §12.3. In §12.4 I introduce and articulate
semantic instrumentalism and highlight its benefits when engaging with
extended ontology solutions to the problem of non-existence.1 In §12.5 I
respond to some objections to semantic instrumentalism which include some
objections from Jeshion (2010) and a reply to those who might be sceptical
about whether the introduction of semantic instrumentalism is helpful when
intentionality is considered to be a representational mental state. Finally, in
§12.6 I conclude that the combination of semantic instrumentalism provides
those with an extended ontology a full and novel solution to the problem
of non-existence.
1I take it that those with a Meinongian rather than modal realist ontology could
make use of something like semantic instrumentlism; however, the modal realist has the
advantage on the grounds that it is stipulated by semantic instrumentalism that the
referrer must believe that the object of their thought exists. The Meinongian will have
trouble meeting this condition for non-actual objects. However, the modal realist can





Prior’s problem has become the canonical way to articulate the problem of
non-existence. Prior (1971, 130) states:
X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation between X and Y when
Y exists, but not when Y doesn’t; but X’s thinking of Y is the
same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. Something plainly
has to be given up here; what will it be?
Since Prior’s articulation of the puzzle, the notion of “intentionality” has
become entwined with “thinking about” or “thinking of”. It is even fair to
say that in analytic contexts “thinking about” is sometimes used synonym-
ously with intentionality. However, Crane (2013) has gone to significant
lengths to pull apart the two, even though Crane is not entirely incorrect
in making this distinction since we would not want to associate the inten-
tionality of the sensation of pain, nor the intentionality of a street sign or
of a map with the intentionality of singular thought. This distinction is
not present in Prior’s puzzle which is very obviously considering the so-
called “thinking about” relation, and if this is what has become known as
“intentionality”—even if for bad reasons—so be it.
Crane also makes the distinction between singular thought and de re thought
on pain of his own position collapsing. Crane (2013, 153) states: “If singu-
lar thought were the same kind of thing as de re thought, then the position
I am trying to sketch in this chapter would be impossible.” Drawing a dis-
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tinction on the grounds of forwarding one’s position is not a good reason for
drawing a distinction. Thus, we should be sceptical about Crane’s reason
for making a distinction. However, this chapter is not a criticism of Crane’s
style of argument, and so I will not examine it further. I do not need to
draw a distinction between singular thought and de re thought for my pos-
ition to get off the ground, so I won’t. It is my strategy to examine Prior’s
problem in its naive form.
However, there is a distinction between two types of thoughts I will draw
which has been well established in the literature, and that is between de
dicto and de re thought.1
Jeshion (2010, 2) articulates the distinction in the following way:
Thoughts of the first type are variously known as descriptive,
de dicto, conceptual, or notional thoughts. Thoughts of the
second type are known as singular, de re, purely referential, or
relational thoughts.
Unlike the singular thought/de re distinction, the de dicto/de re distinction
does play an important purpose. If we attempt to solve Prior’s problem by
accepting that singular thought is relational but the kind of thought we
have about a non-actual object is anything but de re thought, we have
made no progress in solving Prior’s puzzle.
1See Burge (1977) for discussion regarding de dicto and de re thought.
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12.3 The Extended Modal Realist Solution
extended modal realism is a brand of modal realism under which there are
both possible and impossible worlds. Under extended modal realism, worlds
are points in modal space and objects are not only temporally extended, but
they are also modally extended.1 To use the temporal analogue, we might
say that I have past and future stages; likewise, we might also say I have
possible and impossible stages.2 However, unlike Lewis’s modal realism in
which worlds are isolated universes, the extended modal realist believes that
there is only one universe in which all objects and their stages belong. The
extended modal realist solution to the first question asked by the problem
of non-existence is quick and straightforward to understand. It responds
to the natural question that results from Prior’s problem: “What are our
thoughts about when they concern a non-existent object?” The response
goes that when we are thinking of some non-existent object, we actually
have in mind some possible (or impossible) object, something which exists
simpliciter but is non-actual.3 So we say that when we are thinking about
something ‘non-existent’ what is going on is that we are thinking about
some non-actual section of modal space.
The objection might come that in order to think about some object you
1Yagisawa (2010, 44–45) plays up the temporal analogue between modal realism and
eternalism, an analogue that Lewis plays down.
2Yagisawa calls these modal stages “world stages” (Yagisawa, 2010).
3Under extended modal realism existence is a set-theoretic notion. Objects exist
only if they bear the membership relation to a given set. I think we would be better off
using a different term to refer to what Lewis calls existence simpliciter but there is not
space to go into this here. My brief suggestion is to reserve the term “exists” for “exists
at the actual world” and “real” for “exists simpliciter”.
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must stand in some causal relation, or some acquaintance relation to that
object.1 However, it is not clear how the Extended Modal Realist can stand
in any kind of acquaintance relation with non-actual objects. The Lewisian
Modal Realist fares even worse with this challenge since they operate with
completely isolated worlds. I suggest that the Extended Modal Realist also
ought to subscribe to semantic instrumentalism, a position that allows for
relational singular thought without the need for acquaintance or any other
kinds of causal relations which are relied on by other extensional theories
of thought.2
12.4 Semantic Instrumentalism
Semantic Instrumentalism is the position that we can sustain singular thoughts
about objects simply by introducing directly referring terms. When artic-
ulating semantic instrumentalism, I rely heavily on the framing of Jeshion
(2010). Not only does Jeshion provide a clear and systematic account of
semantic instrumentalism but I also opt for Jeshion’s framing because the
ideas voiced by Kaplan in Dthat (Kaplan, 1978) — a pre-curser to Demon-
stratives (Kaplan, 1989b) — concerns the reference of sentences and not the
singular thoughts of agents. Jeshion’s framing of the position is obviously
regarding singular thought and thus much more inline with my aims even
if Kaplan’s original ideas were not.3
1An objection of this kind has been raised by Kriegel (2007).
2For an example of an extensional theory of thought which relies on causal relations
see Burge (2010).
3Jeshion does make a note about some of the interpretive issues regarding Kaplan’s
trajectory of thought regarding semantic instrumentalism (Jeshion, 2010, 118 fn.22).
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Under semantic instrumentalism, we are free to introduce a dthat expression
or descriptive name into the language and so transforming an arbitrary
singular thought into a directly referential one, in turn giving rise to a
singular thought about the term’s referent (Jeshion, 2010, 118–119). For
Kaplan, reference and singular thought is a matter of what we choose to
do. If we want to refer to some object X directly, then all we need to
do is use a dthat expression or a descriptive name as a means of securing
direct reference, in turn, singular thought. These devices exemplify all the
properties of tools. We use them — control and manipulate them — to
secure singular thought (Jeshion, 2010, 119).
Jeshion highlights the following footnote fromDemonstratives which provides
an overview of semantic instrumentalism:
There is a disagreement as to how the given object must be given
to one who introduces a proper name word with the second in-
tention (the intention to originate a word rather than conform to
prior usage). Must he be acquainted with the object, directly ac-
quainted, en rapport, perceiving it, causally connected, or what?
My liberality with respect to the introduction of directly refer-
ring terms by means of “dthat” extends to proper names, and I
would allow an arbitrary definite description to give us the ob-
ject we name...But I am aware that this is a very controversial
position. Perhaps some of the sting can be removed by adopting
an idea of Gilbert Harman. Normally one would not introduce
However, reference to the issues regarding the differences between Dthat and Demon-
stratives is not mentioned.
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a proper name or a dthat-term to correspond to each definite
description one uses. But we have the means to do so if we
wish. Should we do so, we are enabled to apprehend a singu-
lar proposition concerning remote individuals (those formerly
known only by description). Recognising this, we refrain. What
purpose — other than to confound the sceptics— is served by
direct reference to whosoever may be of a dubbing in terms of
description and the active contemplation of characters involving
dthat-terms — two mechanisms for providing direct reference to
the denotation of an arbitrary definite description — constitute
a form of cognitive restructuring; they broaden our range of
thought. To take such a step is an action normally not per-
formed at all, and rarely if ever done capriciously. The fact that
we have the means — without special experience, knowledge or
whatever — to refer directly to the myriad individuals we can
describe does not imply that we will do so. And if we should
have reason to do so, why not?
(Kaplan, 1989b, 560, fn. 76)
Jeshion (2010, 120–125) identifies five interconnected features of Kaplan’s
semantic instrumentalism. First is that there is no constraint by epistemic
acquaintance conditions when it comes to the introduction of dthat expres-
sions and descriptive names. The only thing required to introduce a dthat
expression or descriptive name is for the introducer to have some minimal
understanding of the mechanisms of direct reference. The introducer must
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be adept at using the description and have the intention to introduce a
name.
Jeshion explains that this feature comes in two parts. Although the theses
are given with descriptive names, they can be easily extended for other
DIRTs (Descriptively Introduced Referential Terms).
1. Free Descriptive Name Introduction: One can always introduce
a descriptive name “N” into the language by fixing its reference with a
definite description “the F,” used attributively, so long as one believes
there exists a unique referent of “the F”.1
2. No Constraints: there are no conditions on introducing descriptive
names into the language apart from believing or knowing there is a
unique F and saying or stipulating “Let N refer to the F”.2
(Jeshion, 2010, 120, my emphasis)
The second and third features of semantic instrumentalism pertain to our
cognitive relation to semantic intentions. To secure direct reference and
singular thought, about a named individual, one only needs to have an
intention to originate a name. What is more, to originate a name is just a
matter of one’s choosing to do so. To have a singular thought is possible
1I take that “exists” in this usage corresponds to the unrestricted usage employed
by modal realists to talk about non-actual entities, what Lewis (1986) called “exist-
ence simpliciter”. For if “exists” did not refer to the unrestricted usage, then semantic
instrumentalism would be an uninteresting and unneeded position.
2Jeshion importantly highlights that to say there are no constraints isn’t the same as
saying that there aren’t any limitations for introducing descriptive names, dthat expres-
sions or other DIRTs. Instead, it indicates a minimal condition that the referrer must
have the right semantic intention; they must believe — as I emphasised— that there is
a unique referent of “the F”.
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about any object, if we want to. It is just a matter of will if we want to
secure singular thoughts about the present king of France, square-circles, or
Sherlock Holmes. To achieve singular thought, we need to form an intention
to introduce a DIRT for the desired object. This gives us two more theses.
3. Intentions Constrain Public Name Introductions: At any time
t, one can introduce a descriptive name whose reference is fixed with
“the F” just in case one has an intention to introduce a directly ref-
erential expression into the language.1
4. Free Naming Intention Production: One can have an intention
to introduce a descriptive name or any other DIRT into the language
if one chooses to do so. (Jeshion, 2010, 121)
The fourth feature is the converse of the third that if we have the will we
can refrain from thinking singular thoughts about any objects.
5. Free Choice to Not Think Singularly: One can refrain from
thinking singularly about an individual I by refraining from intro-
ducing a directly referential expression, whose reference is fixed with
“the F,” where I uniquely satisfies the description “the F”. (Jeshion,
2010, 122)
The fifth feature is about the manipulation of direct reference required for
achieving singular thoughts about objects to which we lack acquaintance,
1‘Intention’ as used here is not the same kind of ‘intentionality’ associated with
Prior’s problem. The form might be switched with the word ‘plan’ without any loss of
meaning; the same cannot be said for the latter.
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even though Kaplan is clear that the introduction of a descriptive name or
dthat expression is sufficient for singular thought about the referent. We
should note that:
His [Kaplan’s] writings do suggest, in addition, that the ma-
nipulation of the apparatus of direct reference is also necessary
for singular thought about an individual with which one is not
acquainted. After all, Kaplan never explores even the possib-
ility of alternative sources of securing singular thought in the
absence of an acquaintance relation. So, while Kaplan never
explicitly states this aspect of his Semantic Instrumentalism, it
is a subtext of Demonstratives.
(Jeshion, 2010, 122)
This gives us our sixth thesis.
6. Necessity of Semantic Manipulation: The only mechanism by
which one could have a singular thought about an individual I with
which one is unacquainted is by DIRT introduction — by manipulat-
ing the semantics of direct reference.1
(Jeshion, 2010, 122)
Jeshion points out that these theses taken together give us an account of our
ability to freely introduce DIRTs that are rooted in our intentions, which in
1Although I accept Jeshion’s point here that Kaplan did not consider alternatives,
it must be noted that if we take Kaplan’s claim “that we do not even need to be weakly
causally connected to the object of our thought” seriously then manipulation of semantics
is the only available option.
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turn is rooted in our choice to do so. However, these tenets do not provide
an account of why our thoughts about individuals we think of with DIRTs
count as singular and not descriptive thoughts (Jeshion, 2010, 122).
Jeshion highlights that Harman (1977) provides a way for the semantic
instrumentalist to ensure that their thoughts are singular thoughts. Harman
introduces the idea of ‘mental names’ which are “mental representations of
individuals just as names in language are public linguistic representations
of individuals’ (Jeshion, 2010, 123). Importantly, ‘mental names may be
introduced by those who believe that there exists a unique thing satisfying
a certain condition” (Jeshion, 2010, 122, my emphasis). I draw attention
to this as it shows that mental names can only be introduced by those who
take seriously that there is a unique thing that corresponds to their mental
name. This stipulation, made by both Harman and Kaplan (emphasised
earlier), blocks objections like those made by Priest (2016, 58–59). Priest’s
objections are aimed at those who attempt to solve the problem of non-
existence with “purely representational theories” which involve the use of
a “surrogate object”. In the case of the semantic instrumentalist, there is
no surrogate: the singular thought is straightforwardly direct. The thought
of an agent concerning an object is singular when the agent thinks with
the stipulatetively introduced mental name. This thesis can be put in the
following way.
7. Mental Names Sustain Singular Thought: Thinking of an indi-
vidual I with a mental name that refers to I is sufficient for thinking




To achieve singular thought, nothing is needed apart from thinking with
a mental name. For the Semantic Instrumentalist, any agent can have
singular thoughts about objects which they do not stand in acquaintance
with simply by introducing a mental name for that object and then thinking
about the object with that mental name.1
semantic instrumentalism provides a view where agents can successfully
achieve singular thought about objects which they are not acquainted with
so long as they can be denoted with a definite description or another DIRT.
The only restriction seems to be that the linguist has the correct intention,
which is to say they take seriously the existence — in the unrestricted sense
— of the object of their singular thought.
Jeshion (2010, 124) provides a summary of the tenets of semantic instru-
mentalism:
1. Overall statement of Kaplan-Harman Singular Thought Pro-
duction: One can have singular thoughts about an individual with
which one is unacquainted (I) by virtue of introducing a directly refer-
ring expression, whose reference is fixed with “the F ,” and I satisfies
the description “the F”.
1Jeshion (2010, 123) notes that “Harman thinks of the act of naming as being, in
the first instance, a cognitive act, not simply a public stipulation or a physical act like
a stroke of a pen. Harman sees the agent as directly introducing a mental name into
cognition.” This implies that Harman’s theory is more liberal about singular thought
than Yagisawa’s theory who says that a demonstrative act is require; see Harman (1977)
and Yagisawa (1983) respectively.
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2. Free Descriptive Name Introduction: One can always introduce
a descriptive name “N” into the language by fixing its reference with a
definite description “the F” used attributively, so long as one believes
there exists a unique referent of “the F”.
3. Mental Names Constrain Public Name Introduction: One can
introduce a descriptive name whose reference is fixed with “the F”
just in case one has introduced a corresponding mental name into
cognition.
4. Free Mental Name Production: One can introduce a mental name
into cognition if one chooses to do so.
5. Free Choice to Not Think Singularly: One can refrain from
thinking singularly about I by refraining from introducing a directly
referential expression, whose reference is fixed with “the F ,” and I
satisfies the description “the F.”
6. Necessity of semantic manipulation: The only mechanism by
which one could have a singular thought about an individual with
which one is unacquainted is by DIRT introduction — by manipulat-
ing the semantics of direct reference”.
7. Mental Names Sustain Singular Thought: Thinking of I with
a mental name that refers to I is sufficient for thinking a singular
thought about I.
(Jeshion, 2010, 124, my emphasis)
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Semantic instrumentalism, as articulated above, provides a way for agents
to have direct, unmediated singular thoughts about objects which they are
unacquainted. Such a theory has an obvious benefit to those who would
use an extended ontology to solve Prior’s problem. So long as they take
seriously that their DIRT is genuinely referring to some object, then an
agent is able to sustain singular thought about such an object.
However, semantic instrumentalism is not without its problems. Jeshion
provides some criticisms to semantic instrumentalism which I will articu-
late and respond to below. Before I get there though, one might wonder
why at this point the Extended Modal Realist wouldn’t side with “Cog-
nitivism”, Jeshion’s own position intended to ameliorate the issues with
semantic instrumentalism. The reason for not siding with “cognitivism” is
a practical one. I reject the Significance Condition: “a mental file is
initiated on an individual only if that individual is significant to the agent
with respect to her plans, projects, affective states, motivations” (Jeshion,
2010, 136). The first reason for rejecting the significance condition is that it
seems evident that I can think singularly and dispassionately about all kinds
of regular objects which are not especially significant to me: space rocks,
the chair to my left, the penny in the bottom of my bag, and I could con-
tinue with plenty of other mundane examples. If Jeshion were to reply that
“these objects serve my argumentative project and are therefore significant
on those grounds”, then that seems gerrymandered. If we can gerrymander
the significance condition to suit any object, the significance condition has
become too liberal. Without the significance condition in place we might
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as well be semantic instrumentalists since we’ve now allowed for singular
thoughts about the very kind of objects we were meant to be ruling out
by the introduction of significance condition. The second reason for reject-
ing the significance condition is that there is no need for someone with an
extended ontology to introduce it in the first place. Those of us with ex-
tended ontologies can easily satisfy the most significant hurdle of semantic
instrumentalism, namely believing that the object of our singular thought
exists simpliciter.
12.5 Objections and Responses
12.5.1 Free Mental Name Production
The first issue that faces semantic instrumentalism is to use Jeshion’s term
‘Free Mental Name Production’. The challenge comes in two parts. The
first part of the challenge insists that:
One cannot simply choose to have a mental name for an indi-
vidual. Semantic instrumentalism supposes that we can will sin-
gular intention. But how? By thinking harder, more intensely,
with feeling? This lacks plausibility. Few embrace voluntarism
about belief or the production of other (non-semantical) inten-
tions. (Jeshion, 2010, 125)
By way of response to the first part of this objection, we can say that
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this objection merely amounts to the rejection of the central premises of
semantic intrsumentalism; it amounts to no more than the incredulous stare.
Just because a theory might be met with this incredulous stare is no good
reason to deny it. A straightforward denial of a position is not an argument
against it. In true Lewisian fashion, I suggest that the advantages are
outweighed by the apparent conflict with common sense.
The second part of this objection is:
Mental name production is not wholly under agential control.
It is under cognition’s control.
What distinguishes those instances in which mental names are
introduced and those in which their production is stalled? The
answer concerns not the individuals-to-be-named’s epistemic re-
lation, but rather that individual’s significance to the subject. A
mental name can be initiated only if the individual-to-be-named
is in the relevant way significant to the thinker. (Jeshion, 2010,
125–126)
Relevance is not a feature of semantic instrumentalism but it is of Jeshion’s
cognitivism. Here we can respond that merely asserting a central premise
of one’s own position is no argument against a theory. What we have here
is a case of denying the plausibility of a theory only serving to establish
one’s own position in its place. Semantic instrumentalism is controversial,
but it is consistent, and this first objection does nothing to undermine that.
It merely offers an alternative.
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12.5.2 Free Choice To Not Think Singularly
The second objection concerns our ability to choose not to think singularly.
It goes as follows:
When the conditions are ripe for singular thought, cognition
creates singular thoughts for us, and we cannot put a halt to
them. Think of our Unabomber example. When I heard about
the Unabomber, I, like everyone else, was well aware of the
epistemic gaps in the community’s relation to the bomber and I
knew that “Unabomber” was a descriptive name. Even if I had
had a desire “not to confound the sceptics” I could not have
prevented myself from thinking singularly about him. Because
I feared him and was moved to avoid university mailrooms, my
mind treated him on a par with other individuals to whom I
orient my actions. I could not have reined in my thought to
ensure that it is descriptive and non-singular. (Jeshion, 2010,
127)
This objection seems to imply that there is something about the relation,
“singular thought”, that entails the agent to act in certain ways. Singular
thought is a plain old relation like many other kinds. The fact that I stand
in a relation to the chair to my right—the being-right-of relation does not
entail that I act a certain way to the chair. My relation might inform the
range of possible actions in regards to the chair but it does not entail a
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particular one. In the same way the behaviour of an agent is not entailed
merely by a “thinking of relation”, although the presence of the “thinking
of relation” may inform the range of actions for that agent.
12.5.3 Necessity of Semantic Manipulation
The final of Jeshion’s objections to semantic instrumentalism is:
...that manipulating the apparatus of direct reference is the only
mechanism for securing singular thought in the absence of ac-
quaintance. If the mind brings about such thought for us, as I
suggested above, agential manipulation of semantics is not ne-
cessary, and consequently some other cognitive mechanism is in
place to carry it through. (Jeshion, 2010, 128)
Jeshion suggests that although directly referential semantics does have a
role to play still, the process is complicated and involves direct reference
and perception. It is hard to see how this objection isn’t merely an expres-
sion of favour for cognitivism. I will also say that those people taken by
semantic instrumentalism will be so because the theory is free from the in-
volvement of perception, so what Jeshion implies is a weakness of semantic
instrumentalism is actually a strength.
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12.5.4 What About Intentionality?
So far I have said relatively little about intentionality, and some might sug-
gest that semantic instrumentalism is of no help if we consider the problem
of non-existence to be about intentionality rather than merely ‘thinking
about’. The reason one might object in this way is that one could consider
intentionality to be a representational attitude. Priest (2014, 160) says,
“The intentionality of mental states is one kind of representation. It is not
the only kind.” And Kriegel (2007) seems to think that intentionality and
representation are interchangeable. They might also contend that “thinking
about” does not involve any kind of representation. So, although semantic
instrumentalism might get us singular thought about non-actual objects, it
does not get us intentionality. As I have suggested already, “intentional-
ity” — at least — in the analytic tradition has become synonymous with
“thinking of” or “thinking about”. Whether this is a good or a bad thing,
I will not discuss. However, I will say something to those who think that
intentionality is representational and “thinking of” is not. If we take the
problem of non-existence to involve intentionality (as something represent-
ational), you might construct the problem in the following way, where F
indicates intentionality as a representational mental state.
1. An agent (a) F s some non-existent thing (x).
2. An agent (a) cannot F some non-existent thing (x) if F is a relation.
3. F ing something (x) constitutively involves bearing a relation to it.
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The challenge might come that my suggestion of semantic instrumental-
ism does nothing to solve this puzzle; all I have done is establish non-
representational singular thought. In order to respond to this objection, I
make use of two theses provided by Burge (2010). When discussing repres-
entational mental states, Burge tells us two things. The first is that:
...being in many mental states constitutively depends on rela-
tions between an individual and a subject matter beyond the
individual. (Burge, 2010, 61)
The second is that:
It is trivial that many mental states causally depend on relations
between environment and individual. (Burge, 2010, 64)
Based on what we have already said, we can make small adjustments to
Burge’s theses so that they can be used to ground representational thought
about non-actual objects in the de re singular thought which we have
already established via semantic instrumentalism. We can straightforwardly
meet the conditions for the first thesis. By definition de re singular thought
is relational, so no adjustment is needed there. As for the second, the sug-
gestion I make is to drop the mention of “causal relations”. We ought to
just say that “many mental states depend on relations between the environ-
ment and individual”. As a result of subscribing to extended modal realism
our environment is extended to include non-actual objects, and given the
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commitment to semantic instrumentalism, we stand in relations with those
non-actual objects just in virtue of having singular thoughts about them.
Given the adjustments I have made to Burge’s conditions, we can respond
adequately to those who might pressure my suggestions on the grounds that
to think about something in an intentional way involves more than just the
presence of the “thinking of” relation but also requires a representational
aspect.
12.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have articulated semantic instrumentalism, which might
be the only viable theory for someone who wants to maintain that we can
have singular thoughts about non-actual objects. I argued that semantic
instrumentalism plus the Extended Modal Realist solution to the problem
of non-existence as articulated in Thomas (2019) make a powerful combina-
tion when it comes to solving the problem of non-existence. The pairing not
only allows us to say what our thoughts are about but also how our thoughts
can be singular thoughts. I ended with some replies to objections from Je-
shion and comments about representational intentionality. Semantic instru-
mentalism is undeniably a strange thesis and appeals to a small subsection
of philosophers. However, “strangeness” doesn’t constitute an argument
against a theory. The explanatory power that semantic instrumentalism




In this thesis, I have established a new application for extended modal
realism, a theory developed originally as an extension to Lewis’s modal
realism project. In short, extended modal realism is the view that if we
accept Lewis’s argument for possible worlds, then we should also accept
a similar argument for impossible worlds. Arguing for impossible worlds
from possible worlds was noted by Naylor (1986) but this position was
significantly elaborated on by Yagisawa (1988, 2010). I have argued that
extended modal realism is a viable and helpful solution to problems of non-
existence, most notably problems about thought and problems about truth;
I have shown that where modal realism was thought to be unsuitable when
it came to these issues, we can in fact construct a version of the doctrine
which is explanatory and helpful in solving these problems.
I started this thesis by introducing extended modal realism in Chapter 2. I
pointed out the significant problems of non-existence I would examine and
responded to in this thesis in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 I motivated the
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idea that the standard way of looking at the puzzles concerning thought
— as provided by Crane — is problematic and that we should refocus our
attention on the problem of non-existence as one about what there is, as
opposed to one about thought. There has been a tendency for philosophers
to conflate these issues; I’ve attempted to demarcate the problematic as-
pects of questions concerning non-existence as clearly as possible. Central
to problems of non-existence is the concept of “intentionality” and other
closely related terms, for example singular thought, de re belief, and inten-
sionality. Given the importance of these terms to the problems I examined
in this thesis, I spent Chapter 5 detailing these terms, their significance as
well as any problems that surface when using these terms. In Chapter 6
I highlighted that these problems have a number of solutions and argued
that there is a new player at the table which has received some attention
but is often quickly dismissed. Lewis’s modal realism is often mentioned in
papers concerning non-existence. And even though many scholars before
have seen the potential of such a theory, few have explored it fully. Often
the fuller expositions of modal realism and non-existence involve dismiss-
ing modal realism on the grounds of it being a fantastical theory, which
are poor grounds to dismiss an explanatory powerful thesis. I have shown
that there is a particular variety of modal realism, extended modal realism,
which we should favour, at least when examining cases of non-existence.
When examining non-existence it is important to have clear articulation of
what is meant by “existence”.
In Chapter 7 I provided an overview of the term existence and I also
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used this chapter to highlight some problems associated with the term. In
Chapter 8 I provided a new way that the extended modal realist can think
about existence; here I set my theory apart from Yagisawa’s modal realism,
for we fundamentally disagree on how existence ought to be expressed. I ar-
gued that the theory of existence I offer has advantages when talking about
existence and non-existence. I also argued that it has advantages compared
to the theory of existence offered by Yagisawa (2014), for Yagisawa be-
lieves that existence should be expressed in set-theoretical terms, whereas
I argued that existence ought to be expressed as an indexical.
I provided solutions to these puzzles in Chapters 9 and 11. In Chapter
9 I offered a solution to the problems of truth. I showed that we can
broadly employ the Lewis-Rosen proposal with additions from extended
modal realism which strengthens the position. In Chapter 10, I replied to
objections from Dodd, Jago, and Mumford. And in Chapter 11 I provided
a new solution for the traditional problem of intentionality.
In Chapter 12, I gave an account of thought that is fitting with the extended
modal realist’s metaphysics. Thus I have provided a full account of how one
might respond to the problem of non-existence when it comes to thought,
for a metaphysics without a serviceable theory of thought I argued was an
impoverished solution.
In order to do this, I have suggested that we should think of the problem
of non-existence as, centrally, a metaphysical problem. In Chapter 8, I
provided a new way of thinking about existence within the extended modal
realist framework. The theory I provided has significant advantages over
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that of Yagisawa’s and does not require any drastic changes to the under-
lying metaphysical picture. In the latter two parts of this thesis, I showed
how extended modal realism provides a solution to two of the most serious
problems concerning non-existent objects: problems concerning truth and
the problem concerning thought. In the case of problems about truth, I
highlighted that the Lewis-Rosen proposal can be developed using modal
realism to make it a stronger version of truthmaker maximalism when it
is combined with extended modal realism. In Chapter 11 I showed that
extended modal realism is a viable solution to the problem of thought. The
majority of this thesis focused on highlighting new applications for exten-
ded modal realism, but I also included original contributions to extended
modal realism as a theory itself.
Overall, while this project solves only a fraction of the problems related to
non-existence, the novelty of this project is that I’ve done so with a new
theory which has previously received only passing attention when it comes
to its virtues for solving problems of non-existence. More often modal
realism (extended and otherwise) is mentioned in the non-existence debate
but dismissed before it really has a chance to get going. I’ve shown here that
there is reason to accept that modal realism, particularly extended modal





Before this thesis ends, I will identify five areas for extending and continuing
my philosophical work. The first three might seem obvious while the last
two might strike some readers as slightly unexpected, but nonetheless I con-
sider them worthy projects that require significant research to be completed
in sufficient detail.
13.1.1 Non-standard Non-existence
This thesis has focused on a new application of extended modal realism and
has provided some significant developments on the theory. However, there
is, as with any topic, always more that can be said. One obvious extension
is to take this solution to alternative cases of the representation of other
non-existent objects or places, for example maps, signs, and drawings of fic-
tional people or landmarks. If we think about representation in these cases,
then it is obviously straightforward that extended modal realist theory can
accommodate them.
13.1.2 Existence
The second area that I think I could continue to work on is the theory of
quantification articulated in Chapter 8. Although I have shown the value
in the alternative theory of quantification when it comes to non-existence,
I think the theory of indexical existence may prove fruitful in other areas,
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particularly in those cases where we want to refer to things that are not
present or actual without invoking ambiguity. Existence as a relation and
existence as a predicate are both views which have received attention but
existence as an indexical has received little attention. The suggestion is that
existence is a metaphysically light notion and therefore, indexical existence
allows for an extremely fine-grained theory of existence without additional
metaphysical import.
13.1.3 De Re Belief Without Acquaintance
Although working on this thesis has led to the investigation and interest
in many side topics, one in particular deserves time and attention for fu-
ture work. An area which significant research needs to be done before
development is possible is in the area of de re belief without acquaintance.
Semantic Instrumentalism seems like a promising project for securing refer-
ence when the referent does not exist. I have provided enough detail to solve
the problems detailed in this thesis, but I think there is scope for further
development on this topic and hopefully turn it into a project of its own.
In Chapter 12 I allude to a theory of de re thought without acquaintance.
When outlining this theory I made reference to Harman (1977) and Kaplan
(1989a). Both these authors put forward a similar theory, which involved de
re singular thoughts about objects to which we are not standardly acquain-
ted. However, neither of their views have been fully developed and I be-
lieve only occur in a fraction of these authors’ published works. The second
reason why exploring this project more is of interest is that a theory of de
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re belief without acquaintance has also been expressed by Yagisawa (1983)
but has not received development either and again, I only encountered it in
a single paper of his. It falls outside the scope of this thesis to develop a
substantial theory of de re thought and instead I have opted to scaffold my
suggestions on existing work. One reason for exploring this avenue is admit-
tedly merely academic curiosity. There are, however, independent reasons
which motivate the need for additional scholarship, for example reference
to absences and reference to theoretical entities. Throughout this thesis I
have presented arguments to show that there are cases where we seemingly
do have de re beliefs without acquaintance, or at least we behave as if we
do. In order to investigate and develop such a theory fully, the first step
would be to investigate the regularity of de re thought in daily life. It seems
to be there are many cases, which other theorists attempt to explain away,
but I think the strategy would be to accept the data at face value. The next
would be to research the trajectory of Harman’s, Kaplan’s and Yagisawa’s
thoughts to see if a revised theory could be provided in a satisfactory and
defensible way. Part of the reason why such a project is worthy of attention
is that we often speak as if the beliefs we have about objections to which
we are not acquainted are de re. For example, we speak about things that
we could not possibly be acquainted with in a de re way. Problematically
— at least, I think — contemporary theories that attempt to handle this
quirk of language deny that the belief we have related to our expression is
genuinely de re; instead, they wish to explain this phenomenon by parsing
this seemingly de re expression as a de dicto expression. However, if the
phenomenon is commonplace then surely the strategy to tackle this prob-
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lem is to accept the regularity of such beliefs rather than explain them as
something else.
13.1.4 Modal Realism as a Philosophy of Life
Throughout my work on this thesis, I have become interested in a more
diverse philosophy, particularly in issues relating to mental health and well-
being. It is normally thought that being present is helpful for those strug-
gling with mental health, in particular those with depression. Kashdan
(2010) highlights a number of reasons to think that those who are “psy-
chologically flexible” have some resilience when it comes to mental health.
Pigliucci (2019) also states that for a philosophical position to be a philo-
sophy of life, two conditions are required. First, a metaphysics, a general
account of how the world hangs together and second, a general account of
how we should behave. I believe that there is scope to develop modal real-
ism (modal-realist-style theory), not only a philosophy of life but one which
if taken seriously can improve psychological flexibility. When it comes to
how to act, modal realism counsels that there are other worlds just like ours
and that many of these worlds are inhabited with people just like us, and
many of them are totally different. How should we interpret this as guid-
ance for our behaviour? My suggestion is that modal realism implies that
we should be open and aware of the range of possibilities that happen to
people just like us. I suggest that this awareness of this range of possibilities
encourages flexible behaviour. I think it would, therefore, be interesting to
investigate the relationship between analytic metaphysics and philosophy
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for life and to see if this can have any influence on informing good practice
for mental well-being.
13.1.5 Modal Realism and Priority Monism
The final area of further research which has grown from this thesis is to argue
that extended modal realism should be understood as a variety of priority
monism. Priority monism is the view that the whole is more fundamental to
its parts; such a view has been articulated by Schaffer (2010). My reason
for thinking that extended modal realism would be a stronger theory if
understood as a variety of priority monism is that Yagisawa argues that
the reality is more fundamental than what exists, but does not provide
substantial argument for this. If we can draw an analogy between the whole
and reality and parts and what exists, it could be argued that reality is more
fundamental than what exists for the same reasons that the whole is more
fundamental than the parts; if this is true then the substantial arguments









The term Intentionality has not always been used in the way that analytic
philosophers use the term. I think it is of value to point out that this is
the case although this information adds nothing directly to my argument.
There is valuable scholarship that has been undertaken on the history of the
term which I would be remiss to leave out completely. Therefore, although
in the original draft this material featured within the main content of a
chapter, for the sake of brevity I have moved it to an appendix.
It is important to draw attention to the medieval use of the term ‘inten-
tionality’ in some detail since this is arguably the first emergence of the
term used in a philosophical context. I follow the retelling of Priest on this
matter for he closely relates the medieval accounts to the general purpose of
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this thesis since he had a similar aim in Towards Non-being. Like me, Priest
wants to introduce a new theory to deal with problems of non-existence and
intentionality.
According to Priest medieval accounts rest on the general logical theory
that was in use at the time. It would be helpful to draw attention to the
most relevant features of this logical theory.
Medieval logicians took simple sentences (i.e. those not con-
taining connectives such as disjunction and the conditional) to
be constituted by two terms related by the copula (hence the
name for these logicians: (“terminists”), e.g. “every person is
one with a father”. (Priest, 2016, 68, italics original)
In this case the term “everyone person” is related to the term ‘one with a
father’ by the coupla “is”. Terminists typically account for the semantics
of such sentences such as “every person is one with a father” by invoking
various properties of the terms and of their parts. For those terminists such
as Ockham, the signification of a term is just its extension; for example,
the term “penny” signifies pennies. However, Priest points out that another
group of medieval philosophers found Ockham’s position to be untenable.
For Buridan, for example, the concept F is abstracted from Fs
then adopt the convention of letting the sound “penny” signify
the concept penny. So by convention, the sound “penny” ul-
timately signifies pennies via its immediate signification of the
concept. (Priest, 2016, 68)
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The next important term to examine is supposition. The supposition of
a given term is dependent on the sentence where that term appears. The
supposition is what a term refers to and comes in various forms:
1. Impersonal supposition: There are two kinds: simple supposition, for
example in, “Man is a species”, “man” supposits for a universal; and
material supposition, for example in “Man has three letters”, “man”
supposits for a word.
2. Personal supposition: Where the term supposits for what it signifies.
Personal supposition has two subdivisions. When a term supposits
for a particular object, in the same way as a proper name or definite
description might, it was said to have discrete supposition. Otherwise,
the term would have common supposition, and supposited for a bunch
of things.
The next relevant term is ampliation. Verbs or their features may change
the supposition range of the terms in the sentence in which those verbs
occur. For example, consider the sentence “The Pope is walking.” In this
sentence, “The Pope” has discrete supposition and supposits for a particular
man, who exists. However, if we consider the sentence “Plato walked.”
Anyone who is dead (arguably) no longer exists. Hence, there is nothing
for the “Plato” to supposit for. To allow it to supposit, the tense of the
verb “walked” must allow the term “Plato” to supposit not just for the
present objects, but the past objects too. For the medievals, the concept
of ampliation goes further. Take the sentence “The hydra is walking” is
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false, since the subject refers to nothing presently. However, “The three-
legged dog will walk” is true as the future tense of the verb ampliates the
subjects to present and future objects, and the three-legged dog will exist
(and walk) in the future. However, things do not stop here. Constructions
other than tense are able to ampliate. It is possible that France may invade
America next year; however, many other things that we could hope for will
not happen next year. The modal term “may” ampliates “France invading
America” to supposit not only for the present, past, and future things, but
also merely possible things. Other modal terms do the same. 1
1Priest points out that it is also worth noting that we can reverse-ampliate and
thus, we can restrict a range. For example, the sentence “In my pocket” restricts the
supposition of ‘coins’ to only those in my pocket.
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